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ABSTRACT 
 
 The image of the laughing body recurs throughout the long history of modernist literature 
and film, appearing not only in comic and satirical works but also, surprisingly, in works that 
cannot be labeled as comedies at all. These images are often meditations on embodiment in 
which felt experience is juxtaposed with appearance. Analyzing this juxtaposition against the 
backdrop of the decline of the British Empire, this project argues that texts featuring these bodies 
constitute an archive of the ways that bodies are subject to and resist expectations about how 
bodies should look and feel within the emerging networks of nationalisms in the post-colonial 
Anglophone world. From visual poetry to novels that reimagine the satire as “externalist art,” the 
narratives explored in this project use the visual space of the page to dramatize the incongruity 
between felt experience and image, between how it feels to move across the Anglophone world 
and how external expectations are forced upon the bodies that traverse it. Reading the changing 
network of nationalist rhetorics through the materiality of the body, this project recovers non-
canonical modernist narratives to chart the way that narrative indexes nationalist feeling in 
England and Ireland.  
 The laughing body dramatizes the complex relationship between gender identity, sexual 
attraction, the lived experience of the body, and national sentiment. The desire to move past 
restrictive national identities is often presented as a transgressive sexual experience. Laughter 
enacts this transgression as an extra-linguistic eruption, a guttural and gestural interruption that 
manifests as a textual aberration that is itself transgressive of literary convention. Unauthorized 
feeling becomes unauthorized text that might be littered with extra punctuation, present itself as 
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a linguistic Cubist collage, reference the way that its own pages fold over on themselves, or 
contain errant printers’ marks that take on a life of their own.   
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INTRODUCTION: 
The Laughing Body on the Page of the Twentieth Century 
 
The Laughing Body 
Leopold Bloom sits in a decidedly male space. Surrounded by medical students, doctors, and lay 
people, he finds himself meekly urging quiet in the doctors’ lounge of the National Maternity 
Ward while his companions revel in a spirit of “general vacant hilarity” (U. 14.799). Bloom is 
uncomfortable because of what he perceives as a lack of awareness on the part of the medical 
professionals. While the men are very much aware of the sounds of the maternity ward’s 
patients, they seem consistently less concerned with the way that the sound of their voices carries 
into the patients’ ward, willfully ignorant of the ruckus their foolishness is causing. Bloom 
objects most of all to this lack of sensitivity. After Dixon leaves to deliver the baby, the narrator 
of the Burke-pastiche section notes that Bloom, “after his first entry, had been conscious of some 
impudent mocks which he however had borne with as being the fruits of that age upon which it is 
commonly charged that it knows not pity” (14.845–7). He thinks that the medical students and 
company are too callow to empathize with Mrs. Purefoy, deciding that “to those who create 
themselves wits at the cost of feminine delicacy (a habit of mind which he never did hold with) 
to them he would concede neither to bear the name nor to herit [sic] the tradition of a proper 
breeding” (14.865–8). Bloom faults the men for their willingness to enjoy themselves at the cost 
of the comfort of the women whom the hospital serves, but he acknowledges that their youth is 
to blame for their indiscretion.  
 Bloom’s empathy defines the “Oxen of the Sun” episode of Ulysses. It is profound, 
surprising, and markedly gendered. He imagines what it must be like to give birth and is haunted 
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by the memory of the last time his wife, Molly, gave birth and of the son they subsequently lost. 
He sees risk and pain where the other men see, with a heavy dose of professional distance, social 
ill, and comedic fodder. But what is perhaps most striking about this passage is the physicality of 
laughter—and of the refusal of it. As Bloom hears the other men’s riotous laughter alongside the 
sounds of patients in the maternity ward, the two inputs mingle into a distorted, confused 
cacophony that the reader accesses through Bloom’s empathy and anger. Hearing with empathy 
changes the way that Bloom hears laughter. Bloom is, to borrow a phrase from Finnegans Wake, 
“botheared” (FW. 154.23). Near the end of the fable of the Mookse and the Gripes in Finnegans 
Wake, the Gripes tells the Mookse that he is going deaf: “ofter thousand yores, . . . be the goat of 
MacHammud’s, yours may be still, O Mookse, more botheared” (156.21–3). The Gripes warns 
the Mookse that after a thousand years of refusing to listen to reason his ears will eventually stop 
working altogether. He will become bothered in both the sense of being grumpy/overwhelmed 
and in the older meaning of the word as deafened or bewildered by noise.1 
In changing bothered to botheared, Joyce suggests that being bewildered by noise 
enables a different mode of hearing, even as it seems to foreclose ordinary, comfortable hearing. 
Being bothered by something may lead to becoming botheared to it as well. Laughter, we are 
reminded, is often uncomfortable, and its surprisingly riotous arrival upon our bodies can make 
us newly aware of the way that our bodies process their environments. Though the cognitive 
                                                
1 The OED lists the etymology for “bothered” as unknown, noting only that “the earliest 
instances occur in the writings of Irishmen (T. Sheridan, Swift, Sterne), and the word has long 
formed part of the vocabulary of the comic Irishman of fiction and the stage. This suggests an 
Anglo-Irish origin; but no suitable etymon has been found in Irish.” It does, however, list the 
closest possible Irish relatives—among them, bódhar (deaf) and bódhairim (I deafen). Despite 
the fact that the OED states that there is not sufficient evidence to etymologically link bódhar 
with bother, the context suggests that Joyce uses “botheared” to suggest both being 
bewildered/overcome with noise and (perhaps in the process) being deafened. 
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dissonance Bloom experiences overwhelms him, it also enables him to become botheared in the 
sense of being open to the voices excluded by the selective hearing of the other men in the 
hospital. He hears both the other men’s callousness and the women ignored by that callousness, 
while acknowledging that their inadvertent inconsideration comes from their youth. And in 
becoming botheared, he becomes open to a way understanding the body as subject and resistant 
to gendered narratives.  
 Becoming botheared involves learning to hear laughter as a kind of physical assault, as 
sheer noise. This fact is underscored by the way that the “Oxen of the Sun” episode devolves into 
undifferentiated noise after the departure of Bloom and his gendered empathy.2 This way of 
hearing laughter is surprisingly different from the way that we normally think of the function of 
laughter in literature. Laughter is often thought of as a response to something, as somehow 
ancillary to the work of comedy, which is itself thought of as having content. Comedy, satire, 
parody—they are signs; they say something about the world. By laughing we acknowledge the 
existence of those signs. In laughing we say that there is a something there, albeit a something 
that we may have to revisit in order to understand its meaning fully. But for Bloom, the non-
signifying guttural explosion of laughter is itself significant, precisely in the way that it interrupts 
understanding. Laughter is just noise, loud, obnoxious, and disturbing. And learning to hear it as 
such is revelatory about the way we think about the bodies that produce those disruptive noises.  
 Anca Parvulescu has described the disruptive function of laughter in modernist narratives 
as something that makes audible something that is invisible. She describes the way that Ralph 
Ellison frames his work in terms of laughing precursors like jazz trumpeter Louis Armstrong: 
                                                
2 For an expanded version of this argument, see my essay, “‘With a glance of motherwit 
helping’: Empathy and Laughter in ‘Oxen of the Sun’” (Joyce Studies Annual 2014, pp. 143-
163).  
  4 
 “Ellison’s ‘strength’ comes from a very specific sound he hears in Armstrong’s laughter. In 
Armstrong’s wake, Ellison’s genius is to have proposed that if the Invisible Man is not seen, he 
is heard. We hear what we cannot see; we hear the laugh of the invisible man” (71). Laughter 
speaks where language cannot. It makes audible bodies that are otherwise invisible. It makes us 
aware of relationships between bodies and social spaces that are often unspoken. Laughter has 
the potential to make the reader palpably aware of the way that sound of loud, laughing men may 
assault the ears of a mother in labor in the room next door.  
 In Ulysses laughter-as-noise serves to short-circuit the relationship between reader and 
text, inviting the reader to laugh alongside the men in the maternity ward while reminding them 
that that laughter is ethically compromised. Laughter has a similar function in many modernist 
narratives, where, as Laura Salisbury notes regarding Samuel Beckett, “the joke or the comic 
moment always risks the possibility of misrecognition, of dissolving back into unmarked 
incongruity—an incongruity that is pre-comic although also comedy’s very possibility.” “Instead 
of representing moments that mask the instability immanent within their construction,” she 
argues, “Beckett’s comedy seems to advertise failure and uncertainty” (21). Modernist laughter, 
such as it exists, is always dissolving into the conditions that produced it. The comic moment 
rises above the absurd incongruity that gave birth to it, only to revert back into its prenatal 
origins and become surprisingly disturbing as a result.  
Salisbury is not alone in her assessment of modernist laughter as somehow failing. 
Parvulescu observes that many modernist writers were more fascinated by the mechanism of 
laughter than they were interested in actually provoking laughter in their audiences. Discussing 
Velimir Khlebnikov’s 1909 poem, “Incantation by Laughter,” she notes that his “poem may 
draw a few laughs from its reader, but it is not necessarily funny. Khlebnikov is interested in 
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laughter, which he locates in its sound; the laughing subject, the laugher; and a possible 
collective formed around laughter, a laughterhood” (3). Michael North has made similar claims 
about modernism’s fascination with mechanization: “If there is something inherently funny in 
mechanical reproduction, then it is also possible that modernity itself is governed by a comic 
rhythm, even when it is not particularly amusing” (Machine-Age Comedy 5). Audiences may 
laugh when Charlie Chaplin’s Little Tramp gleefully becomes part of the factory machinery in 
Modern Times, but the gag is funny because the logic of modernization itself is, in Beckett’s 
words, “the laugh that laughs […] at that which is unhappy” (Watt 207). Laughter in modernist 
objects exists to draw attention to things normally entirely incongruous to laughter itself. In some 
cases, laughter does not signify enjoyment, but rather creates a collective around the disruptive 
nature of sheer noise. In others, laughter is not spontaneous but instead mechanical and rote, 
indexing the processes of mechanization upon the laugher’s body.  
 
Figure 1: The Little Tramp happy in his cogs and wheels 
North, Parvulescu, and Salisbury each describe laughter in terms of its gestural form. It is 
sputtering, coughing, or gagging. An explosive act of sonic protest. A repetitive motion that 
inscribes social forces onto the body. Gesture, in each of these readings, signifies something 
about the way that the laughing body occupies or responds to its world. When the body becomes 
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a sign it makes legible something that ordinarily seems to be beyond language. Characters are 
unable to speak, and so their laughing bodies literally gag on the words that they are unable to 
expel. Or characters may be able to speak most of the time, but are not able to speak openly 
about things like racism or working conditions, their bodies erupting in laughter that marks the 
unnamable absurdity to which they are daily subjected. And other characters may lack the 
language to describe the emergent mechanization that dictates their every movement, and so their 
bodies mutely register the forces in which they participate. As gesture, laughter speaks where 
language cannot.3  
Existing scholarship thus describes laughter in modernism as something that signifies, 
albeit in interesting ways, the familiar hallmarks of modernist social critique. It literally 
embodies an aesthetics of failure, revolution, or mechanization. This emphasis on laughter’s 
content, however, risks overlooking the more foundational question of how the body becomes a 
gestural approximation of language in the first place. How does the body come to replace 
language in laughter? What can it express that language cannot? And why would a poet or 
novelist, who works in language, use gesture at all? The question of how writers translate or 
transcribe gesture into language is foundational to understanding how modernist laughter works 
and why it is so important to the writing practice so many modernist authors. If language is 
                                                
3 Studies of modernist comedy often emphasize the capacity of mirthless laughter to create 
communities around shared affect, particularly when that affect is unpleasant or revolting. James 
F. English’s Comic Transactions: Literature, Humor, and the Politics of Community in 
Twentieth-Century Britain (Cornell UP, 1994) represents one example of this approach, using the 
social practice of joke-telling to develop a theory of comic writing as communal practice. 
Writing about the decidedly non-comic genre of Victorian satire, Aaron Matz represents a 
different approach that emphasizes the capacity of satirical form to function as a representational 
mode that “promises to reveal something essential about the human” through vicious attention to 
things like complexion (17). See Aaron Matz, Satire in an Age of Realism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2010). Bruce Michaelson’s Literary Wit (Massachusetts UP, 2000) is another 
example of a similar approach that emphasizes linguistic play that is not always humorous.  
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limited in its capacity to describe the kinds of things that bodies experience and express, then 
how would a writer go about making these extra-linguistic felt experiences manifest on the page? 
Laughter, for many modernist poets and novelists, provides a way of bringing sensation onto the 
space of the page.  
Modernism is often concerned with limit cases, with artists and writers attempting to find 
the point at which the restraints of a particular medium or form begin to break. For writers, the 
inadequacy of language is a particularly strong obsession. Thomas Hardy lamented the way that 
poetic language seemed inadequate to the task of accounting for the loss of community he 
foresaw in the nascent twentieth-century: “The tangled bine-stems scored the sky / Like strings 
of broken lyres, / And all mankind that haunted nigh / Had sought their household fires” (“The 
Darkling Thrush” 5-8). The Coleridgean aspiration to become an Eolian harp or lyre is here 
deflated, as Hardy looks out onto the coming century and asks how to make music on 
instruments with broken strings. In the coming century, many writers would share Hardy’s 
anxiety about the inadequacy of literary language to describe the changing national and colonial 
landscape. For these writers, language’s apparent inadequacy is itself a subject for exploration.  
If modernist laughter is often about the gestural expression of the body in language, then 
what form does that language take? In other words, how does a body become a language on the 
page? Modernism’s Laughing Bodies catalogues the way that poets and novelists, many of whom 
were trained in the visual arts or were in conversation with designers and painters, borrowed 
from the language of the visual arts and graphic design to enact laughter as a gesture on the page 
itself. Not content with mere description, these authors used white space, typography, visual 
metaphor, collage, and other visual strategies to create an almost comic incongruity of language 
as meaning and writing as materiality.  
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By mapping the ways that laughter erupts onto the page of twentieth-century literature, 
this project argues that the materiality of the page provides authors with a way of exploring the 
materiality of the body. The visual texts analyzed here create textual spaces for bodies to speak 
where linguistic expression cannot. Sensation is paramount in these new textual spaces. Readers 
are invited to participate in the vicarious reconstruction of feeling unlicensed by national or 
gendered discourse. Characters’ bodies appear as textual abstractions that mimic the kinds of 
violence carried out by the state. Through laughter depicted as visual language, the space of the 
body intersects with the space of the page. To understand modernist laughter, then, it is first 
important to understand what is meant by spatial writing during the modernist period.      
 
Literature Review and Methodology 
Going back as far as Ezra Pound’s publication of Ernest Fenollosa’s The Chinese Written 
Character as a Medium for Poetry in 1919, visual poetics has been foundational to the narrative 
created by scholars and critics to describe the work of modernist poetry. Joseph Frank, perhaps 
more than any other early modernist scholar, is responsible for the way that Pound’s thinking on 
imagistic writing has been used to define literary modernism in terms of its emphasis on visual 
space in narrative, what Frank termed “spatial form.” Authors like Eliot and Joyce inverted 
classical literary conventions, he argued. Conventionally, the logic of painting was spatial and 
the logic of writing was temporal: 
Form in the plastic arts, according to [Gotthold Ephraim] Lessing, is necessarily 
spatial, because the visible aspect of objects can best be presented juxtaposed in 
an instant of time. Literature, on the other hand, makes use of language, 
composed of a succession of words preceding through time; and it follows that 
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literary form, to harmonize with the essential quality of its medium, must be 
based primarily on some form of narrative sequence. (223) 
Language propels the reader through time, while painting allows the spectator to experience a 
scene as a synchronous visual whole. This convention does not apply to modernist poetry, 
however, where the reader experiences the temporal progression of language as disjunction and 
contradiction.  
If, as Pound argued, an image in modern poetry is not defined as “pictoral reproduction” 
but instead as the “unification of disparate ideas and emotions into a complex presented spatially 
in an instant of time” (226) then modern poetry “asks its readers to suspend the process of 
individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended 
as a unity” (230). Modernist poetry asks the reader to collect obscure references while reading, 
delaying the satisfaction of understanding until the whole poem can be reassembled by the reader 
as a collage of allusions and references. Something similar happens in modernist fiction, he 
argues, where the reader sees the novel as a collage-like synchronous visual whole:  
In other words, all the factual background—so conveniently summarized for the 
reader in an ordinary novel—must be reconstructed from fragments, sometimes a 
hundred pages apart, scattered throughout the book. As a result, the reader is 
forced to read Ulysses in exactly the same manner as he reads modern poetry—
continually fitting fragments together and keeping allusions in mind until, by 
reflexive reference, he can link them to their complements. (234) 
Ulysses gives the reader an impression of Dublin in 1904 by asking him to accumulate fragments 
and delaying the moment when those pieces fit together into an image of the Dublin of Joyce’s 
youth.  
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 Exuberant in his excitement for the then very contemporary modernist scene, Frank’s 
analysis overplays his hand slightly. One might argue that all poetry asks its reader to delay the 
satisfaction of understanding until all the pieces are in place. Moreover, Ulysses’s obsessive 
reconstruction of historical detail was one of its most conventional techniques, echoing realist 
strategies that extend to the earliest examples of the novel. Despite these limitations, Frank’s 
analysis remains useful as an apt reminder that there is something remarkably spatial about 
literary form in the first half of the twentieth-century. Joyce plays with visual arrangement 
frequently in Ulysses, with the “Aeolus” episode mimicking newspaper headlines, the “Oxen of 
the Sun” episode functioning as a visual and stylistic pastiche of academic anthologies of English 
literature, and the “Circe” episode flirting with play-text form, to name only a few examples. As 
the case of Ulysses suggests, visual space and geographical/lived space are undoubtedly linked 
for many modernist writers.  
 Frank’s theoretical model is the foundation upon which more recent scholarship 
concerning spatial writing is laid. There are three branches of that scholarship that are 
particularly significant to this project. The first branch (Thacker, Berman, Hart, Hegglund) 
participates in the larger disciplinary turn to geographical and geopolitical concerns, 
transforming Frank’s concept of spatial form into geopolitical form. The second branch (Mayer, 
Bohn, Drucker) approaches visual poetry from a visual and material perspective, borrowing 
methodologies from material culture studies, art history, and visual studies. The third branch 
(affect theory, Garrington) is less concerned with the question of literary form and more 
interested in the way that language approximates sensation, where sensation is taken to mean the 
relationship between a body and its immediate environment.  
  11 
 Scholars like Andrew Thacker, Jessica Berman, Matt Hart, and Jon Hegglund have 
demonstrated that the language of modernism itself implies a geographical, if not geopolitical, 
aesthetic. As Andrew Thacker has suggested, “the spaces of modernity alter and transform the 
literary space of early twentieth-century writing; while the peculiar spatial stories told in the 
literary texts of modernism shape the ways in which we view and understand modernity itself” 
(31). Jessica Berman argues that modernist narrative forms often enact a “performance of 
[cosmopolitan] affiliation already on the brink of dispersal” (27). Narrative structure dramatizes 
a desire for cosmopolitan connection that is already disappearing as soon as it is desired. Matt 
Hart has argued that the creation of synthetic dialects by modernist poets provided a form of 
national feeling where no nation existed.4 Jon Hegglund argues that many modernist novels 
“work like maps. They pull back from the local, particular, and immediate, often in disconcerting 
or self-conscious ways, to a cartographic overview that places the narrative scene in a new, 
disjunctive context” (8). Though the subject of each of these studies is quite different, they each 
document the way that spatial writing dramatizes the often vertiginous sensation of feeling out of 
place in the new, geopolitically fractured twentieth-century.  
 A similar kind of vertigo is often experienced by the reader who encounters literary 
objects that play with the spatial arrangement of text. Much of the impactful research on visual 
poetry and fiction was conducted during the 1980s and 1990s, when scholars like Willard Bohn 
and Johanna Drucker began to treat visual poems more like paintings or design pieces than 
linguistic objects. These objects often produced what art historian Stephan Oetterman calls “see-
sickness” (11), a kind of vertigo that challenges the viewer’s understanding of his relationship to 
his environment. This vertigo gives the reader a radical form of interpretive freedom by allowing 
                                                
4 See Hart, Nations of Nothing but Poetry.  
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the eye to consume the poem in whatever order strikes its fancy. Peter Mayer challenged Frank’s 
definition of image by arguing that “the visual in a text could be described as some degree of 
semantic appropriateness, nonarbitrariness, motivation, figurative, mimetic, or even ‘abstract’ 
quality in the presentation or layout.”5 Spatial writing does not present an image to the reader, 
but rather invites the reader to read layout as itself signifying.  
 The vertiginous sensations provoked in readers by these texts are difficult to describe 
because they occur when the normally neutral elements of printed text become themselves 
significant. Abbie Garrington’s recent work on the aesthetics of touch approaches this difficulty 
from another angle. “Human skin,” she argues, is “a kind of chiasm writ large—a medium of 
sense experience that at once separates the self from the surrounding world and facilitates the 
perception of that world, both as existent, and as distinct from the self, further reiterating the skin 
boundary at the very moment of realising its limits” (29). Skin here is described as possessing 
poetic form. It is a chiasmus that we embody, as both boundary and membrane. Our way of 
being in the world—the way that our skin negotiates our relationship to lived space—is itself a 
poetic act in Garrington’s work. Though Garrington’s theory of touch shares an affinity with 
affect theory and other recent forays into the aesthetics of sensation, Garrington’s work is 
included in this history of modernist scholarship surrounding spatial writing because of its 
                                                
5 Mayer, “Some Remarks Concerning the Classification of the Visual in Literature,” 
Dada/Surrealism 12 (1983): 5-13. 5. Mayer’s article provides a thorough introduction to the 
range of techniques employed in visual literatures. Many of his terms have become standard in 
the field and are employed in this project. This article was part of special issue of 
Dada/Surrealism on visual poetry that contains numerous other explorations of the role played 
by typographical experimentation in the Dada and Surrealist movements. For more on visual 
poetry, see Willard Bohn, The Aesthetics of Visual Poetry: 1914 – 1928 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1986) and Johanna Drucker, The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art 
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 1994). Visual poetry will be discussed in more detail in Chapter One.  
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treatment of gesture as a kind of poetic act.6 Gesture speaks because of the way that it alters the 
relationship between skin and world.  
 The scholarship surrounding spatial writing provides a number of foundational concepts 
for this project. Spatial writing during the modernist period is often concerned with the 
relationship between bodies and their environments. Environment here refers equally to local and 
personal spaces like bodies and homes and to more abstract categories like nation, colony, or 
cosmopolitan community. These environments may be shared or may seem unique, but they are 
always felt. Sensation is a fundamental aspect of the way that readership and viewerships 
experience spatial writing, which in turn is often itself concerned with recreating or otherwise 
enacting the experience of particular sensations that seem to escape conventional literary 
description.  
 Despite occasional references to gesture or movement, scholarship surrounding spatial 
writing has yet to develop a theory of the seemingly paradoxical intersection of movement and 
language that frequently occurs in spatial writing. Laughter—and, particularly, the laughing 
body—provides a way of theorizing the intersection of movement and language because 
modernist writers often depict the laughing body on the page as a kind of interruption of 
language’s ordinary communicative function. Laughter is vocal but not linguistic, and the 
laughing body finds its way onto the page through extra-linguistic interruptions in the text. 
Visual poetry is rarely funny, and yet the image of the laughing body provides many visual 
writers with a mechanism for exploring the ways that bodies might speak beyond language.  
                                                
6 See, for example, Sianne Ngai’s Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2012).  
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 This project combines a methodological emphasis on the visual materiality of the page 
with an emphasis on the materiality of sensation. This methodological approach is necessary 
because each of the writers discussed in this project are in conversation with the visual and 
design arts. Hope Mirrlees, with the help of novice printer Virginia Woolf, is typographically 
experimental. Wyndham Lewis thinks of his writing as an extension of his painting practice. 
Elizabeth Bowen uses bookbinding and interior design thinking to organize her characters’ 
movements. James Joyce elevates a series of editorial marks into a system of character images, 
combining them ultimately with abstractions that represent the intimate spaces of his characters’ 
bodies. Just as Willard Bohn and Johanna Drucker turned to art history to relocate visual poetry 
as visual art, this project aims to describe modernist laughter as a visual practice.  
 Walter Benjamin provides an important model for combining visual materiality with 
sensation when studying the laughing body.7 In a brief yet frequently cited essay, Benjamin 
argued that Charlie Chaplin’s peculiar comic appeal was in part a result of the way that “the 
human being is integrated in the film image by way of his gestures” (94). The rapid succession of 
discontinuous images in film allows the audience to experience the actor’s movements as stinted 
or halting, an effect that Chaplin manipulated to great effect: “Whether it is his walk, the way he 
handles his cane, or the way he raises his hat—always the same jerky sequence of tiny 
                                                
7 Many studies of modernist comedy begin with Henri Bergson or Sigmund Freud instead of 
Benjamin. Bergson, in particular, provides an early example of the sensational/gestural approach 
to laughter in his description of inelasticity. He argues that in many, for him contemporary, texts, 
one finds mechanical inelasticity “just where one would expect to find the wide awake 
adaptability and the living pliableness of a human being” (5). His concern, however, is with 
images that provoke laughter and the surprising ways that inelasticity creates laughter and is in 
turn replicated on the laughing body. See Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of 
the Comic, 1900, trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell (London: Macmillan, 1911), 
Sigmund Freud, The Joke and its Relationship to the Unconscious, 1905, trans. Joyce Crick 
(New York: Penguin, 2002), and Freud, “Humor,” The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 
Jan. 1928 (9.1): 1-6. 
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movements applies the law of the cinematic image sequence to human motorial functions. Now, 
what is it about this behavior that is distinctly comic?” (ibid). Chaplin’s vaudeville slapstick is 
amplified by the way that early film technology breaks the body into composite images stuttering 
their way across the screen. Benjamin curiously emphasizes “human motorial functions” and 
“the human being.” The act of filming Chaplin’s body seems to transform it into something 
uncannily mechanical. Motor functions, which help us navigate the world, become evidence of a 
human motor, stripping Chaplin’s body of its agency in the process. The primary functions that 
gave him a way of orienting his body to the world now seem to betray him as a kind of 
automaton. Benjamin’s concluding question is poignant. Why is that transformation funny at all?  
 Benjamin did not answer this question. His analysis is brief indeed, encompassing only a 
half-page. Michael North’s Machine-Age Comedy is in many respects an attempt to pick up 
where Benjamin left off. “If there is something inherently funny in mechanical reproduction,” 
North argues, “then it is also possible that modernity itself is governed by a comic rhythm, even 
when it is not particularly amusing” (5). North is interested in the question of why something so 
apparently disturbing seems to provoke laughter so frequently. Ultimately, he suggests that 
laughter taps into an anxiety about repetition, novelty, and failed promise of social change in an 
era that is characterized by innovations that seem to increase rather than decrease suffering.8  
                                                
8 North argues that “reproduction seems to separate an original and its copies, as modern time 
seems to come apart along the line between novelty and repetition. The assembly-line routine, 
repeated into giddiness, represents the reversibility of these categories, as repetition builds up 
into something completely different, and each instance of the same shock effects the same 
surprise, or an even greater one. What the assembly-line routine represents is the paradox of 
perpetual modernity, of the new over and over again, and though it has become relatively easy to 
disdain as false a novelty that keeps on coming, day after day, modern comedy exists to maintain 
that the new is still new” (199-200).  
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 There is an alternate way of understanding Benjamin’s question, as confused 
exasperation more than genuine interest. Modernism’s Laughing Bodies begins with this 
interpretation of Benjamin’s analysis. The question is not really why we find Chaplin funny, but 
rather the repeatability of the mechanism that renders his body into an automaton. A similar 
relationship exists between body and text in many modernist comedies, as authors attempt to 
represent the body’s discontinuous movements within and outside of national spaces via 
manipulations of textual space. In visual depictions of laughing bodies we find a kind of 
amplification, translation, or transcription of the body into a new medium. This project is an 
attempt to understand the nature and impact of that transcription.   
 
Chapter Overview 
 The image of the laughing body recurs throughout the long history of modernist literature 
and film, appearing not only in comic and satirical works but also, surprisingly, in works that 
cannot be labeled as comedies at all. These images are often meditations on embodiment in 
which felt experience is juxtaposed with appearance. Analyzing this juxtaposition against the 
backdrop of the decline of the British Empire, my project argues that texts featuring these bodies 
constitute an archive of the ways that bodies are subject to and resist expectations about how 
bodies should look and feel within the emerging networks of nationalisms in the post-colonial 
Anglophone world. From visual poetry to novels that reimagine the satire as “externalist art,” the 
narratives explored in this project use the visual space of the page to dramatize the incongruity 
between felt experience and image, between how it feels to move across the Anglophone world 
and how external expectations are forced upon the bodies that traverse it. Reading the changing 
network of nationalist rhetorics through the materiality of the body, this project recovers non-
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canonical modernist narratives to chart the way that narrative indexes nationalist feeling in 
England and Ireland.  
 The laughing body dramatizes the complex relationship between gender identity, sexual 
attraction, the lived experience of the body, and national sentiment. The desire to move past 
restrictive national identities is often presented as a transgressive sexual experience. Laughter 
enacts this transgression as an extra-linguistic eruption, a guttural and gestural interruption that 
manifests as a textual aberration that is itself transgressive of literary convention. Unauthorized 
feeling becomes unauthorized text that might be littered with extra punctuation, present itself as 
a linguistic Cubist collage, reference the way that its own pages fold over on themselves, or 
contain errant printers’ marks that take on a life of their own.  
Chapter One examines Hope Mirrlees’s Paris, a poem from the previously unexplored 
perspective of primitivism. An interrogation of the poem’s mimicking of primitivist rhetoric 
reveals that Paris pits the naïve primitivism of the narrator against the ethical skepticism of the 
implied author. What results is a poem that seems to question its own aesthetic strategies, as the 
English narrator’s exploration of “primitive” embodiment and visual space is juxtaposed with the 
bodies of black musicians that resist being made into abstract “primitive” figures on the 
speaker’s page. I argue that the reader is invited to negotiate this readerly dilemma through the 
poem’s comic sensibility, which ultimately fails: the speaker’s ecstatic visions never fully deliver 
on their comedic promise and instead serve to create an interpretive opportunity for the reader to 
look unflinchingly at the ethical compromises of a primitivist modernism. 
Chapter Two continues this analysis of the gendered body by exploring Wyndham 
Lewis’s externalist satire as a colonial fantasy of embodiment. I chart the development of this 
new mode of satire in terms of the way that Lewis describes his characters’ bodies, beginning 
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with the accounts of laughing bodies being dismembered in The Childermass (1928) and 
continuing with the description of sexual violence in Tarr (1918). Reframed in terms of 
sensation, embodiment, and gesture, Lewis’s externalist satires are described as works in which 
the body is a representational space upon which conflicting markers of national identity are 
scored. A mirthless, menacing laughter is the index of that conflict, which is ultimately 
unresolved and intimately connected with the cultivation of feelings of readerly disgust.  
During the 1930s, these questions about embodiment, gender, and colonial affect are 
increasingly dramatized as domestic melodrama in middlebrow fiction. Chapter Three analyzes 
Elizabeth Bowen’s To the North (1932) as an example of this trend. Building upon recent 
revaluations of middlebrow modernism as genre parody, I argue that Bowen occupies a space 
between melodrama and modernism. What emerges from that space is a visual comic practice 
that uses the kind of satire employed by Lewis in order to imagine a comic style that is altogether 
more empathetic. To the North depicts laughing bodies along a sliding scale of agility, with 
“agile wit” metonymically representing the possibility of moving beyond national boundaries 
offered to women by emerging professional occupations.  
Chapter Four brings all of the questions by the previous chapters together in a discussion 
of the space of the gendered body in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939). In the 
“Nightlessons” chapter of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, the reader finds the Porter children 
hard at homework in the hours before bedtime. One child, befuddled by Euclid’s Elements, turns 
to his twin for help. His brother lightens the lesson by drawing a figure that both demonstrates 
Euclid’s first proof and traces the outline of their mother’s sexual body. Like the novel’s famed 
“sigla” (non-linguistic characters), this figure straddles the line between illustration and 
language, a printed character that represents the mother’s body through playful visual 
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iconography. Joyce invites his readers to see language through this comical lens, approaching his 
experimental text with what one twin calls the “aha hahah” (FW 293.29). I argue that Finnegans 
Wake creates a language in which the body of a fictional character becomes a written character 
on the page that is partway between image and sign, that the Wake’s haptic language uses humor 
to represent the body as both extended in space and in motion.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
The Holopsychosis of Hope Mirrlees: Paris, a poem and the Poetics of “Primitive” 
Embodiment 
 
Hope Mirrlees’s long-forgotten Paris, a poem is a meditation on the relationship between 
bodies, place, and language. It recounts the increasingly bizarre journey taken by an unnamed 
speaker through the metro stations and streets of postwar Paris and is in large part a search for a 
language to describe her fantastic encounters. Borrowing the concept of holophrasis from her 
partner, the classicist Jane Harrison, Mirrlees frames the poem as a search for a “primitive” 
language of embodiment.1 As the city is remade into a ludic fantasy space around her, the 
speaker finds herself surrounded by buildings and bodies that seem curiously malleable to her 
surreal visions. Everything appears liquid and insubstantial, as if the whole of Paris is melting 
around her in a manner that she describes as “plastic.” Within this ethereal environment, 
however, the other bodies that the speaker encounters seem to resist her attempts to remake 
them, becoming syncopating marks on a page whose movements elide her control. Two 
narratives unfold in this poem. One is the familiar modernist narrative of a European (English) 
narrator searching for a new language to describe the experience of moving through a city that 
has been irrevocably changed by the Great War. The other is the more surprising narrative of 
non-European bodies that do not speak and, in their silence, seem to resist the narrator’s attempts 
to recast Paris and its occupants as “primitive.” 
                                                
1 Michael Bell advocates for an understanding of primitive “within implicit quotation marks” in 
order to signal that “no life condition can be primitive in itself” (353). To acknowledge that 
“‘primitivism’ denotes an Occidental construction, a set of representations where ‘reality’ is 
purely Western,” I place primitive within quotation marks throughout this essay (Barkan and 
Bush 2). 
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The juxtaposition of these competing narratives of “primitive” modernism creates a 
readerly interpretive dilemma. Though an interrogation of the poem’s primitivist rhetoric, this 
chapter argues that Mirrlees imagines Paris as a textual space in which readers can negotiate the 
politics and ethics of a modernist aesthetics of primitive embodiment. Faced with a poem that 
pits the naïve primitivism of the narrator against the ethical skepticism of the implied author, 
Mirrlees’s readers encounter a modernist poem that questions the political implications of its 
own aesthetic strategies. In analyzing Mirrlees’s engagement with primitivism I further develop 
John Connor’s claim that, “though it mimics the hermetic idiom of international Modernism, 
Paris inhabits this language only to denounce it, to describe a politics more participatory and 
inclusive” (4). Ultimately, I argue that what is at stake in Mirrlees’s pastiche of primitivist 
rhetoric is the way that it creates a readerly textual space. Paris invites the reader to imagine the 
space of the page as a version of the city, a space both neutral (outside of the control of an 
authorial voice) and contradictory (defined by competition between the city’s many “voices”). 
Mirrlees makes space for a more participatory and inclusive politics by inviting the reader to 
resist her speaker’s politics, to participate in the poem by negotiating the political implications of 
its aesthetic strategies.  
 Primitivist rhetoric is foundational to the way that Paris’s speaker conceives of 
embodiment and space. The ethnolinguistic concept holophrasis, alluded to in the poem’s 
opening line, has long been a starting point for scholarly reflections on Paris. Previous studies 
have overlooked, however, the specific significance of holophrasis as a primitivist theory of 
language and embodiment.2 For Jane Harrison, holophrasis names a stage in the evolution of 
                                                
2 Cyrena Pondrom hints at a connection between holophrasis and primitivism when she suggests 
that whereas “[T.S.] Eliot laments the loss of the [primitive] communal concept and Mirrlees 
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language in which speakers have not yet constituted themselves as speaking subjects and so 
cannot differentiate themselves from their environment. It is a theory of language that presents 
the “primitive” body as firmly enmeshed in its world. Though holophrasis is directly alluded to 
by the poem’s narrator, the proliferation of bodies that resist the narrator’s attempts to describe 
them as “primitive” suggests that Paris itself is perhaps better described as a poetic act of 
holopsychosis, Harrison’s term for the way that holophrasis does not permit speakers the ability 
to name themselves as speaking subjects.  
In describing Paris—with its disparate, “syncopating” bodies—as holopsychosis, I want 
to emphasize the way that the poem invites and complicates readerly participation. The reader is 
constantly invited to join the narrator in looking a city undergoing a bizarre, proto-Surrealist 
transformation. The narrator describes this transformation as a series of “little funny things [that 
have been] ceaselessly happening” to her (Mirrlees 338), and yet her descriptions of these 
encounters are often more shocking than humorous as her unconscious mind tries violently and 
grotesquely to remake the city. The first two sections of this chapter analyze the speaker’s 
invocation of holophrasis and the nature of her trance-like visions before the final section returns 
to this question of the poem’s failed humor. The English narrator’s exploration of “primitive” 
embodiment and visual space is uncomfortably contrasted with the bodies of black musicians 
that resist being made into abstract “primitive” figures on the speaker’s page. The speaker’s 
ecstatic visions never fully deliver on their comedic promise and instead serve to create an 
interpretive opportunity for the reader to look unflinchingly at the ethical compromises of a 
primitivist modernism.  
                                                
discovers in its synthesis a Paris ‘full of grace,’ the presentation of the fragmentary shards which 
may be found in the civilization of a modern city is strikingly similar” (6).   
  23 
Long overlooked in critical accounts of primitivism modernisms and geospatial form, 
Paris has been a particularly difficult poem to locate for much of its history. The fifth volume 
printed by Leonard and Virginia Woolf’s fledgling Hogarth Press, the poem was published in 
May of 1920 in a limited print run of 175 copies. Since that original print run, the poem has had 
a troubled publication history, as documented by Julia Briggs and Sandeep Parmar.3 Mirrlees 
stopped writing poetry for years after the publication of Paris and would eventually distance 
herself from the poem, consenting to its republication in the short-lived Virginia Woolf Quarterly 
only with significant revisions to some of its more obscene and iconoclastic elements (Parmar 
xxxiii). For much of the poem’s history, then, it existed only in its first edition and in this heavily 
revised and poorly circulated reprint. As Briggs notes, “Paris fell victim to the limitations of 
print culture,” remaining relatively unknown as a result of its scarcity (“Hope Mirrlees and 
Continental Modernism” 263). Indeed, Mirrlees is perhaps better known as the author of the 
1926 fantasy novel Lud-in-the-Mist or as the companion and possible romantic partner of Jane 
Harrison than as the author of difficult and obscure modernist verse. Her historical obscurity has 
led to a curious fact: until the poem’s reprinting in The Gender of Modernism: New Geographies, 
Complex Intersections in 2007, the readers who encountered Paris, a poem encountered it in its 
original print format, whether in person or through the PDF of the original Hogarth Press 
printing created by McMaster University’s Library.4 Unlike most modernist texts that have been 
reprinted and edited numerous times since their original publication, Paris, a poem has remained 
                                                
3 As J. Howard Woolmer notes, though the copyright page for the Hogarth Press edition lists the 
publication year as 1919, it was printed in 1920. He suggests that 1919 is likely the poem’s 
composition date (31). 
4 See Bonnie Kime Scott, ed., The Gender of Modernism: New Geographies, Complex 
Intersections (Urbana: Illinois UP, 2007). Julia Briggs wrote annotations for this edition of Paris, 
a poem, which have been reprinted in Sandeep Parmar’s edition of Mirrlees’s collected poems. 
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in its original format for much of its history. “The first edition of Paris,” Briggs observes, “is the 
only complete and authoritative text that exists” (268). This essay attempts to continue this print 
tradition by including facsimiles from the original printing whenever possible. 
  
Holophrasis, Holopsychosis, and the Space of the Page  
Paris, a poem opens with a simple declarative statement from the poem’s unnamed 
speaker before erupting in a series of lines that overpower the speaker’s voice:   
I want a holophrase 
 
NORD-SUD 
 
ZIG-ZAG 
LION NOIR 
CACAO BLOOKER 
 
Black-figured vases in Etruscan tombs 
 
RUE DU BLAC (DUBONNET) 
SOLFERINO (DUBONNET) 
CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES 
 
Brekekekekek coax coax we are passing under the Seine 
 
DUBONNET  
(Mirrlees 1-11) 
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Figure 2: The first page of Paris, a poem 
The speaker expresses a desire for a new poetic language, what she terms a “holophrase.” 
Immediately after this stated desire for a new language, however, her voice is lost amongst the 
wash of bits of language and sounds from the city that overtake the page. Texts from posters, 
snippets of conversation, and the creaking of the metro intrude upon the page as the city itself 
seems to speak, blurring the distinction between poetic voice and urban environment as the 
poem, in Briggs’s words, “catches up and quotes the city’s proliferating signs” (“Hope Mirrlees 
and Continental Modernism” 265). Combining capitalization and center-set type, these lines 
name places while drawing attention to the page as a textual space, linking the spaces through 
which the speaker moves with that which her language carves out on the paper. Eight of the 
opening lines are directions, advertisements, or metro stops, each printed in capital letters and 
center-set on the page. “NORD-SUD” names a Parisian metro line, presumably the one the 
speaker is travelling on, and “ZIG-ZAG” suggests an alternate reading of “NORD-SUD” as 
direction (North-South). The next three capitalized phrases are stops along the Nord-Sud line, 
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ending with Dubonnet, where the speaker alights from the train. As directions (nord-sud, zig-
zag) and coordinates on a metro map (Rue de Blac, Solferino, Chambre des Deputes, Dubonnet), 
the opening lines emphasize the way that the reader’s eyes are invited to move around the page, 
darting between uneven lines and pausing for emphasis on capitalized place-names. The allusion 
to Pierre Reverdy’s influential journal of poetry and visual culture, Nord-Sud, suggests a 
dialogue between Mirrlees’s exploration of the space of the page and the exploration of visual 
poetry in the French little magazines. It is significant, however, that the poem’s speaker alights 
from the Nord-Sud metro line, suggesting a similar departure from the Nord-Sud/Reverdy 
tradition of visual poetry. Paris, a poem takes Reverdy’s poetics as a starting point but quickly 
moves into new territory as the space of the page is reconfigured as a “primitive” site.5  
The speaker sees her textual and urban journey as one through an environment that has 
become provocatively “primitive.” The poem begins as a descent into an underworld, as signaled 
by the allusion to the chorus from Aristophanes’s The Frogs: “Brekekekekek coax coax we are 
passing under the Seine” (Briggs, “Commentary” 113). In that underworld, posters that evoke 
images of blackness for advertizing purposes take on new significance as images of the 
“primitive.” Briggs notes that Zig-Zag is a “type of cigarette paper,” Lion Noir “a brand of shoe 
polish,” and Cacao Blooker a “Dutch make of drinking chocolate” (“Commentary” 113). The 
names of these companies “introduce themes of empire and of négritude (blackness)” (ibid). For 
                                                
5 As a magazine that played a central role in the early theoretical development of Cubism, Nord-
Sud explored the connection between visual abstraction and “primitive” iconography. Alighting 
from the Nord-Sud line, then, might also suggest a departure from existing models of primitivist 
modernism. 
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the speaker, traveling on an underground metro line is a descent into an underworld that will, 
upon ascent back to the streets of Paris, transform the city into a fantastically “primitive” space, 
as if moving through a dark, underground space and seeing 
images that evoke colonial fantasies of blackness has 
remade completely her metropolitan experience.6  
The poem’s opening lines evoke the idea of 
primitivism to describe the kind of language that the 
speaker wants her poem to create. Through an allusion to 
Mirrlees’s teacher and companion Jane Harrison, the 
poem’s speaker suggests that whatever this new language 
will look like, it will be “primitive.” In Themis: A Study of 
the Social Origins of Greek Religions (1912), Harrison 
defines holophrasis as a stage in the development of human speech still evident in “savages”: 
“Language, after the purely emotional interjection, began with whole sentences, holophrases, 
utterances of a relation in which subject and object have not yet got their heads above water but 
are submerged in a situation. A holophrase utters a holopsychosis” (472-474). A holophrase does 
not contain nouns and verbs. In Harrison’s words, “it simply expresses a tense relation” that is 
common enough to require a phrase to express it even before language has evolved the set of 
characters and tools to articulate it (474). Harrison explains the phenomenon as follows: 
                                                
6 Briggs argues that the poem’s particular mode of cultural literacy “creates problems for the 
modern reader.” “Visitors to Paris in 1919,” she notes, “could have easily identified the 
advertising slogans, street signs, metro names, landmarks, and newspaper celebrities referred to 
in the poem, but that these are now utterly obscure” (“Hope Mirrlees and Continental 
Modernism” 267). While the specific posters alluded to by Mirrlees are lost to history, I have 
included a poster typical of Blooker Cacao’s style from this period. 
Figure 3: An advertisement for Blooker's Cacao 
  28 
A New Caledonian expressing the fact that some fruit was not high enough for the 
native palate, said not ‘it-not-yet-eatable,’ but ‘we-not-yet-eatable.’ 
 
Egotism could scarcely go further. The thing eaten is regarded as a mere 
appendage to, as in fact part of, the personality of the eater. It is indeed actually 
an essential factor in that activity, that eating or not-eating of which he is 
intensely conscious. (474-475) 
 
For Harrison, the “primitive” speaker lacks the grammatical tools necessary to distinguish 
himself from his environment. Food becomes an extension of his body, something that he does 
not yet know how to separate linguistically and intellectually from his person.  
Language and environment are closely linked in this primitivist theory of language 
development. Harrison understands the act of abstracting oneself from one’s environment to be 
fundamentally linguistic in nature. The speaking subject names her relationship to the objects 
that surround her, constituting herself as an ontological subject through the grammatical 
separation of subject and verb. By contrast, the “savage” is incapable of naming himself as 
distinct from his environment. Paris, a poem’s opening lines invoke this muddling of subject and 
environment and complicate the authority of the speaker’s voice as a result. As Sandeep Parmar 
notes, the speaker’s allusion to Harrison signals that, by the start of the poem the boundaries 
between the speaker’s mind and the outside world have already become permeable: “The 
holophrase predates ‘Parts of Speech,’ which are a means of negotiating boundaries between the 
outside world and the inner consciousness of perception. As language is indeterminate in the 
holophrase, so is the positionality of the speaker” (xl). From its first utterance, the speaker’s 
voice is already indeterminate because it is searching for a way to articulate the experience of 
having the walls between mind and environment break down.  
Though critics often note that Harrison provocatively links subjectivity and language, the 
foundational role that her evolutionary framework plays in the development of Mirrlees’s poetics 
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of visual space is often overlooked. Holophrasis is an evolutionary theory of language that is 
premised on the development of the “modern” out of the “primitive.” Harrison’s conception of 
holophrasis as a stage in the development of modern (Western) language is primitivist insofar as 
it posits an imaginary evolutionary stage in a necessary progression of all language and finds a 
model for that language in the speech in non-Western populations. Harrison sees evidence of this 
earlier evolutionary stage in the speech of even some Westerners as well: “Uneducated and 
impulsive people even to-day [sic] tend to show a certain holophrastic savagery. They not 
unfrequently [sic] plunge into a statement about relations before they tell you who they are 
talking about” (474). For Harrison, these glimmers of civilization’s othered past serve as 
reminders of the advancement from which they retreat. Showing your “holophrastic savagery” is 
only a reminder of just how modern everyone else is. Harrison’s conception of holophrasis is an 
account of modernization, the tendency for “uneducated and impulsive people” to show their 
“holophrastic savagery” serving as an embarrassing reminder of modernity’s not so distant 
“primitive” past. Moreover Harrison’s model implies a modernist politics of space by locating 
the spaces of “primitive” embodiment in the Pacific and those of modern embodiment in 
England. Tierra del Fuego is singled out as exemplary site for this kind of holophrastic language. 
She casts the Pacific Islands as a “primitive” site where still holophrasis still flourishes and 
contrasts it with a Europe that occupies the present, a site where holophrasis is an unfortunate 
slip of the tongue by an impulsive speaker.7 
This relationship between the impulsive European and the “savage” Fuegian is the key to 
understanding the way that Paris engages with the rhetoric of primitivism. By expressing her 
                                                
7 Harrison on the Fuegians: “The Fuegians have a word, or rather holophrase, mamihlapinatapai, 
which means ‘looking-at-each-other,-hoping-that-either-will-offer-to-do-something-which-both-
parties-desire-but-are-unwilling-to-do’” (474). 
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desire for a holophrase, the poem’s speaker seems to suggest an equivalency of some form 
between her experiences and those of Harrison’s “savages.” Like all modernist primitivisms, 
however, such an equivalency is fraught with contradiction. Michael North describes a similar 
contradictory relationship in a 1909 notebook entry in which Gertrude Stein says that she 
“believe[s] in reality as Cézanne or Caliban believe in it” (qtd. 275). As North notes, equating 
Paul Cézanne with Shakespeare’s Caliban highlights the fundamental ambiguity behind the 
modernist invocation of primitivism: “Is [Stein] claiming that Cézanne introduces us to a reality 
as basic as that lived by Caliban, or that Caliban has as unsettling an effect on our notions of 
reality as Cézanne?” (275).  
Greater ambiguity attends these questions with regard to Mirrlees than with regard to 
Stein. Stein’s statement appears in a notebook entry and so presumably represents her personal 
reflections on the question of primitivism. The line “I want a holophrase,” however, appears at 
the beginning of Mirrlees’s poem. This “I” is not necessarily Mirrlees, and the fact that that voice 
claims holophrasis as its mode of speaking means that its authority as a speaking subject is 
already slipping away. From the poem’s opening line, the “I” of Paris is losing its ability to 
recognize itself as an “I.” Even as this speaker seems to lose her voice, however, she claims a 
similarity of some kind between herself and the “primitive.” This fact suggests the foundational 
paradox of Paris, a poem. The speaker wants a language that will articulate her inseparability 
from her environment, perhaps as a way of losing her distinction as a subject or of finding a 
language to describe that already-occurring loss. Yet expressing a desire for such a language 
involves comparing herself with a hypothetical “primitive” speaker by establishing her voice as 
something distinct from the “primitive,” that searches the example of the “primitive” for a model 
for modern experience. What happens when Paris itself becomes a holophrase, when the speaker 
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loses her authorial voice and the poem’s textual space invites utterances from other, unauthorized 
bodies?  
What Harrison terms holopsychosis offers Mirrlees a way of using the space of the page 
to mediate the speaker’s mind and her environment, to enact the blurred relationship between 
them on the page as a material object. The different voices speaking in the poem are signaled 
through typography. The speaker’s voice appears surprisingly infrequently here, the place-
names, poster titles, and snippets of conversation overpowering both her voice and the space of 
the page. From its opening lines, Paris, a poem creates a textual space that is in tension with the 
way that the speaker experiences urban space. In Paris, the city is a poem, though never in quite 
the way that the speaker imagines it to be. Holophrasis—and the holopsychosis that accompanies 
it—affords Mirrlees a language to describe a journey through the city that looks forward to 
similarly embodied reflections on urban life in Mrs. Dalloway and The Waste Land. For Jane 
Harrison, “as civilization advances, the holophrase, overcharged, disintegrates, and, bit by bit, 
object, subject and verb, and the other ‘Parts of Speech’ are abstracted from the stream of warm 
conscious human activity in which they were once submerged” (474). As the speaker plunges her 
language back under that stream of conscious activity, the poem becomes a holophrase in a much 
more radical sense, juxtaposing the city-as-text with the speaker’s words in a textual space 
characterized by contradiction and incongruity.  
 
Plastic Poetry 
From its opening lines, Paris enacts a strangely literal version of Harrison’s metaphor of 
a “primitive” language submerged in water. When the speaker’s voice first merges with that of 
the city, she is riding on a metro car travelling through a tunnel under the Seine. When the 
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speaker emerges from the metro station at the start of the poem she finds a city undergoing 
increasingly bizarre mutations. At first, grotesquely satirical visions flicker in and out of sight, 
hallucinatory visions projected by the speaker’s unconscious mind onto the city. Briggs suggests 
“that the whole poem, flickering between ‘real’ and imagined Paris sights, was generated by [a] 
‘tranced’ moment of gazing out of the window,” observing that this tranced flickering is a proto-
Surrealist form of the “trance states, and the automatic writing they generated, [that would] 
fascinate the Surrealists” (“Commentary” 123).8 The influence of proto-Surrealist writing is 
further suggested by the way that the overflowing Seine begins to submerge the city in 
floodwaters. As Briggs notes, “the poem’s intermittent ‘tranced’ states become rising dreams, 
first knee-deep and then, as the atmosphere grows heavier, waist-deep” (“Modernism’s Lost 
Hope” 87). The flooding Seine becomes the speaker’s unconscious, imparting a dream-like state 
in the city that seems literally to flow out of the speaker’s head. The speaker’s invocation of 
holophrasis at the beginning of the poem, placed before a descent into the underworld, initiates 
the submersion of the speaker’s language under what Harrison would term the warm waters of 
human consciousness. The speaker’s unconscious floods the city, submerging the speaker and 
her environment in an outlandish fantasy space. Paris and its occupants seem curiously malleable 
to the speaker’s projections. Her fantasy of a “primitive” mode of embodiment—the submersion 
of herself and the city under the floodwaters of her unconscious—is attended by a violent 
remaking of the city and its occupants.  
For the speaker, this new urban experience is immersive. Paris changes around her, its 
occupants and dimensions becoming increasingly liquid as she walks. The city, in other words, 
                                                
8 Composed in 1919, Paris was written during a foundational moment for Surrealism. As such, 
Mirrlees’s engagement with the proto-Surrealist ideas is suggestive of but not reducible to the 
systematic Surrealist art generated in the 1920s. 
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begins literally to melt. “Heigh ho!,” she exclaims, “I wade knee-deep in dreams” (Mirrlees 310). 
The speaker constantly invites her readers to look at the melting city. An experience that for the 
speaker is embodied and immersive takes the form, for the reader, of a textual space of visual 
contradiction. The speaker moves through a city that is melting around her. She wades in the 
messy excess of her own dreams as they spill out of her head and onto the streets of Paris. The 
reader looks at pages in which words are scattered in abstract designs and is invited to imagine 
the scenes that those words suggest while navigating the increasingly abstract visual space of the 
poem’s pages. The poem’s title takes on two very different meanings when this difference 
between speakerly and readerly experience is taken into account. For the speaker, Paris as a 
poem is a city transformed by her poetic imagination. Paris is a tactile and visual hallucination, a 
poetic fantasy. For the reader, Paris has become a textual space marked by abstraction, 
discontinuity, and contradiction. Paris is a poem; it is scattered words on a page. The visual, as a 
category of aesthetic experience, marks the difference between the speaker’s desire for a 
holophrase and the speaker’s unintentional creation of a holophrastic poetics of textual 
materiality.  
When she alights from the metro at Place de la Concorde, the speaker finds a city that is 
at first uncomfortably haunted by satirical hallucinations. Visions of the disfigured bodies of 
dead soldiers from the First World War flicker in and out of sight, incongruously draped over 
scenes of a postwar Paris trying to return to the ordinary life of peacetime. The poem’s speaker 
disembarks at Place de la Concorde and begins to walk towards Place de la Carousel, the 
northwest entrance to the Louvre that features the Napoleonic monument, Arc du Triomphe de la 
Carousel. As we follow her through these monumental spaces, the iconography of nationalist 
sacrifice devolves into satirical images of horrifically disfigured bodies. In one hallucination, 
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young boys riding a carousel are transfigured into the dead soldiers that, had the war not ended, 
they may have ultimately become: “Little boys in black overalls whose hands, sticky / with play, 
are like the new furled leaves of / the horse-chestnuts ride round and round on / wooden horses 
till their heads turn” (23-6). For the speaker, the image of young boys turning their heads as they 
ride on the horses of a merry-go-round evokes the unsettling images of young men riding actual 
horses, their heads turned around by broken necks as they fall in battle.  
The location for this hallucination heightens the satirical effect. In these opening lines, 
the speaker is walking from one carousel to another, moving from the amusement ride on which 
the boys play to the Place de la Carousel at the entrance to the Louvre. The Place de la Carousel 
is an open space named for the military dressage, or demonstration, that the children’s carousel 
imitates. The speaker’s hallucination places the bodies of dead soldiers uncomfortably alongside 
monuments to military sacrifice and prowess. Another such juxtaposition occurs as the statues of 
nymphs that line the walkway become strangely erotic: “These nymphs are harmless, / Fear not 
their soft mouths -- / Some Pasteur made the Gauls immune / Against the bite of Nymphs…look” 
(30-3). As Briggs notes, the erotic charge here comes from the fact that “nymphs” suggests 
nymphae—labia minora (“Commentary” 114). They are something sexual whose bite has been 
rendered impotent by an immunization. Their proximity to the boys on the carousel suggests the 
irony of a military leadership concerned for the sexual wellbeing of a group of men who they 
will later send to die in the trenches.  
In her description of the nymph statues, the speaker invites her readers to look. More than 
just drug-fueled visions, these satirical re-imaginings are invitations to see Paris differently. 
Throughout the poem, the city seems to flicker for the speaker, moving between increasingly 
bizarre hallucinations and descriptions of familiar public spaces. And her readers are 
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continuously told to look as well—to see the way that the scenes flicker between the familiar and 
the satirically obscene and grotesque. They are asked, that is to say, to maintain a kind of 
incongruous double-vision. For the speaker, these double-visions are of course felt as well as 
seen. The flickering streets, monuments, buildings, and pedestrians are objects to be engaged 
with, things that can be touched in all of their mutability. This blending of the tactile and the 
visual is further evidenced by the speaker’s tacit claim that her experience is “primitive.” The 
world around her becomes curiously liquid as the distinction between mind and city blurs. The 
speaker’s holophrase—the poem’s accumulation of the city’s signs—is meant to communicate 
this blurring to the reader. Yet Paris-as-holophrase creates a textual space marked by 
contradiction and discontinuity. Instead of the speaker’s felt experience of a city that has become 
confluent to her mind the reader encounters a visual space where the difference between the 
poem’s presumably white speaker and her “primitive” environment is all the more apparent. The 
invitation to look—to share the speaker’s experience—becomes an opportunity to see the 
limitations of the speaker’s desire for a “primitive” modernist language.  
The speaker frequently describes the changing city as “plastic,” a term that is emblematic 
of this difference between felt double-vision and visual contradiction. “Plastic” is first invoked to 
describe a vision immediately after the passage about the nymphs. When, at the end of the 
passage, the speaker asks the readers to look, she invites them to look specifically at a statue of 
Leon Gambetta, “national hero and Minister of War during the German siege of Paris” (Briggs 
114) in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870: 
Gambetta 
A red stud in the button-hole of his frock coat 
The obscene conjugal tutoiment 
Mais c’est logique 
 
The Espirit Français is leaning over him,  
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Whispering 
Secrets 
exquisite significant 
fade  plastic 
(Mirrlees 36-42) 
 
Figure 4: A page from Paris, a poem 
The reader is invited to look at something intimate and obscene here. The personification of 
France as a nation leans over one of the nation’s great military heroes, whispering something in 
his ear. That whisper is both an obscene conjugation (tutoiment being a familiar address, 
suggesting an all too familiar acquaintance between the two figures) and conjugal (a kind of 
sexual penetration). A sexual relationship is further evidenced by the fact that “button-hole” 
(boutonniére) is “slang for anus” (“Commentary” 114). In a comedic inversion of the image of 
French soldiers being immunized against the bite of nymphs, Gambetta is here imagined to be 
engaging in some form of sexual play with—and perhaps be penetrated by—the Spirit of France. 
This verbal and physical penetration is described as “exquisite,” “significant,” “fade,” and 
“plastic.”   
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I want to suggest “plastic” as a term to describe the way that body and language are 
interchangeable in this vision, an interchangeability that is evocative of the speaker’s desire for a 
language that has lost its ability to distinguish between body and environment. “Plastic” appears 
first in the poem at the end of a stanza that eschews the format of the standard poetic line. This 
placement suggests an allusion to Pierre Reverdy’s description of poetry that engages with the 
visual arts as “plastic poetry,” a theory that he developed in Nord-Sud. Kim Grant notes that 
Reverdy “located the mental origins of the Cubist painting in the Cubist painter’s adoption of the 
poet’s traditional means of analogy, ‘the conjunction of two more or less distant realities to 
create a new reality,’ used in the creation of the poetic image” (26).9 Poetic incongruity 
(analogy) creates a new reality in the form of a plastic object (painting). Grant goes on to note 
that the subject of a “poetic” incongruity that could create new realities was instrumental as well 
in André Breton’s writing about the Dadaist “marvelous faculty,” writing that laid the 
groundwork for the development of a Surrealist aesthetics. The marvelous faculty, Breton 
argued, can “place within the reach of our senses abstract figures calling with the same intensity 
at the same relief as the others” (qtd., Grant 55). Dadaist abstractions used incongruity to bring 
new sensual realities into being. Grant observes that Breton often understood aesthetic invention 
as the construction of “a new world that (like contemporary physics) revises the sensible givens 
of time and space” (Grant 34). “Plastic” suggests a new world in which the sensible givens of the 
familiar world have become pliable, like melting wax or flooded ground. Mirrlees’s poem, with 
its tranced visions of a Paris flickering between the real and the surreal, has become plastic in 
this sense of using incongruity to create new sensible givens.  
                                                
9 The Reverdy quote appeared originally in “L’Image,” Nord-Sud, no. 13 (March 1918): n.p. 
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In the case of Paris, however, the new sensible givens created by the incongruous 
flickering of the speaker’s visions are very different for the reader than they are for the speaker. 
For the speaker, the city is plastic in the sense that what was solid (stone) or real (shared reality) 
is becoming airy/imaginary (hallucinatory vision) or idiosyncratic (something that only she sees). 
The city’s buildings become airy and insubstantial as the day progresses: “The Louvre, the Ritz, 
the Palais-Royale, the Hôtel de Ville / Are light and frail” (Mirrlees 313-14). The infrastructure 
of the city seems to melt as her unconscious floods the city. “The Louvre,” she notes, “is melting 
into mist” (265). The statue of Gambetta, like Paris, has become plastic in the sense that it has 
been softened, made pliable to the fancy of her surreal visions. The speaker curiously believes 
that these visions are sometimes shared by the other pedestrians she observes. A snippet of 
conversation—mais c’est logqiue (but it makes sense)—is wrenched from its original context 
and italicized on the page to signal its appropriation. Its new position on the page suggests a 
snickered bit of gossip: of course, you know, it makes sense that Gambetta is up to no good, now 
that you say that. For the reader, however, this snippet of conversation resists integration into the 
speaker’s vision. It remains a bit of conversation by other people who do not share the speaker’s 
state of reverie. If Paris is a holophrase, in other words, the bits of language from the city that 
accumulate on the page retain their agency independent of the speaker’s intentions.  
For the reader, it is the page and not the city that has become plastic, as the reader is 
invited to negotiate the incongruity between the speaker’s words and the city’s interruptions. The 
speaker’s description of her surreal visions creates a textual space very different from the surreal 
space that she encounters in the city. The flickering between ordinary and surreal Paris is 
replaced by the flickering between the speaker’s language and that of the city. Reverdy used 
“plastic” to describe the overlapping of “two more or less distant realities to create a new 
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reality.” In Paris, the new reality created, however, is on the page: Paris as a poem. This new 
textual space is significant because it elides the speaker’s control. As the day progresses, the 
speaker’s visions attempt to remake not only buildings and statues, but also other bodies. The 
overlapping of these bodies with the speaker’s body on the page allows the reader an opportunity 
to resist the suspicious politics of the speaker’s primitivism, particularly when the speaker’s 
fantasy of her own body as “primitive” intersects with her description of black bodies as 
“primitive” abstractions.   
 
Bodies in Obscene Syncopation 
Amidst the melting city, the poem’s culminating and strangest vision highlights the 
problem posed by the city’s other bodies. In this vision, musical notations (crochets and quavers) 
have the heads of black musicians attached to them:  
But behind the ramparts of the Louvre 
Freud has dredged the river and, grinning horribly,  
waves his garbage in a glare of electricity. 
 
Taxis,  
Taxis,  
Taxis,  
 
They moan and yell and squeak  
Like a thousand tom-cats in a rut.  
The whores like lions are seeking their meat from God: 
An English padre tilts with the Moulin Rouge: 
Crochets and quavers have the heads of niggers and 
they writhe in obscene syncopation: 
Toutes les cartes marchent avec une allumette! 
A hundred lenses refracting the Masque of the Seven 
Deadly Sins for American astigmatism: 
“I don’t like the gurls of the night-club—they love women.” 
Toutes les cartes marchent avec une allumette! 
 
DAWN  
(413-31) 
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Figure 5: A page from Paris, a poem 
The hallucination begins with the fairly ordinary image of the heads of black musicians that 
move along with the rhythm of the music they are playing. As they do so, however, their heads 
becomes the note heads on imaginary sheet music, their instruments the stems. The musicians’ 
bodies graph onto the sheet music from which they play, and the resulting bizarre amalgam of 
body and text is transposed to the page of the poem as a writhing embodiment of syncopation. 
The violence of this image should not be ignored. The distinctly American racial slur “niggers” 
accompanies a vision of dismemberment that is both sexual (obscene syncopation) and painful 
(writhe). The “primitive” body here is both sexualized and tortured. For a poem that begins by 
invoking the imagined experience of the “primitive” body, this image is a visceral reminder of 
the bodies that haunt Paris, a poem. The black musicians find themselves literally enmeshed in 
their environment as their bodies attach themselves to the objects that surround them, their 
transformation an uncomfortable enactment of Jane Harrison’s theory of “primitive” 
embodiment. Violently remade as emblems of a “primitive” modernity, they are written into two 
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textual objects: the sheet music in front of them and the page of the poem in which they play a 
part. They have become a kind of living example of Mirrlees’s particularly textual mode of 
holophrasis, as the bodies that are unable to abstract themselves from their environment are 
written into language’s material traces. 
 This vision occurs in the middle of the poem’s culminating ludic fantasy. Night is almost 
over, and the speaker’s dream-waters have reached their highest point. The surrealist excess of 
the speaker’s fantasies are matched by the bawdy scene outside the Moulin Rouge. The vision 
opens with a comically literal version of Freud’s concept of “day residue.” The search for 
meaning under the flooding waters of the Seine is evocative of Harrison’s description of 
holophrasis as a submersion of language under the waters of consciousness. After Freud’s 
dredging, the poem’s language becomes almost fluid as a series of colons push the reader along 
to the next line while withholding the possibility of semantic closure. Light and dark play against 
each other as well, as Freud “waves his garbage in a glare of electricity” produced by the 
garishly lit Moulin Rouge against the backdrop of the breaking dawn.  
Placed between descriptions of darkness/light and submersion/dredging, the image of 
musicians as musical notes is a particularly bizarre abstraction. The musicians’ bodies are 
reduced to simple shapes to which they bear only a slight resemblance and their skin colors 
become the uniform black of ink on a page. This abstraction is an iteration of one of the poem’s 
key images. As “The Louvre [melts] into mist” and becomes “transparent” (265-66) the Eiffel 
Tower becomes “two dimensional, / Etched on thick white paper” (273-74). While looking down 
from a hotel room balcony later on, the speaker images that the people below her have become 
“all black / Flies nibbling the celestial apricot-- / […] They are black and two-dimensional and 
look like / silhouettes of Louis-Philippe citizens” (400-4). The city and its occupants become 
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plastic, both ethereal (transparent, silhouette-like, etched) and strangely solid (the immobility of 
ink on a page). Their bodies have become abstractions in the most basic sense of becoming two-
dimensional drawings. Distance and height simplify the bodies of Parisians walking below into 
shadowed outlines. Their bodies, like those of the transfigured musicians, are “all black.” As the 
city becomes a poem, it becomes black in this sense, a two-dimensional arrangement of ink on 
thick white paper. The Eiffel Tower metonymically represents this metropolitan transformation, 
an allusion to Apollinaire’s unnamed calligramme in which the words are arranged into the shape 
of the Eiffel Tower.  Whereas Apollinaire’s Tower is composed only of words, however, 
Mirrlees’s Paris is filled with bodies that, like the environment through which they move, have 
been rendered into inky shapes. Mirrlees’s Paris-poem is one in which bodies signify as much as, 
if not more than, the architecture and infrastructure through which they move.  
The intersection of body and language in the obscene conjugation of Gambetta and the 
Spirit of France here becomes the abstraction of “primitive” bodies into ink on a page. Both 
visions are described as obscene. Though Gambetta’s obscene conjugation with the Spirit of 
France is presented as perversely sexual, the bodies of the musicians are obscene only insofar as 
they continue to writhe on the page. Their obscenity lies in the way that their bodies resist 
abstraction. They continue to move—syncopate—like bodies even as they are transfigured into 
musical notes. They animate the space of the page, adding a temporal dimension to the textual 
space of the poem. For this reason, the image of musical notes is particularly significant. They 
are printed marks that signify timing. This connection between timing and spatial arrangement is 
further justified by the fact that an actual bar of music appears just a few pages prior to the 
description of the musicians’ bodies.  
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Embodied syncopation is what distinguishes Mirrlees’s visual poetics from the French 
precursors to whom she alludes throughout the poem. Visual poets like Apollinaire often employ 
what Willard Bohn calls “semantic plurality” (71). Apollinaire’s “Lettre-Ocean” (1914), one of 
the archetypal 
examples of visual 
poetry, utilizes a page 
layout that puts the 
reader in a much more 
creative position than 
a traditional stanza-ed 
poem would. The 
reader has to decide in 
what order to read the 
poem’s various parts 
and determine the relationship between those parts. To borrow Johana Drucker’s description, 
such a strategy employs “the capacity of typographic representation to manipulate the semantic 
value of a text through visual means” (95). In other words, poems like Lettre-Ocean manipulate 
the space of the page to increase the semantic possibilities of the poem. Bohn, again: “Words no 
longer are perceived as transparent signs, but assume the shape and destiny of objects” (3). In 
visual poetry, we have not only signs but also the newly reclaimed semantic possibility of shape 
and image.  
 
Figure 6: Lettre-Ocean 
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Visual poets often describe this semantic plurality in terms of simultaneity. Apollinaire 
called his calligrammes simultaneous poems (poèmes simultané). In these poems, the semantic 
plurality of the page recreates the psychological experience of modernity. Things seen on the 
street, snippets of overheard song or conversation, and other bits of metropolitan flotsam float 
along the stream of the poet’s consciousness. This co-mingling of objects and thoughts is evident 
throughout Paris, a poem in the form of the city-text that floats onto the page. Unlike most visual 
poems, however, Paris develops a narrative. A poem like Lettre-Ocean is simultaneous in the 
sense that the reader can read the poem’s composite parts in any order. There is no narrative 
progression; the “time” of the poem is at the reader’s discretion. Paris, however, balances 
psychological simultaneity with the temporal progression of a narrative. As the day progresses 
into night, Paris becomes airy, transparent, and almost immaterial. The reader is invited to “scorn 
the laws of solid geometry” with the speaker and to “Step boldly into the wall of the Salle 
Caillebotte / And on and on…” (Mirrlees 57-59). She invites her readers to step, literally, into 
the wall of Salle Caillebotte, a room in the Musée du Luxembourg that housed impressionist 
paintings (Briggs, “Commentary” 115). She “scorn[s] the laws of solid geometry” by walking 
into a wall that displays paintings that themselves react against the order and clean lines of solid 
geometry. Once she does so, statues, buildings, and other parts of the physical infrastructure of 
Paris seem to melt: “The Louvre is melting into mist” (Mirrlees 265). 
Paris’s transformation does not change the fundamental shape or design of the poem. The 
visual strategies employed in the poem’s final pages are not all that different from those 
employed at the poem’s start. Instead, the city’s transformation draws attention to the page as a 
contradictory space. Mixed in with shaped stanzas that seem to take the form of flowerbeds or 
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buildings are lines that insist upon the poem’s words as inky abstractions of bodies and places.10 
As the last of a series of such abstractions, the transfigured black musicians change the meaning 
of blackness in Paris, a poem from abstraction to a reminder of the way that bodies are situated 
within and inscribed by imperial networks of national belonging. The musicians’ bodies are both 
rooted and abstract. By casting blackness as “primitive,” the poem invites an alternate reading of 
these bodies as, to borrow a phrase from Paul Gilroy, routed as well (34). The description of 
these bodies as “primitive” or rooted/enmeshed in their environments is a reminder of the 
violence of the larger colonial system in which primitivism participates. The political 
implications of primitivism haunt the speaker’s search for an aestheticized language of 
primitivism. As North notes, primitivism often served “as a sign of expatriation” for European 
modernists, a fact that is evident in this example of a British poet using primitivism to develop a 
language of cosmopolitan experience based in embodiment (277). In trying to write other bodies 
into that primitivist language, however, the speaker creates signs that escape her control, bodies 
that, rewritten as “primitive,” register a violent legacy of forced diaspora. The boundaries 
between the speaker’s mind and her environment have broken down. The sole authority of her 
voice has eroded as it has become difficult to distinguish between her utterances and the city’s 
interruptions. And as one voice is replaced with the strained and incongruous clamor of the city, 
the silent bodies that have been disfigured by the speaker’s visions register ways of feeling that 
escape the speaker’s perspective.  
                                                
10 Briggs outlines a few examples of this kind of shaped verse as follows: “Three lines of type 
represent the Tuileries by imitating Le Nôtre’s layout of the gardens, three lines represent 
queuing taxis, and on 1 May 1919, when daily life was interrupted by a general strike, the 
horizontal lines of print become vertical, representing the marching defile of strikers—or, 
perhaps, the slender stems of lily-of-the-valley, normally sold in the street on 1 May, but not 
available that year (Paris, 4; 21; 13-4)” (“Modernism’s Lost Hope” 85). 
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The speaker’s voice is supplanted by the bodies that her unconscious appears to remake, 
as if their remaking empowers them silently, paradoxically to speak back to her. Her desire for a 
holophrase inadvertently creates a textual space in which modes of embodiment that are 
seemingly unauthorized by the poem’s speaker are presented to the reader as equally significant 
to the work of the poem, to the work of the city. The musicians’ bodies arrest the reader’s ability 
to identify easily with the mode of embodiment that the speaker wants to create. This 
juxtaposition of bemused observation and painful, writhing syncopation is a textual discontinuity 
that offers to the reader very different models of embodied experience inside the metropolis.  
Faced with such discontinuity, what are we to make of Mirrlees’s invocation of 
primitivism? Paris begins by alluding to a decidedly primitivist theory of language and 
embodiment before unraveling that theory through a playful exploration of abstraction, 
embodiment, and textual materiality. I want to suggest that the answer to this question lies in the 
poem’s bemused tone. The musicians’ bodies are presented to the reader as the culmination of 
the series of “little funny things [that have been] ceaselessly happening” to the speaker (Mirrlees 
338). Paris is filled with satirical scenes that sometimes veer into the territory of quirky Dadaist 
humor, from Gambetta’s conjugation to Freud’s river discovery to the description of “President 
Wilson grin[ning] like a dog and run[ning] about the / city, sniffing with innocent enjoyment the 
diluvial urine of Gargantua” (125-27). Despite being buried in the midst of one of the poem’s 
most ludic sequences, the transfigured bodies of the musicians seems to lack the comic punch of 
a president sniffing urine like a dog. The description of these bodies is instead strikingly violent 
and an uncanny inversion of the speaker’s own desire for a new mode of “primitive” 
embodiment. This final vision is presented to the reader as the completion of the speaker’s 
journey, signaled by the arrival of dawn. It is also, however, an anti-climactic devolution of a 
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satirical text into what Laura Salisbury has termed the “unmarked incongruity” of modernist 
comedy (21). Salisbury argues that Samuel Beckett’s novels are always in the process of failing 
to communicate their status as comedies to the reader: “the joke or the comic moment always 
risks the possibility of misrecognition, of dissolving back into unmarked incongruity—an 
incongruity that is pre-comic although also comedy’s very possibility” (ibid). Reverdy might 
have called this dissolution plastic. Modernist texts like Beckett’s Molloy—and, I want to 
suggest, like Paris, a poem—present the reader with potentially comedic moments that flicker 
between provoking laughter and dissolving back into a frequently unsettling incongruity.  
The reader who encounters Mirrlees’s poem is presented with both the speaker’s 
aestheticized primitivist body and the decidedly more political “primitive” bodies of the 
musicians. Without readerly laughter to resolve this incongruity, the reader is left to negotiate the 
relationship between bodies marked as “primitive” in contradictory ways. The speaker’s 
holophrasis creates a “primitive” language of modernity premised on multiplicity and 
contradiction. It is a site of textual discontinuity, one where “primitive” signifies both the desire 
for a language of metropolitan experience premised on national exile and the violence that 
accompanies a colonial system that describes bodies as “primitive” or “pre-modern.” This 
discontinuity creates an interpretive dilemma insofar as the poem describes itself in terms of both 
an aesthetic of exile and a poetics of violence. Paris literally embodies the desire for a modernist 
language of “primitive” experience and the violence that that desire cannot seem to escape, 
presenting the reader with a poem that mimics the rhetoric a primitivist modernism while 
inviting a political critique of such an aesthetics.  
Jane Harrison presciently offers insight into this interpretive dilemma in her description 
of the example of the “savage” who says “we-not-yet-eatable”: “A faint survival of this egotistic 
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plural is observable in the ‘we’ of the modern writer, which absorbs the reader’s personality; 
when the writer becomes doubtful of a sympathetic union he naturally lapses into the exclusive 
‘I’”(474-475). Modern writers, she suggests, employ a form of holophrasis when they believe a 
sympathetic union between writer and reader is likely. The poem’s speaker invokes holophrasis 
to describe the archetypal experience of metropolitan modernity, but begins in the exclusive “I”: 
“I want a holophrase.” The poem never escapes the fundamental contradiction of the singular “I” 
searching for the egotistic plural of holophrasis. That contradiction defines the poem as a search 
for a poetics of embodiment that is always and must always be premised on contradiction and 
incongruity. The speaker of Paris, a poem sets out in search of holophrasis, but the poem that 
results is perhaps better described as an exercise in holopsychosis, the uneasy comingling of a 
primitivist modernism and the ethical challenge posed to it by the uncanny silence of bodies 
whose syncopation on the page signals their resistance to being figured as “primitive.”  
 
 In what sense are the bodies of the musicians laughing bodies? They seem to be wracked 
with movement that looks very similar to laughter. As they play for the audience at the Moulin 
Rouge, they perform a kind of exuberance, their bodies selling the idea that their performance 
represents. That gesture is reinscribed by the poem as obscene syncopation, yet another little 
funny thing happening to the poem’s speaker. Do they laugh as part of their performance? Do 
they incorporate brief comic sketches between songs? Does the speaker simply find their 
transformation into inky, black outlines of themselves humorous? Laughter is a social gesture 
that is very susceptible to misinterpretation. As a gesture, it incorporates many movements that, 
by themselves, could be misunderstood as laughter when they are in fact something else. What 
looks like a laughing body could just as easily be a body in pain.  
  49 
Paris is remarkable for the way that it enacts this misinterpretation of gesture onto the 
space of the page, a theme that runs throughout this project. The poem’s depiction of 
holopsychosis illustrates four concepts that characterize the way that many modernist writers 
approach the laughing body: 
1) Laughter is a social gesture that can not only be misinterpreted but that also has 
very different meanings for the person making the gesture and anyone witnessing it. 
Laughing is structurally infectious, meaning that it can be passed on without the passing 
on the object or situation that caused laughter to erupt in the first place. Laughter can 
look like something very different, and other gestures (grimaces, leers, coughing) can 
themselves be misread as laughter.  
2) Gestures of all kinds can be reinscribed by a text as laughter or as humorous. As a 
result, it is particularly important to pay attention to the difference between the 
experience of being subject to a fit of laughter on your own body and being the object of 
someone else’s laughter.  
3) This dynamic between the subject and object of laughter is often played out in the 
visual strategies of a text. Hope Mirrlees’s holopsychosis. Wyndham Lewis’s externalist 
art. Elizabeth Bowen’s empathetic comic style. James Joyce’s portmanteau character 
language.  
4) Finally, laughter does not to be funny to matter. The reader’s experience of laughter in 
modernist text is often discomfort. The relationship between this discomfort and the 
laughing bodies of the text is often very important.  
Like Mirrlees’s holopsychosis, Wyndham Lewis’s externalist art uses the visual space of the 
page to explore the laughing body in relation to its immediate environment.   
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Wyndham Lewis and the Problem of Externality 
 
Fantasy and Colonialism 
Buried in the middle of Time and Western Man is a bizarre account of what Wyndham 
Lewis fancifully termed “mind-travel.” There have always been and will always be a certain 
romantic travelling sensibility in humans, he argues, and as we run out of geographical places to 
“discover,” that sensibility will need a new object of focus: “As there was the globe-trotter, so 
there will be the ‘time’-tripper. Men have taken up with time, where space ended, but they have 
not changed their habits” (250). Colonialist thinking pervades this idea. The world’s “blank” 
spaces are being filled in. Unoccupied spaces are being filled in. And what is the colonial 
traveler—Lewis’s blank-space filling “globe-trotter”—to do once open-space has ended? He 
takes up journeys “inside the head—that is where the time-tracts lie—the regions of memory and 
imagination, as opposed to ‘matter’” (emphasis is Lewis’s, 251). Once we have exhausted space 
we begin to colonize the mind.  
 As he so often does, Lewis here turns to the language of fantasy and science fiction to 
describe the political implications of aesthetic practice. He diagnoses the modernist fascination 
with temporality, the present moment, and historical reconstruction as a kind of colonial fantasy. 
The modernist novel is a symptom of geopolitical exhaustion. While he is often seen as a 
reactionary figure and willful misreader (as much of himself as of his peers), Lewis is in this 
passage a surprisingly astute reader of the geographical implications of literary modernism, 
prefiguring the kinds of connections that scholars like Andrew Thacker and Jon Hegglund have 
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recently made between literary form and the geography of empire.1 Yet, as is often the case with 
Lewis, his unusual diction complicates his meaning in fascinatingly generative ways. These 
mental journeys seem to be at once ethereal and tactile. Lewis chooses the word “head” over 
“mind” here. These journeys chart time-tracts, which are described as temporal spaces extending 
inside of one’s head. Boundless temporal exploration is described as contained within the 
physical boundaries of the skull. Like characters in a Philip K. Dick novel, Lewis’s mind-
travelers negotiate the paradox of an embodied mind that is opposed to matter. 
 While Lewis rails against this new aesthetics of the inside of the head, he is also 
beginning to conceive of what he saw as a new kind of satirical fiction that would use 
“externalist art” to combat this worrisome trend. Time and Western Man (1927) was initially part 
of the novel that most typifies this new externalist satire, The Childermass (1928). During the 
1920s, Lewis conceived of most of his written work, as well as some of his drawing, as part of a 
series of large, encyclopedic works that would combine fiction and criticism. When he began to 
separate out the novels from the critical works for publication, the boundaries between these 
texts remained porous.2 The fantastic language of Time and Western Man reflects this 
porousness. Lewis describes the bodies of other modernist writers as battlegrounds for the ideas 
that they will dramatize in their fictions. Restricted in their physical movements by an 
increasingly “discovered” world, they retreat into their heads, colonizing their minds like 
                                                
1 Curiously, Lewis is infrequently mentioned in studies of modernist spatial writing, despite the 
fact that he was one of the few modernists to describe his own writing practice as indebted to the 
visual arts. If we were to replace “maps” with “paintings,” Jon Hegglund’s assertion that “novels 
work like maps” might just as easily been penned by Lewis. See Hegglund, p. 8.  
2 See Paul Edwards, Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer (Yale U P, 2000), 320-321. As 
Edwards observes, “much of the philosophical section of Time and Western Man […] was 
intended in 1926 for another project, ‘The Infernal Fair’, an offshoot of ‘Joint’ [another 
fictional/critical project] that became The Childermass” (320). Lewis often thought of individual 
novels, tracts, and drawings as part of an ever-evolving set of larger projects.  
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previous generations had colonized Africa or India. This passage employs many of the same 
rhetorical strategies that characterize the novels that Lewis was writing during this time. Bodies 
matter in Lewis. The language used to describe those bodies is surprisingly resistant and 
difficult. There is something odd about the way his language describes bodies. Most importantly, 
the weirdness that clings to certain bodies seems to tell us some fundamental fact about the way 
that those bodies interact with their world. Weirdness, manifest as linguistic difficulty, signals 
something about the ontological status of bodies in Lewis’s writing, fictional or not. Put another 
way, Gertrude Stein’s obsession with the present is not merely a problem with her writing. It is a 
problem inside her head.  
 This chapter is about the problem of externality in Lewis’s writing in the immediate 
postwar period. The theory of externalist art expounded by Lewis in retrospective critical 
writings is often very different from the writing practice that he sought to describe. During the 
1920s, Lewis’s prose fiction employs an angular style that creates an atmosphere of almost 
surrealist fantasy in which bodies lose their solidity and become subject to the whims of visual 
metaphor. While critics often read Lewis’s fiction as a programmatic dramatization of the ideas 
found in his critical writing, Lewis’s novels are in fact fantastic dream sequences that exceed the 
stark oppositional thinking of his non-fiction writing. Read as a colonialist fantasy of 
embodiment, a novel like The Childermass is a surprisingly original meditation on the 
relationship between language and embodiment in the Anglophone world. This chapter is in part 
a history of Lewis’s thinking on the subject of externality and in part a revaluation of his work as 
postcolonial writing.  
 The cluster of aesthetic and political concerns that Lewis’s critical work labels 
“externality” takes on very different characteristics in his surreal 1928 novel The Childermass. 
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“Externality” describes the way that Lewis’s fiction explores the body as a representational 
space. For Lewis-the-critic, “externality” names an aesthetic ideal, a way of treating characters as 
physical shells with no insides. Such characters are compilations of exaggerated appearances, 
characters as caricatures. As Lewis biographer Paul Edwards has noted, however, such an ideal 
is not possible in practice, and Lewis’s characters always exhibit some element of interior 
thought. Lewis’s criticism is polemic, and, as such, is by definition reductive. “Externality” is, 
for him, a kind of shorthand used to describe the way that his aesthetic work interrogates 
embodiment through representational space. Tracing the development of Lewis’s visual 
interrogation of embodiment from Tarr (1918) to The Childermass (1928), this chapter argues 
that the body is a representational space upon which conflicting markers of national identity are 
scored. Laughter is the index of this conflict, both in the form of laughing at other bodies and of 
bodies being ripped apart by violently convulsive laughter. By the time Lewis is writing The 
Childermass, the body has become for him a geographical site. Its mutable surfaces function as 
representational spaces that are legible to everyone else around you while remaining inaccessible 
to yourself. When laughter is used as a marker of difference, however, it collapses in on itself. 
When one is subject to laughter-as-violence or uses laughter as a means of differentiating oneself 
from others, laughter indexes the relationship between the body and the spaces it occupies.  
 
Externality in Theory and Practice 
Lewis first uses the term “externalist” in the 1930s as a way to talk about what he was 
trying to accomplish in his novels during the previous decade. For nearly ten years after the First 
World War, he writes, he had abandoned the novel, focusing instead on painting “with the object 
of creating a system of signs whereby [he] could more adequately express” himself (Blasting and 
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Bombadiering 215). Prose narrative felt limited after the war, and Lewis turned to visual 
practices to construct a new aesthetic language that he could use in not only painting but in 
critical and fictional writing as well. This translation across media creates a prose style that is 
infamously dense and that can provoke a synaesthetic response from readers. Lewis does not 
play with arrangement, typography, or white space. His novels sometimes include drawings, 
though his fiction from the 1920s contains fewer drawings than his fiction from the pre-war 
period. Despite the conventionality of the page layout and design of many of his novels, they are 
often described as possessing a kind of Cubist or collage-like syntax. In Fredric Jameson’s 
words, Lewis’s “words, unable to go together properly, end up projecting the warring planes and 
angles of a cubist painting” (33).  
 Lewis always assumes a defensive posture when writing about his satirical methods and 
about externalist art in particular. The Vorticist manifestoes in Blast outlined the boundaries of a 
new aesthetic method as it was being practiced. When Lewis writes about externalist art, 
however, he is attempting to shape the perception of his work retrospectively. In 1914, he was a 
collaborator of Ezra Pound and at the center of a new, natively British modernist avant-garde. As 
Tyrus Miller observes, by the 1930s, Lewis had found himself “politically isolated, financially 
straitened, and desperate from the evident approach of another war” (69). Where Lewis’s work 
before the war “took shape within the framework of avant-garde groupings and concerns,” his 
postwar activity was “increasingly bound up with a logic of publicity, ideological conflict, and 
struggle over canonizing authority in literary criticism” (ibid). Lewis had a very different goal in 
writing about externalist art than he had in defining the Vorticist movement. He was now more 
concerned with defending his aesthetic practice against the tide of literary modernism that had 
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changed after the war, placing less and less value upon the kind of vitriolic satire that he still 
favored.  
 Like all of his evaluations of his own artistic practices, moreover, Lewis’s theory of 
externalist art flattens the complexity of the novels it sets out to describe. Lewis’s novels are 
often filled with references to political and aesthetic theories that he expounds upon in his 
nonfiction work. The Childermass (1928), for example, satirizes the work of Gertrude Stein and 
James Joyce and contains a lengthy debate about the dangers of Bergsonian thinking to political 
institutions. These elements of the novel are certainly illuminated by reading The Art of Being 
Ruled (1926) and Time and Western Man (1927), which were composed during the same period 
as The Childermass. While many critics argue that “Lewis is dramatizing the arguments of” 
these nonfictional books, however, Alan Munton observes that such a reading “accounts for very 
little of the text” of The Childermass (Munton 12). Because of The Childermass’s extensive use 
of fantasy, it is something of a special case in Lewis oeuvre, an argument that will be developed 
in more detail later on in this chapter. Munton’s example suggests, however, that Lewis’s novels 
always exceed his own assessments of them.  
 When he describes his satirical novels as externalist art, Lewis identifies something 
significant about his novels even if his own assessment of how those novels actually work fails 
to describe them fully. In Men Without Art (1932), he says that he had turned to satire because he 
felt that it best enabled him “to achieve those polished and resistant surfaces of a great externalist 
art” (95). Satire, he argues, “must deal with the outside”; it is an art form “for those who like a 
resistant and finely-sculptured surface, or sheer words” (ibid). Satire reduces characters to what 
Lewis called shells, less characters than a set of exaggerated characteristics. Externality, he 
argued, describes the way that these novels reduce characters to “shells” in order to give his 
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prose an angular texture, “a resistant and finely-sculptured surface” (ibid). As Paul Edwards 
notes, Lewis’s characters never fully live up to this description of them as mere shells. They have 
motivations and emotions, and they act upon them. Lewis’s theory is somewhat disappointing as 
a literal assessment of his own work. As an act of willful misreading, however, his theory of 
externalist art echoes the way that Lewis describes journeys in the mind in Time in Western Man. 
Bodies are shells whose surfaces can be read easily if we are willing to look at them in just the 
right way.  
 Lewis turns to satire because it allows him to explore the materiality of the body through 
language. Satire is the art of surface. Aaron Matz argues that satire, like realism, purports to open 
up meaning through the mundane and the visible: “Satire and realism are both low genres that 
are—unlike epic, unlike tragedy—allowed to traffic in the prosaic and worldly facts of physical 
matters. And if reality is often construed to mean what is visible or tactile, then perception 
promises to yield some kind of comprehension” (13). Satire makes the body visible and promises 
that a body that has been thrust into the merciless sunlight is a body that is more honestly 
depicted. It is a visual and tactile representational mode, even when it is used in literature. For 
Lewis, Tyrus Miller argues, “satire will address itself precisely to enumerating and even 
exaggerating the fragility, friability, and permeability of the human body” (47). It is easy to see 
why Lewis, creating a new writing practice from his painting practice, would be drawn to satire 
as a visual representational mode that opens up the body to language.  
  Lewis wants language to be able to grasp at the body, to somehow embody in itself the 
very materiality that it seeks to describe. This desire emerges after his participation in the First 
World War. First as an artillery officer and later as a war correspondent specializing in painting 
and sketching, Lewis experienced and processes the trauma of the war in visual terms: 
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In a war of the type with which I am acquainted, therefore, a gunner [artillery 
officer] is a very dangerous type of spectator—without intermission throwing 
murderous missiles into the bullring below […], and over at the banks of equally 
active spectators opposite, who are of course doing the same thing. It is ‘active 
service’ all right. But it is not strictly speaking ‘fighting’.” (Blasting and 
Bombadiering 128). 
He describes himself as spectator and not a fighter. Unlike the men in the trenches, he was 
removed from the immediate consequences of his fighting. He saw shells land “through [his] 
field-glasses,” and when his companions died, they died a mile or more away in another battery 
(ibid).  
 Tyrus Miller has argued that Lewis’s interest in the materiality of the body emerges a 
response to his distinctly visual participation in the war. “The unspoken primal scene of his 
writing,” he suggests, is “the loss of bodily and affective control before the sight of shocked, 
damaged, mutilated human bodies” in the war (48). Laughter—particularly the kind of mirthless 
laughter that Lewis champions in his theory of externalist art—“is the self-reflexive laughter 
(‘laughing at ourselves!’) of the survivor in the face of alterity and death, the subject’s minimum 
self-confirmation, the minimal trace of the instinct for self-preservation. I laugh, therefore I am” 
(49). Laughter is a traumatic response to the realization that bodies have become frighteningly 
permeable as a result of mechanization. 
 Externalist satire focuses on the body as a site of contradictions. It is a shell, but also 
something that seems dangerously fragile and permeable. “Laughter,” Miller suggests, “serves to 
resolve this apparent contradiction” between the body as a stable source of one’s identity and as 
something that is easily dismembered (47). In Men Without Art, Lewis makes no distinction 
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between the laughter that breaks out over a character’s body and the laughter that his novels may 
provoke in their readers. This laughter is mirthless and universal. “In a sense, everyone should be 
laughed at,” he argues, “or else no one should be laughed at” (Men Without Art 89). In his 
fiction, however, laughing bodies are sites of violence. The act of looking at someone who is 
laughing is often itself a kind of violence. In the world of the novels at least, there is a very real 
difference between being a laughing subject and being the subject of laughter. And what is at 
stake in that difference is often whether you are being dismembered by laughter or whether you 
dismember someone else by watching and laughing at them.  
 
The Laughing Body as Kicking Ordnance 
The Childermass is perhaps Lewis’s novel from this period that most characterizes this 
dichotomy between being the laughing subject and being subject to laughter. It is undoubtedly 
one of the weirder novels written during the modernist period and certainly one of Lewis’s most 
inventive works. Originally conceived as a two-part novel, The Childermass project was 
abandoned shortly after Lewis published Part I in 1928 and only resumed late in Lewis’s life as 
the much-changed tetralogy, The Human Age, itself left incomplete at the time of Lewis’s death. 
The novel takes place in Purgatory, a place described as “Outside Heaven.” This particular 
version of Purgatory seems to be populated entirely by dead British soldiers from the First World 
War. The novel can be divided into two sections. The first is a surreal fantasy that follows the 
journey taken by two soldiers, Satters and Pullman, as they make their way back to their camp 
and trudge through the “Time Flats,” an area on the boundary of Purgatory that is bizarrely 
animated by errant magnetism escaping the distant Magnetic City (the novel’s version of 
heaven). The second describes the scene that Satters and Pullman find back at the camp. They all 
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but drop out of the narrative as the novel turns its attention towards a debate between the Bailiff 
of Purgatory and Hyperides. The Childermass consists, then, of what might be described as two 
novels: a surreal fantasy that W.B. Yeats compared to Gulliver’s Travels and a mennippean 
satire that dramatizes the aesthetic and political ideas that Lewis had outlined in The Art of Being 
Ruled (1926) and Time and Western Man (1927).3 This split-structure makes The Childermass 
one of the more significant sources for studying the way that Lewis’s fiction often exceeds the 
strictures and terminology of his critical thought. As a surreal reflection on an interstitial zone of 
national identity, the novel’s opening 120 pages represent one of Lewis’s most important 
meditations on the body as a representational and geographical space.  
Much of what happens in those opening 120 pages concerns the question of the dead 
soldiers’ “bodies.” Fredric Jameson calls The Childermass “theological science fiction,” an apt 
description that hints at the novel’s emphasis on both speculative thinking and corporeality (6). 
As the Bailiff will repeatedly remind the men later on, they do not, strictly speaking, have bodies 
at all. They live, he jokes, “a post-human life” (135). As Satters and Pullman move through the 
“time-flats,” Satters becomes increasingly inquisitive about the state of their personhood. Who 
are they—or, more importantly, what are they? These questions are difficult to answer as the 
men’s height, weight, age, clothing, and even personalities and gender change constantly, often 
as a result of the way that other people perceive them. What results is a bizarre feedback loop of 
perception and physical transformation. Pullman becomes an overweight nanny, drill sergeant, or 
teacher to Satters’ infant, soldier, or schoolboy. The soldiers have no control over these 
transformations. Their bodies are entirely under the influence of the perceptions of the people 
                                                
3 See Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957), Actarbirkhauser: Madrid, 2010. “In a letter to the author 
quoted on the dust jacket of The Apes of God (B&M Cats. 21-23), W.B. Yeats compared the first 
120 pages with Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels for their imaginative intensity” (312).  
  60 
that surround them. This problem is so pervasive that the Bailiff has taken to congratulating the 
men when they look particularly like themselves: “Gentleman! I am glad to see you all looking 
so well and so much yourselves. That is capital: to be oneself is after all the main concern of life, 
irrespective of what your particular version of self may be” (The Childermass 133). Of course, in 
Lewis’s Purgatory, you only look like yourself if someone else thinks that you do, and so the 
reassurance that the Bailiff’s comment is meant to imply is undercut by its tautological structure.  
Laughter draws attention to the precarious status of embodiment in Purgatory, as is 
evident in an exchange that occurs early in the novel. Satters, as a newcomer to the afterlife, has 
been given a questionnaire to fill out before his first appearance at the Bailiff’s court. He is easily 
distracted, however, as he learns to navigate the strange changes to which his person is now 
subject in Purgatory. He becomes a petulant child and then an old man, and Pullman has to 
remind him repeatedly to try and work through the questions. Eventually, the task makes Satters 
erupt in laughter: 
It is the war-time Satters that is beneath the parchment [the questionnaire]. The 
joke is too big for his capacity. Charged with the imbecility of Tommy-laughter 
rammed home by the facetious queries he continues to go off pop. His body has 
become a kicking ordnance calibrated for the ‘any-old-where’ of happy-go-lucky 
Satters of Armenteers. Now he grovels before Nurse Pullman (so hard-boiled yet 
kindly), the victim of the devils of Humor, of war pestilence and famine. All 
outside is blank Nowhere, Pulley is abolished. His lips beneath the paper whimper 
with the anguish of this false too great joke, his mouth and nostrils full of the 
Death-gas again, shell shocked into automaton. (CM 52) 
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On one level, this description is almost realist in its depiction of laughter. We often say that 
someone broke into laughter, a phrase that aptly describes the way that laughter can make people 
crumple up or contort their faces. Satters does not merely look like his body is breaking apart. He 
instead literary breaks apart like a piece of exploding ordnance. “The joke,” we are told, “is too 
big for his capacity,” implying both that the task of filling out the form makes Satters laugh so 
much that he loses self-control and that perhaps the real “joke” behind the task is somewhat lost 
on him. However, as it becomes clear that Satters’s laughter is the result of a kind of 
bombardment—the joke becoming various types of ordnance as the passage progresses—the 
phrase takes on another meaning: the joke, burying itself within him like an artillery shell, 
becomes literally too big for his capacity. Satters not only laughs because the joke “explodes” 
within him (i.e., because he gets the joke). The laughter is also something that becomes too much 
for him; in laughing, he breaks apart as well.  
Lewis’s prose is angular because of its insistent metonymy. Laughing bodies are not 
simply like bombs; they are bombs. Lewis’s preference for metonymy is partly responsible for 
the distinct air of weirdness in his fiction. His worlds are fantastic because all of the basic, solid 
elements of the narrative are subject to change at a moment’s notice. Characters have numerous, 
unpredictable bodies, voices, and personalities. Though the novel takes place entirely in 
Purgatory, the boundaries of that space and the things contained within it are constantly shifting. 
As Jameson observes, the novel’s prose style is similarly mutable. A descriptive passage’s 
“initial figural richness” is superseded by a barrage of words whose “function is to interfere with 
each other, to clash visibly within the sentence itself in such a way that no surface homogeneity 
has time to reform: the words, unable to go together properly, end up projecting the warring 
planes and angles of a cubist painting” (31, 33). While Lewis may not be writing a visual style 
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like that employed by Mirrlees, his metonymic style interrupts the conversational flow of 
everyday language.  
 By focusing only on what Lewis liked to call the “shell of the animal,” the novel 
characterizes Satters’s body first as the sound of machine gun fire, then as both ordnance and the 
field on which that ordnance lands, and finally as an entirely different kind of machine (a soldier 
whose movements have been rendered jerky by nerve gas exposure) (Men Without Art 99). 
Lewis’s fiction from this period is filled with descriptions like this, so much so that it often 
seems as if narrative has taken a backseat to style. His descriptive passages are comically 
incongruous and at times absurd, written in a style that reflects the already absurd incongruity of 
human behavior. As Michael North notes, characters in Lewis’s satirical paintings and novels are 
“abstracted first by [their] own comic behavior, [their] mechanical habits, which the painter [or 
novelist] simply etches more firmly into the background” (138). And so when Lewis says that 
satire produces language that engages with the sheer shape of words, what he really means is that 
satire done his way contorts the syntactic relationships between words. When we read the 
sentence, “Charged with the imbecility of Tommy-laughter rammed home by the facetious 
queries he continues to go off pop,” the ambiguous phrasing leaves us in the position of being 
unsure if Satters is being charged with a crime, rammed with something that sounds like laughter 
(i.e., machine-gun fire), or simply overcome with laughter. Lewis’s language doesn’t leave us the 
possibility of reading this description only as a metaphor. It is both that and something more 
literal.  
This figural richness plays with the relationship between the laughing body and its 
environment, blurring the lines between inside and outside of the body. The joke is too big for 
his capacity, and he explodes into a series of contradictory spatial arrangements. Laughter has 
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rendered his body into a ridiculous explosion, both “kicking ordnance” and the field at which 
that ordnance is aimed. His body has become a site that is constantly changing in dimension and 
location; he is place (battlefield), vector (flying ordnance), and their combination (explosion). As 
he hides beneath the questionnaire, everything beyond becomes nowhere. He hides beneath a 
thin sheet of paper in no-man’s land.  
 The function of the laughing body in The Childermass contradicts the dominant critical 
narrative about the trajectory of Lewis’s comic practice. Vincent Sherry argues that Lewis moves 
from an initial fascination with the ludicrous to a mature theory of laughter that privileges the 
ridiculous: “The earlier sense of the ludicrous—a boisterous laughing with the wild body of 
comedy, a participatory fun with the comic automaton playing his harmless bottle music—
dissolves into a repugnance at the dangerous political prepotence of such performance and 
sympathetic participation” (133). In his pre-war comedies, Sherry argues, Lewis was content to 
mock people in a way that participated in their buffoonery. These comedies were characterized 
by a ludic playfulness that is absent from the political handwringing of his later satires, where 
certain behavior is ridiculed as politically suspect. The first mode implies a kind of viewer 
participation, reveling in the comic behavior. The second implies disdain and judgment, 
distancing the audience from the ridiculed subject. Sherry gives The Wild Body, which predates 
The Childermass, as evidence of this mature theory of the ridiculous, and yet the laughter that we 
find in The Childermass privileges the ludicrous over the ridiculous.4  
                                                
4 Lewis arguably never really develops a “mature” theory of comedy, instead creating a series of 
theories that each share concepts but ultimately serve his needs at different moments in his 
career. It is, however, particularly odd to claim that The Wild Body, as one of Lewis’s earliest 
theories, accounts for his mature thinking on the subject. The Wild Body was published in 1927 
as a collection of revised short stories from before the war. It contains some critical reflection on 
this early stories and reframes them into a narrative about laughter and embodiment that serves 
Lewis’s evolving needs at a moment when he was transitioning from painting to writing again. 
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 Satters undergoes bodily transformations because of the way that his body is perceived 
by Pullman. When his body becomes permeable and unstable, it is because of the active 
spectatorship of his companion. Looking does not create distance or fuel ridicule, but instead 
actively participates in the violent exploration of the body’s relationship to its environment. 
Despite being an early scene in a novel that nominally serves to explain to one of the characters 
the way that this world works, this scene provokes more questions than it answers. How do these 
transformations come about? Are they painful? Are the soldiers aware of the transformations 
while they are happening? What is clear is that there is no stable body beneath these shifting 
shells.  
 Laughter reveals something fundamental about the function of embodiment in this novel. 
It is an eruption that amplifies a process that is constantly taking place. Bodies are always 
changing in Purgatory, and when people laugh their bodies demonstrate the only characteristic 
that is constant to them: their tendency to change constantly. The language of this passage 
prefigures the language that Lewis would later use to describe externalist art. Bodies are shells, 
here literally exploded by and becoming artillery shells. Unlike his description of bodies as mere 
shells in Men Without Art, however, there is something generative about the body here. In The 
Childermass, bodies are more ludicrous than ridiculous.  
 The ludicrous tone of The Childermass is a result, in part, of its use of fantasy. As James 
English has observed, “for Lewis identity as such is always a kind of joke, a more or less witty, 
more or less laughable performance” (96). Laughing bodies often break apart in these novels. As 
                                                
The relationship between an essay like “The Meaning of the Wild Body” and the stories 
contained in that collection, then, is akin to the relationship between Men Without Art and The 
Childermass. Recall that Lewis often willfully misread his earlier writing in an effort to craft a 
narrative about his development as an artist that served his current publicity needs.   
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dismemberment, Satters’ laughter is not unique or even noteworthy. In “A Soldier of Humour,” 
for example, a laughing body is described as having “everywhere struggled to assert itself, and 
everywhere been overcome” (23). A situation is described as being “totally outside [this body’s] 
compass,” prefiguring the description of Satters as laughing at a joke that is too big for his 
capacity (29). Laughter breaks apart the body throughout Lewis’s work. What makes The 
Childermass unique is the fact that this laughter takes place in a fantastic world. In “A Soldier of 
Humour,” Lewis’s language is still metonymic, which lends an element of weirdness to his 
descriptions. Bodies, it seems, really do struggle to reassemble themselves in an otherwise 
realistic world. When bodies begin to break apart in The Childermass, however, they do so in a 
way that works within the logic of that world. The soldiers are all dead. Their surroundings 
undergo bizarre transformations all the time. Their dismembered laughing bodies do not seem 
out of place. To put it another way, in the fantastic world of The Childermass, Lewis’s 
externalist art finally seems to have found a setting that allows it to explore the relationship 
between language, body, and environment. 
 
Irrational Nerves 
None of Lewis’s other completed novels employ fantasy to the extent that The 
Childermass does.5 Scott Klein has suggested that The Childermass indulges in fantasy because 
Lewis was so closely parodying Joyce at different points in the novel: “Lewis transforms Joyce’s 
landscape of the dreaming mind into a different vision of a world beyond the known world, a 
                                                
5 Lewis began but never finished a science fiction novel that takes place on the planet of the 
Tyros, the leering satirical figures that Lewis began painting in the late 1920s. Lewis used Tyros 
in some of his most famous paintings, including a self-portrait. The first hundred pages or so of 
the unfinished manuscript are housed at the Cornell University.  
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surreal plain of the afterlife born from the embers of the First World War. Lewis’s most 
important fictions, in other words, are in large part parodic responses to Joyce” (8). The 
Childermass features a well-executed pastiche of Finnegans Wake, then known as Work in 
Progress. The pastiche features numerous references to specific characters from the Wake and 
mimics many of novel’s rhetorical strategies (acrostics, portmanteau language, associating 
gender with tactile experiences of hardness and wetness). The pastiche is so well done that it is 
clear that Lewis must have very carefully read early published versions of Work in Progress in 
transatlantic review or transition. Joyce may represent everything that is wrong in the world and 
a dangerous path for literary experimentation, but mocking him seems to have been generative 
for Lewis. The logic of The Childermass is ludicrous mocking, not ridicule. That logic allows 
The Childermass to explore embodiment through the lens of fantasy.  
The Childermass largely consists of conversations, with the by far most frequent topic of 
conversation being the question of whether or not the occupants of Purgatory have bodies.  
Pullman characterizes their bodies as betrayed by “irrational nerves.” When the novel begins, 
Satters is newly arrived in Purgatory, and much of the novel’s first section is devoted to his many 
questions about the strange place in which he finds himself. In these conversations, Satters is 
often transfigured into a schoolboy or some other infantilized figure, while Pullman becomes a 
teacher, mother, or other figure of parental/adult authority. In one such instance, Pullman 
responds to Satters incessant questioning with an example culled from his real-life (that is, past-
life) experience as a schoolteacher. Pullman tells Satters the story of John Tyndall, an English 
physicist who, while lecturing, received an electrical shock and perceived himself as 
disembodied: 
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But while he was reassuring the audience [that he was unharmed], his body 
appeared to him cut up into fragments. For instance, his arms were separated from 
his trunk, and seemed suspended in the air. He was able to reason and also to 
speak as though nothing were the matter. But his optic nerve was quite irrational. 
(CM 69-70). 
 
Pullman tells Satters that “when I got here the story came to my mind” (70). The story has 
particular resonance for individuals trying to navigate a world where physical perception and 
sensation seems suspect and where individuals are locked into perceptual feedback loops that 
enable the way that others perceive oneself actually to change one’s physical characteristics. 
Moreover, the electric shock that Professor Tyndall receives speaks to the errant magnetism 
leaking out of the Magnetic City, a force that seems to aggravate the perceptual feedback loops.6  
 Like Tyndall, Pullman suggests to Satters, the citizens of purgatory are “disembodied” 
even as they possess a form of “sensational completeness” that exceeds what Tyndall was able to 
accomplish during his lecture:  
Tyndall when he was addressing the audience was really disembodied. He had no 
body at that moment, only bits. He spoke from memory of the normal situation. 
Do you see the train of thought or not? On the physical side we are, at present, 
memories of ourselves. Do you get that? We are in fragments, as it were, or 
anything you like. We are not normal, are we? No. Conscious—we are conscious, 
though. So there you have a sufficient parallel. We behave as we do from 
                                                
6 This magnetism is frequently cited by the men in Purgatory as the source of many of the weird 
manifestations and transformations that take place.  
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memory, that’s the idea. We go one better than Tyndall: we put the thing together 
in its sensational completeness. (ibid) 
 
Pullman’s explanation sets out the basic contradiction of existence in purgatory. As souls in 
Purgatory, the soldiers experience sensation without actually possessing the nerves necessary to 
relay those sensations to their brains. They remember what it was like to have bodies, and so 
they construct a “sensational completeness” from that memory. Though most of the men 
recognize this completeness as a construction, they firmly believe in it as a sensation. The 
citizens of Purgatory have no bodies outside of perception and sensation. Their physical 
characteristics, clothing, and even size change based on the changes in how other citizens 
perceive them—or, based on how their perceive themselves in relation to other citizens. They 
have sensation but not nerve-filled bodies, consciousness but not brains. Indeed, they seem to be 
parodic “embodiments” of the mind/brain split.7  Lewis’s Purgatory is defined by this bizarre 
contradictory experience of embodiment: to believe so firmly in the sensational completeness of 
your own body and yet to see that everyone else’s bodies are composed of fragments constantly 
and randomly reshaping themselves into new arrangements. 
Pullman’s explanation of how their irrational nerves function signals that they do not 
possess bodies in the ordinary sense. Bodies, by definition, extend in space. In Purgatory, 
however, bodies experience extension without actually extending into space. The soldiers 
experience extension—and experience it in a form of “sensational completeness”—without 
actually possessing a body that extends in space. They experience extension through memory, an 
idea that can be taken in two ways. In an abstract sense, they remember what it is like to have a 
                                                
7 The experience narrated by Pullman is actually narrated in Tyndall’s memoirs.  
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body that extends in space, any space. In a more local sense, they remember the memory-traces 
that particular spaces made upon their bodies. The play between these two senses is foundational 
to understanding how space works in The Childermass. If the men construct sensational 
completeness from memory, then their bodies retain the traces of the lived spaces through which 
they moved in life. Throughout The Childermass, these memory-traces are in tension with the 
bizarre quasi-nationalist space of Purgatory.  
 
Outside Heaven 
 What kind of a world is Lewis’s Purgatory? Unlike many afterworld narratives where 
landscape and space serve as grotesque backdrops to loftier allegorical explorations, geography 
is foundational to the work of The Childermass. Lewis’s Purgatory is at once a camp (detention, 
military, concentration), England, colony, courtroom, battleground, trench, and literal waste land 
(polluted by errant magnetism). Its mutability means that it is perhaps best understood in those 
moments when it undergoes dramatic changes.  
One of the most telling of these changes occurs in the transition between the novel’s 
opening dream-like section and the menippean dialogue that constitutes the novel’s second half. 
Positioned between the lyrical opening and the didactic dramatization of Lewis’s theories, the 
arrival of the Bailiff’s court is a transitional moment. Compared to the surrealist fantasies that 
preceded it, the passage describing the Bailiff’s entrance is highly allusive, using references to 
classical, medieval, and renaissance architecture to describe the “obscene grating vibration” of 
the court as it appears like “an insult from nowhere” (CM 123). The novel begins to assume the 
playscript format that will dominate the remainder of the novel. The “two characters who have 
occupied the opening scene,” Satters and Pullman, “conveniently stand aside to observe the 
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entrance of the massed cast [of the Bailiff’s court] in stately procession” (ibid ). Consisting 
primarily of sub-human creatures described as “peons,” the court is a strange sight. While Satters 
and Pullman stand to the side like “aloof puppets,” the court itself assumes a commedia dell’arte 
character (124). Physically, it is both grandiose and flimsy, both “a large auditorium on the 
model of the antique theatre” (ibid) and “a lofty tapering Punch-and-Judy theatre” (125). There is 
something artificial about this court, which arrives daily from the Magnetic City across the river 
and can be assembled and disassembled in a matter of minutes. Its artificiality is linked to its 
theatricality. With its vaudeville-esque impersonations and grotesque executions, the court is 
more performance than government body. Indeed, what happens in the Bailiff’s court seems to 
be more about distracting and mollifying the citizens of purgatory than ever actually getting to 
the matter at hand of deciding who can get into heaven.8  
 The artificiality of the Bailiff’s court speaks to the larger question of perception and 
reality in The Childermass. The Bailiff seems to have little control over his populace and the 
realms he purportedly rules, and he appears to assert his authority through rhetoric alone. The 
Bailiff’s opening remarks read like the opening remarks of a town hall meeting. He compliments 
his audience (“I am glad to see you all looking so well and so much yourselves”) and informs 
them that today’s meeting will be different, that today’s meeting will stay on schedule (133). He 
explains that the day’s schedule will proceed according to “mean solar time or as you call it civil 
                                                
8 Though a few characters petition to move on to heaven, these petitions are often interrupted by 
debates about what purgatory is, pastiches of Stein and Joyce, and lengthy explanations of 
purgatory itself on the part of the Bailiff. The only citizen granted access to heaven in The 
Childermass is one who does not want to get into heaven at all. Macrob, a Scottish character who 
accuses the Bailiff of “merely extracting the creative principle from [the citizens] and collecting 
[their] dead shells” (CM 227), is silenced by a gruesome dismemberment. The Bailiff commands 
his peons to “take him in” to the Magnetic City, where he will be angry to find himself 
recomposed (235).  
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time” (ibid). This statement is the first of a series of comments made by the Bailiff that allude to 
an earlier time in the history of Purgatory when things were run differently. It is not just that they 
have changed the way that their schedule works, but rather that they have changed the way that 
time itself works in Purgatory. He lists all of the previous “times” that they have attempted to 
implement and reminds the crowd that “in spite of these concessions, since the characteristic 
incandescence of our infernal neighbour has of recent years been so noticeably on the increase, 
we are as you are well aware very much arrear as a consequence of the unfortunate climate” 
(ibid). This rare reference to hell suggests that it is as proximate to purgatory as the Magnetic 
City is. More importantly, however, the Bailiff’s explanation characterizes purgatory as a civic 
space somewhat incompetently managed by a bureaucracy struggling to deal with an 
“unfortunate climate.” Time can be changed, but the space of purgatory seems to elude the 
Bailiff’s control.  
 This fact is evident later when the Bailiff lists a few suggestions from what he calls 
“management”:  
It is a matter of great regret to the management that you are so cramped for 
space—although as regards time it’s another matter. I refer of course to the 
dispositions of the encampment and the facilities for exercise. Beyond the 
restricted limits of the camp things are as you know by no means as they should 
be indeed they are all upside-down to put it plainly there’s no concealing the fact, 
anything but orderly even chaotic. The least observant of you will have noticed 
that as you approach a certain well-defined limit the stability that we have secured 
for this small and necessary area is by no means maintained [i.e., the Time Flats]. 
Almost immediately unorthodox spaces and even unorthodox times betray their 
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presence by untoward occurrences it must be admitted often of a distressing 
nature. We are able to guarantee nothing beyond those prescribed limits. We feel 
we owe you an apology for the fact that our provision of space is stinted but no 
remedy so far has been found for this state of affairs. (161) 
 
The Bailiff strangely offers suggestions to a group of men who strictly speaking do not have 
bodies, about how they might utilize the exercise facilities. The fundamental irony of Purgatory 
is that its occupants find themselves with too little space and too much time. The language of 
bureaucracy (“management,” “well-defined limit,” “state of affairs”) persists in this description 
of Purgatory as an encampment comically reminiscent of a military camp. The limits of the camp 
are well-marked, and yet many citizens wander into the undefined and unmaintained wasteland 
in which we found Satters and Pullman at the novel’s start. The Bailiff’s authority, it seems, is 
limited to the relatively small area of the camp. Once outside of that area, citizens are at the 
mercy of forces beyond the Bailiff’s control. These unwieldy elements are indeed forces in a 
literal sense—the magnetism of the Magnetic City and the “incandescence” of hell act on the 
bodies of citizens who have wandered out of bounds in bizarre ways.  
 The language of control and boundaries speaks to the novel’s larger concern with 
mapping the geopolitical onto abstract spaces. The Bailiff’s apology on behalf of management 
recasts the divine geography of The Childermass in geopolitical terms. The encampment is 
described as a distinctly British space. Many of the soldiers appear to be English.9 Indeed, as the 
court’s business progresses, the Bailiff makes repeated reference to the Britishness of his 
audience. He insists upon their rights as freeborn Englishmen and apologizes for not being able 
                                                
9 There are occasional references to a women’s camp, though this often seems like a rumor 
circulating among the soldiers.   
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to give them the right of habeus corpus. He describes the Magnetic City itself as “that little 
world of ours over there on which the sun never sets” (187). Purgatory, however, is a British 
space, not an English one. The rabble-rouser Macrob is Scottish, and various iterations of 
Caribbean patois and Irish brogue fill the court when the crowd grows unruly. As Ian Baucomb 
has noted, 
Englishness has consistently been defined through appeals to the identity-
endowing properties of place. […] Whatever specific ‘ways of being’ Englishness 
has been understood to entail, Englishness has been generally understood to 
reside within some imaginary, abstract, or actual locale, and to mark itself upon 
that locale’s familiars. Over the past 150 years the struggles to define, defend, or 
reform Englishness have, consequently, been understood as struggles to control, 
order, and dis-order the nation’s and the empire’s spaces. (4) 
 
Englishness is an abstraction attached to location, which may be and often is imaginary or 
abstract itself. Purgatory, in the Bailiff’s estimation of it, is English in this vexed and 
contradictory sense. At stake in his statements on behalf of management is the question of the 
relationship between “ways of being” English and ways of relating to the spaces of the divine 
world, whether those spaces be the very clearly demarcated boundaries of the camp or the ill-
defined and constantly shifting terrains of the time-flats. 
 The question of the camp’s “Englishness” is further complicated by the fact that the 
geography of Purgatory is internally consistent but externally inconsistent. Purgatory is 
positioned between the Magnetic City and Hell but “the distance to the city [and, presumably, 
Hell] varies” (CM 22). Satters and Pullman use the Magnetic City as a kind of North Star as they 
try to make their way back to the camp and negotiate the constant spatial flux of the time-flats. It 
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is the only marker external to the time-flats, and it constantly moves: “The whole city like a film-
scene slides away perceptibly several inches to the rear, as their eyes are fixed upon it” (ibid). As 
they attempt to find their way back to the camp, “they get along splendidly with regard to space, 
but the time is another matter” (34). Paradoxically, they can cover a lot of ground but make no 
time. To complicate matters further, the Magnetic City is out of their time. “That shore is not for 
us yet!,” Pullman informs Satters, noting that “it’s in another dimension” (32). Though Purgatory 
does not lack stable landmarks, they are all in another dimension, visible but useless. “They’re 
not in our part of Time at all,” Pullman tells Satters. “We couldn’t reach them if we walked on 
here forever. We should just be turning round” (36).10 
 Purgatory is not England, though it may be Britain. Both Purgatory and the Magnetic 
City are eclectically built. Like Decline and Fall’s Professor Silenus, who quipped that the 
perfect building would be the one that eliminated “the human element from the consideration of 
[architectural] form,” the architect of the Magnetic City seemed to have designed a city never 
meant to be occupied, a bizarre choice given that that city is Heaven (159). Composed of a series 
of empty cathedrals from through Christendom, the city feels inhuman and distant. Purgatory is 
similarly patchwork. Though the camp itself is apparently rather uniform, the Bailiff’s court is 
composed of architectural features from a variety of styles, and the areas surrounding the camp 
are littered with topographical elements from various locations: 
BAILIFF. ‘The mountains were an idea of mine! (He suggests by his expression 
that his high colour is a bashful blush.) ‘Yes, I thought of them one day as I was 
sitting here!’ (He casts his eyes down with the shamefaced finicks of the female 
                                                
10 When Satters complains that he does not understand, Pullman uses the example of stars: “‘We 
can see the stars can’t we?’ Pullman exclaims testily” (ibid). The invocation of stars seems to be 
an indirect reference to parallax in Ulysses.  
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impersonator of broad comedy, rawboned, with Wellington nose and wattled 
eyebrows.) ‘They are as a matter of fact from Iceland, volcanic as you see I 
daresay—that is the Skapta Jokul—you can’t see them but there are white 
columns of vapour rising up to a considerable height all over them; yes most 
interesting, but they’re too far off—’ (167) 
 
Purgatory is composed of a bricolage of national spaces, populated by a diverse group of dead 
soldiers. It accumulates geography in a comically literal version of colonial conquest. It may not 
be English, but it is very British.  
 In the divine geography of The Childermass, Wyndham Lewis maps geopolitical 
categories onto abstract spaces. If the English have run out of places to colonize and started to 
colonize the mind instead, then “our public material paradise” had begun to “disintegrat[e]” and 
be replaced by a “sham reality” (ibid). For Lewis, there is a relationship between the 
geographical exhaustion that the British Empire faces at the beginning of the twentieth-century 
and the turn towards interiority in modern fiction. The relationship between colonies of the mind 
and the persistence of stable “matter” that once constituted a public mental paradise is evident in 
the relationship between minds, bodies, and spaces in The Childermass.   
 
“This is England?” 
Environments, like the bodies moving through them, have become abstractions in 
Purgatory. The occupants of Purgatory negotiate these abstractions through movement. Entering 
a space may change the way that it looks or feels. Looking at someone else may change the way 
that their body composes itself. Occupants often respond to these changes with laughter, from 
wry commentary on the transitions to outright ridicule of other occupants’ apparent instability. 
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When they laugh at the changing abstractions through which they move, occupants rarely 
imagine themselves to be participants in those abstractions. They imagine themselves to be 
immune to their environments and to the forces that wrack the bodies of their peers. Everyone 
seems to constantly forget, even moments after they undergo frightening transformations 
themselves. Laughter, however, is also a movement that fundamentally changes the relationship 
between someone’s body and its environment. As Tyrus Miller observes, “laughter has an 
intimate relationship with the situation of the embodied subject in external space” (49). If the 
body’s instability is always a subject of ridicule in The Childermass, then ridiculing laughter is 
always ludicrous as well, something that forces the laughing body to be dismembered just like 
the mocked bodies of one’s peers. Laughter, that is to say, is always incriminating.  
In Purgatory, laughter registers the relationships between bodies and environments that 
the dead soldiers want to ignore. The occupants as well as the Bailiff characterize the camp as a 
British space. Yet it is a space that is outside of the control of the Bailiff. The camp is a 
provisionally-defined space in a country that functions according to very different rules from the 
camp. Purgatory itself resists the Bailiff’s attempts to control it. The camp is a colonial space in a 
foreign land. The Bailiff comes over from the Magnetic City each morning to adjudicate his 
limited authority, complaining about the illegibility and permeability of the boundaries of 
Purgatory. The ultimate goal of this new “post-human life,” the Bailiff tells the dead soldiers, is 
to allow “the soul fit to survive [to be] received into the ultimate corpus of the mother Church” 
(135). They must gradually be stripped of the pretense of having a body in order to enter Heaven, 
a process that the Bailiff describes as a divine enema:  
This sort of rectal feeding of the paradisal body […] has been resorted to for one 
reason because few human personalities could hope to escape the vigilance of 
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what stands for the medulla in the celestial internal economy where the ‘vomiting 
centre’ would marshal the muscles […] for the violent emesis. The administration 
over which I preside is from that point of view a sort of nutrient enema—we are 
you might say the funnel. Without these precautions […] there be no alternative 
for the despise and rejected but that uncomfortable spot to our left. (135-136) 
If the men were allowed to enter heaven as they are, they would vomit. It is not clear what about 
the “celestial internal economy” would provoke this revulsion. The message, however, is clear. 
For personalities to enter heaven, they have to lose their bodies. After the Bailiff’s lecture, the 
mean erupt into “laughter and applause, all eyes turned in the direction of the neighbouring 
Inferno” (ibid). Bodies, even if they are only the memories of bodies, are closely associated with 
the space of Purgatory. They are something disgusting that has to be stripped away by funneling 
personalities through the anus of the celestial internal economy.  
 Yet their laughter, revulsion, and ridicule returns the men to the situation they find 
themselves in at the moment. The enema is a fantasy of ascension into nationalist recognition. 
Toil long enough in the colony and you, too, will be sufficiently British to return to your rightful 
place at home. Work hard enough, or rather let the military work hard enough on you, and your 
personality will have so little concern for the base materiality of the body that it will become a 
true citizen. One result of this narrative is that the dead soldiers treat the men who have been in 
Purgatory for too long with complete disdain, repulsed by the way that the bodies of those men 
have become stiff and mechanical. The act of looking at these men, however, returns the soldiers 
to the relationship between their own bodies and their environment. Looking—ridiculing—
makes one complicit with the object of ridicule. Ridicule is a ludicrous act.  
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One of the most significant scenes of this dehumanizing spectatorship occurs in a 
panorama, a painting installation that acts as much on the spectator’s body as on his eyes. As 
Pullman and Satters attempt to make their way through the Time Flats and back to the Bailiff’s 
court at the beginning of the novel, they encounter a panorama of eighteenth-century England. 
The panorama is described as a “picture” or “hallucination” that can be entered into (83). Satters 
and Pullman at first do not realize that they have entered the installation or that they have moved 
inside at all. They notice only that the air has changed; it “is moist and chilly but windless.” 
Believing that they have stumbled into “a vacuum,” they note that the atmosphere is “musty […] 
like a damp vault” and that being inside of it is “like being in an enormous empty building—at 
night!” They soon discover, however, that the space is filled with trees, shrubs, and people that 
become smaller as they continue to walk. Thrilled to find himself in a familiar place, Satters 
exclaims, “It’s England, isn’t it?” And with disdain Pullman responds, “It’s supposed to be, no 
doubt” (ibid).  
 They have entered a panorama, a form of installation art that surrounds the spectator with 
a circular painting. Such installations have always played with the tension between verisimilitude 
and its interruption. The panorama was invented by the eighteenth-century painter Robert Barker 
as a way to recreate the 360˚ view one experiences at the top of a prominent vantage point. As art 
historian Stephan Oetterman notes, these early panoramas were “more than just the 
counterpart[s] of a natural phenomenon […]. The panorama was both a surrogate for nature and 
a simulator, an apparatus for teaching people how to see it” (11-12). The simulation of a natural 
vista was accomplished through both the painting of a 360˚ scene on curved canvas panels and 
the construction of a building around those panels. A decidedly popular art form, the panorama 
emerged from the practices of using the camera obscura “hobby painters” and artists who lacked 
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formal academic training in painting. As Oetterman observes, amateur painters “lacked two 
technical skills that we seen at the time as determining to a large extent the artistic quality of 
painting and that could only be acquired through practice: the technique of working in oils and a 
mastery of perspective” (29). The use of cameras obscura were seen, by critics and trained 
artists, as crutches, a short-cut to bypass the lack of a mastery of perspective. Around the same 
time, the emergency of “geognosy” as a science (a scientific discipline that would later be broken 
apart into the distinct fields of cartography, geography, geology, and biology) created a need for 
a form of landscape painting and engraving that favored “not works of art but illustrations to 
enhance the scholarly text.” The illustrations that emerged to meet this need used cameras 
obscura to create “realistic, precise illustrations” that challenged the prevailing tendency to paint 
landscapes not according to how they actually looked but according to “what they ought to look 
like” (Oetterman 32). 
 
Figure 7: Barker's first panorama 
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Figure 8: Barker's panorama under construction 
 
Figure 9: Cross-section of Barker's panorama 
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Barker’s panoramas—and the many imitations that followed—were as much about 
physical sensation as they were about visual spectacle. Visitors entered Barker’s panoramas 
through an underground tunnel, before ascending a staircase leading to a round viewing 
platform. Natural light filtered in through a hidden circular opening at the top of the panorama, 
illuminating the canvas. Hidden below the viewing platform, an empty trench separated the 
spectators from the canvas wall. The illusion of depth created by the curved canvas was coupled 
with the warmth and illumination provided by real sunlight. The canvas was not displayed on the 
wall of a gallery, but instead enveloped the spectators, allowing them to explore the painting by 
moving their bodies. Historical accounts of Barker’s installations wryly note that the illusion was 
so convincing that men frequently donned their hats in surprise once they reached the platform, 
believing themselves to be in fact outside. Barker employed bodily immersion to generate a 
sense of sublime nature, to allow Londoners to experience what Oetterman calls “see-sickness”: 
the physical vertigo created by contemplating the visual spectacle of nature as inconceivably 
enormous. Yet, the architecture of Barker’s panoramas caused a second kind of “see-sickness” as 
well. Walking around a small viewing platform, spectators were constantly reminded that they 
were inside of a building, the optical illusion checked by the physical reminder of limited 
mobility. Indeed, as Oleksiczuk notes, “the more real such illusions were, the more viewers 
looked for their deficiencies and limitations” (11). These limitations were never more evident 
than in space of the viewing platform itself. As the spectator walked across the platform, the 
illusion worked itself on his eyes even as his body betrayed its constructedness. Movement and 
vision were thus in tension in the panorama.  
Like Barker’s spectators, Satters and Pullman are first tricked by the panorama before 
searching for its limitations. They enter it through a dank tunnel, but only gradually notice that 
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their environment has changed.  It takes them more than a few minutes to realize that they have 
actually entered a building at all and even more time to understand that they are standing in a 
panorama: 
‘Why we’re in a panorama!’ [Pullman] exclaims.  
Satters gazes up in drowsy anger.  
‘A what?’ 
‘It’s a panorama! Look at that hedge. Do you see its perspective? It’s built in a 
diminishing perspective! I believe the whole place is meant to be looked at from 
behind there, where we have just come from.’ 
The little figure stands uncertain and crestfallen.  
‘Why then are all these things so lifelike?’ he asks, in a tone of injury. The 
complexion of the time-scene is altered by the discovery of the device upon which 
it depends. (CM 97) 
 
Satters and Pullman leave the viewing platform and literally walk into the scene represented on 
the canvas. As they do so, the “complexion” of the scene changes. The curves and angles that 
generate the painting’s perspective now distort around them as they view the painting from 
inside the canvas. From this impossible perspective, everything in the panorama that at first 
seemed “lifelike” now seems stiff and artificial. And as they continue to move further away from 
the platform, the trees, shrubs, and people that they encounter in this pseudo-England become 
increasingly smaller.11  
                                                
11 The panorama seems to parody novels like Ulysses that recreate historical locales in great 
detail. Lewis famously argued that “people are in the process of being locked into both places 
and times” and that “time-fanaticism is in some way connected with the nationalisms and 
regionalisms which are politically so much in evidence, and so intensely cultivated.”11 Lewis 
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 England first seems lively and realistic, but soon becomes stiff and illusory. This 
transition is effected by the way that Satters and Pullman move their bodies, transgressing into 
spectator positions not authorized by the panorama. Barker’s panoramas mapped the 
discontinuities of the spatial imagination of the British Empire onto the bodies of the spectators 
who entered the installations. As Oetterman notes, “the panorama’s unbounded illusion of space 
came to function as a metaphor for the social reality of the British empire and of the 
uncontainable singularities of the spectator’s body” (3). See-sickness becomes the index of this 
metaphor. In Barker’s panoramas, the optical illusion of unbounded imperial space is checked by 
the physical reminder that one is standing on a viewing platform in a painting installation in 
London. In The Childermass, however, the situation is reversed. The visual experience arrests 
the illusion of a sensationally complete body. Seeing other bodies fragment and collapse in on 
themselves causes the soldiers to feel see-sickness, their vertigo reminding them of just how 
precarious their own bodies have become.  
Satters and Pullman react violently to these reminders, revolted by the other bodies. 
Despite standing inside of a scene represented on a canvas, they firmly believe that their bodies 
are unaffected by the bizarre hallucination in which they find themselves. As they move forward, 
however, that belief is challenged by bodies that appear distorted, stiff, or diminished. The first 
such encounter occurs when Satters and Pullman look back at the viewing platform:  
                                                
considers Ulysses to be “a time-book,” a novel that “lays its emphasis upon, for choice 
manipulates, and in a doctrinaire manner, the self-conscious time-sense, that has now been 
erected into a universal philosophy.”11 With its detailed and eclectic reconstruction of 1904 
Dublin, Ulysses is, in Lewis’s estimation, an example of the “time-fanaticism” that speaks to a 
renewed interest in regionalisms and nationalisms. The panorama, as a recreation of 18th-century 
Ipswich, is a comically-exaggerated version of Joyce’s novel. 
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Satters looks back. There is an iron railing where they had stood, and apparently a 
circular verandah. A group of posturing figures, with the silhouettes of ancient 
fashion-plates, pivot and point to all quarters of the compass, occupied with the 
view. Their arms stand outstretched, as stiff as cannons, or travel slowly across 
what they are surveying. One aims a telescope. A butterfly female revolves a grey 
parasol. Two point in his direction. These figures are swaggering a great deal, for 
peons, it is his opinion. (CM 84) 
 
These figures appear to be part of the installation itself, silhouettes whose stiff movements seem 
programmed to compass and survey the panorama like animatronic tour guides. Satters is made 
uncomfortable by the way that two of these less-than-human figures seem to be pointing at him. 
By now he is, of course, immersed in the panorama in a very different sense than Barker’s 
audiences had ever been. He and Pullman occupy the only perspectival position that the 
panorama does not authorize: the non-place inside the canvas. And now he finds himself being 
gestured at by an inhuman figure as if he were part of the vista, as if his body has been claimed 
by the space it occupies.  
 This moment is particularly unsettling for Satters because it is a peon that makes him 
aware of the way that the hallucination has affected his body. In The Childermass, peons are the 
“castoffs of God,” men who have been in Purgatory for too long and who have no hope of 
entering heaven. “Sacred” to some of the figures in the novel, “they are the mascots of the river-
crossing,” symbols of the traffic between purgatory and the inaccessible Magnetic City (13).12 
Indeed, the peons are afforded privileges not available to the citizens as they are clergy of the 
                                                
12 Their status as mascots is always at risk of falling into ridiculousness, as evidenced by the fact 
that they arrive in purgatory on a boat named “SHAM 101” (13).  
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Bailiff’s court and can claim the Benefit of Clergy, which would position them above the laws of 
purgatory. As the Bailiff notes to his citizens, the peons “could slay you with impunity, but no 
right possessed by you allows you to lift a finger against your problematic destroyer” (209). Such 
a right, however, is small compensation for the horrifying change citizens undergo when they 
become peons. Their prolonged stay has allowed their bodies to reflect their post-human life 
more directly. “Rigid as archaic waxworks,” the peons are “halted human shells” that attract the 
eye “as though to a suddenly perceived vacuum” (14). “They’re a particularly feeble lot,” 
Pullman tells Satters, “they seem scarcely material. We could almost walk through them!” (13).  
Their rigid yet scarcely material bodies and arrested movements fascinate Satters, and 
even though Pullman repeated tells him to look away he finds himself drawn to them. He is 
fascinated by the way that the look like objects that have suddenly disappeared, both present and 
absent. When stared at, the peons’ bodies are reduced to outlines that seem to flicker in and out 
of recognizably-human shapes, causing vertigo for the voyeur who has stared for too long:  
Here are there their surfaces collapse altogether as his eyes fall upon them, their 
whole appearance vanishes, the man is gone. But as the pressure withdraws of the 
full-blown human glance the shadow reassembles, in the same stark posture, 
every way as before, at the same spot—obliquely he is able to observe it coming 
back jerkily into position. One figure is fainter than any of the rest, he is a thin 
and shabby mustard yellow, in colouring a flat daguerreotype or one of the 
personnel of a pre-war film, split tarnished and transparent from travel and barter. 
He comes and goes; sometimes he is there, then he flickers out. (15) 
 
Looking at them for too long causes the peons to engage the unwelcome voyeur, repeating vague 
parroted phrases that they have learned from the less rigid citizens. “Zuuur! I say! … Zuuur!” 
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[“Sir! I say! … Sir!], one drawls when Satters stares for too long (17). Their vacuity both 
fascinates and makes the peons easy to forgot once one ceases to look at them: “The peons 
become a part of the sodden unsteady, phantasm of the past upon the spot. In the course of a 
minute they have convulsively faded. Satters forgets, too, what is hidden by his mountainous 
trembling shoulders and presently even the trembling is gone” (19). While every hallucination 
and distorted vision is forgotten rather quickly in Lewis’s purgatory, the peons seem to have a 
special status as vacuous figures. There and not there, they are menacing when engaged and 
immediately forgotten once passed by. Whenever one of the soldiers looks at a peon, its features 
“collapse,” as if being observed reveals it for what it has become: something that is now only 
vaguely human, something, in the Bailiff’s words, “post-human.” 
 If looking at a peon has this effect on its body, then it is understandable why being looked 
at so intensely by a peon is unsettling for Satters. A peon’s body is legible. Purgatory has marked 
itself onto the peon’s collapsing features and rendered its body into a version of Purgatory itself. 
They are visual representations of what is happening to all of the soldiers’ bodies. Satters is left 
wondering, what does it mean if this less-than-human figure looks at me? A while before they 
had entered the panorama, Satters, struggling with the concept of peons, had looked at Pullman 
and managed momentarily to change him into one:  
Pulley looks up. Satters gazes into a sallow vacant mask, on which the lines of 
sour malice are disappearing, till it is blank and elementary, in fact the face of a 
clay doll.  
‘Why, you are a peon!’ Satters cries pointedly, clapping his hands.  
Pulley recovers at his cry, and his face, with muscular initiative, shrinks as though 
in the grip of a colossal sneeze. The screwed-up cuticle is a pinched blister of a 
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head-piece: it unclenches, and the normal Pulley-mask emerges, but still sallow, 
battered and stiff-limbed.  
‘And you’re an ass! No.” Pulley mouths, as though about to sneeze, peaking his 
nostrils. ‘What made you say that? Was I asleep?’ (30) 
 
In Lewis’s Purgatory, being looked at by someone else threatens that firm belief in sensational 
completeness that matters so much to the soldiers. Your body is not stable. It does not even exist. 
And being looked at is a reminder of something that everyone in Purgatory seems as of yet 
unwilling to admit to himself. This threat is even more terrifying for the fact that Pullman does 
not seem to remember having been changed into a peon once he changes back, suggesting that 
such transformations could be happening constantly and unconsciously. 
 Part of what makes the peons terrifying for the other men is the fact that their bodies are 
legible; Purgatory has reduced them into abstract shapes. This legibility, however, is also what 
makes this novel’s exploration of embodiment in Purgatory such a fascinating reflection on the 
body as a geographical site. It is significant that the bodies that seem most transparent to the dead 
British soldiers are called peons. As the name suggests, the peons are, bizarrely, physical 
laborers. And they are described with a hodge-podge of racist colonial characterizations. 
Heathens with physical features that are catalogued as “barely human,” they are despised and 
feared by the soldiers who find them shadowy and aggressive. Their bodies are described as too 
reflective of their environment, somehow all the more disturbing for being “natural” to the place 
where they live.  
 As Satters and Pullman walk even further into the scene represented on the canvas, they 
begin to have more direct encounters with increasingly smaller peons. These encounters are often 
inflected with colonial discourse. Pullman describes their journey as an “out-of-bounds” 
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experience. They debate what would happen if all of the tiny peons could suddenly speak, joking 
about whether they would allow the peons home rule or just dominion status. Their journey ends 
when Satters grabs a very small peon by the neck. The foot-and-a-half-tall man protests, and 
Satters and Pullman are soon encircled by a group of suddenly active peons, one of whom speaks 
“in a ringing voice of small compass but deep and powerful”: “We may be in Lilliput,” he says, 
“but you are not a gentleman as was Gulliver, it is evident, from whatever world you have 
dropped, you may have been blown off some man but you are not one nor ever will be! You are 
a lout, as I have already said, and I say it again, in spite of your dimensions” (102). The 
encounter ends somewhat predictably with Satters becoming “electrified with rage” as he 
tramples the peon “out of human recognition” (103).  
 Like the figures from the viewing platform, this peon seems to map Satters’s body in a 
way that Satters is used to doing to peons. He speaks with “small compass” to great effect and 
questions Satters’s humanity in spite of his dimensions. Satters, meanwhile, is the body more 
directly animated by its environment as he becomes electrified with rage. He is the one who 
reacts violently, disfiguring the smaller man’s body in a way that robs it of its human 
resemblance. The Childermass dramatizes the discontinuity of reading non-Western bodies as 
“native” or “natural” while refusing to see the constitutive relationship between Western bodies 
and the vast colonial system in which they are embedded. Embodiment, then, becomes an “out-
of-bounds” experience, a way of interrogating nationality outside of the orthodox English space 
of the Bailiff’s court.  
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A Joke Too Deep for Laughter 
Satters ridicules the peons, looking closely at the surfaces of their bodies and finding 
there only the shell of humanity. Ridicule requires careful visual attention. He has to stare 
intently at them in order to see them collapse into mere outlines of themselves. This form of 
ridicule makes him ethically complicit in the violence being done to their bodies. Looking seems 
to be itself a form of violence here, precipitating the collapse of their surfaces. The peons look 
back at him in a moment of human recognition and ask him to stop. This returned gaze causes 
Satters to himself collapse into abstraction. When Pullman notes that he has now become a peon 
himself, Satters reacts with rage. He tramples the peon’s body out of human recognition to 
protect the fantasy he holds about himself, to stiffen himself against the idea that he, too, might 
be something less than human in this new post-human life.  
Throughout Lewis’s career, laughter often functions as a violent defense mechanism 
against threats to a body’s humanity. As Vincent Sherry has observed, Lewis inverts the 
Bergsonian theory of mechanized laughter by  
laugh[ing] at the pretence to humanity, the imitation of personhood by its 
inveterate inferiors; the very humanist vantage assumed by Bergson is here the 
butt of laughter. Lewis’s comic characters are not some subnormal exception; 
they comprise a usual humankind, whose strenuous but vacuous attempt to 
supersede their animal-mechanical nature affords the constant opportunity for 
comedy. (123) 
Where Bergson was hopeful and humanistic, Lewis is posthumanist. The humorously 
mechanized body is important for Bergson because “it identifies the fool, rebukes the automaton, 
and purges the nonperson, the thing, from proper society” (Sherry 122). For Lewis, however, the 
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real joke is the human-animal pretending to some lofty ideal of humanity that is always already a 
fantasy.  
 For Lewis, laughter is violence that asserts a community by defining the kids of bodies 
that should be excluded from that community. Yet laughter draws attention to the body of the 
person who would define those boundaries, and in doing so brings the laughing body onto the 
same plane as the bodies that it seeks to ridicule and define itself against. The Childermass maps 
this rhetoric of posthumanity onto the space of colonialist body politics. To the other men, the 
peons are subhuman because they have a close relationship to their environment. They are 
animated, articulated by the magnetism that pervades that environment. When the soldiers 
ridicule the peons, however, they find that their own bodies have become naturalized that 
environment as well. They are articulated by the same forces, and so respond in violence. 
Laughter is a definition of exclusionary community that collapses in on itself. 
 Though Lewis often described externalist art as “non-ethical satire” that does not rely on 
“the moral sanction of a community” for its value, laughter is almost empathetic function in The 
Childermass (Men Without Art 88). Here laughter is a violent act, one that asks the readers to 
become ethically complicit in the act of laughter as well. It is in this sense, finally, that Lewis’s 
conception of laughter is more ludicrous than ridiculous. Lewis’s fiction asks the reader to 
participate in violent actions, placing the reader in the uncomfortable position of distancing 
himself from that violence while also realizing that that distance is only available to him because 
he has been made complicit in the violence that repulses him. Jonathan Greenberg has argued 
that satire and modernism share an underlying logic:  
The modernity of satire, then, lies less in a particular moral, religious, or 
philosophical set of values that critical interpretation might recover […] than in a 
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kind of temperament or outlook, a satiric sensibility—a characteristic of the 
implied author and reader who savor the transgressive pleasures that satire 
affords, who may deride the chaos of modernity but also need it, even help create 
it. (8) 
Lewis’s satire creates a much more literal version of this satirical sensibility. It asks its readers to 
experience revulsion, to be disoriented by the play of visual surfaces not only in the novel’s 
prose but also on the bodies of the novel’s characters, and finally to ask whether a similarly 
instable bodily condition attends the way that their own bodies navigate the world.  
 This conflicted sensory experience is nowhere more evident than in the eruption of 
laughter in Lewis’s first novel, Tarr (1914). In an infamous scene, a painter explodes into 
laughter immediately before raping the women who is modeling for him. This rape scene is hard 
to take in no small part because of the way it is presented to the reader as “a joke too deep for 
laughter, parodying the phrase alienating sorrow and tears” (164). The chapter begins with a 
description of the model’s posture immediately after the rape, before going back to reconstruct 
the lead up to and execution of the violent act. Bertha, the model, is described as reminiscent of 
the victim of a practical joke. The narrator recounts the way that her body was “bent awkwardly 
forward, neck craned out” while she tidies her clothes. The narrator continues: “This had been, 
too, a practical joke of the primitive and whimsical order, in its madness and inconsequence. But 
it was of a solemn and lonely kind, more like the tricks that desperate people play upon 
themselves: at its consummation there had been no chorus of intelligible laughter” (ibid). 
Academic criticism does not usually afford the critic room for personal response, and yet I find it 
impossible not to allow the first-person voice to interject here. It is absurd to compare rape to a 
practical joke, the trauma of sexual violence to the hurt feelings of someone who he is “spitting 
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out the remains of their polluted drink.” All of the hallmarks of Lewis’s writing about laughter 
are here: primitive bodies that experienced violence, a joke without laughter, and a bizarre 
insistence on viewing gender and sexuality through the lens of a kind of mirthless laughter that is 
frankly itself a form of violence.  
In short, I find this passage revolting.  
Lewis draws attention to and perhaps amplifies readerly disgust when he describes the 
rape as a joke too deep for laughter. No one is laughing here, he assures the reader, but this is 
still structurally speaking a joke. It is a practical joke, which would imply that it is about the 
body. Is there a reader who has encountered this scene who has not asked, but why must it be a 
joke at all?  
The way that Kresiler, the painter, and Bertha describe each other prefigures the way that 
the act of looking at someone else changes bodily composition in The Childermass. As Kreisler 
begins to paint Bertha’s portrait, he becomes distracted by her arms. “You arms are like 
bananas!,” he exclaims (166). The observation worries Bertha, who now believes that “anybody 
who could regard her arms in that light was inartistic” (ibid). The portrait, she now believes, is 
no longer an artistic act but instead merely sexual. Kreisler’s observation seems to spur his 
violent impulse, and he quickly grabs her arms and forces himself upon her. After the rape, 
Bertha tries to square the different version of Kreisler that she has experienced that afternoon:  
She saw side by side and unconnected, the silent figure engaged in drawing her 
bust and the other one full of blindness and violence. Then there were two other 
figures, one getting up from the chair, yawning, and the present lazy one at the 
window—four in all, that she could not for some reason bring together, each in a 
complete compartment of time of its own. (167) 
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Laughter opens up the body as a kind of “laughing machine” that recognizes itself as something 
less than human through laughter (“A Soldier of Humour” 17). Lewis’s reader is asked to 
approach this passage through a satirical sensibility, revulsion in direct conflict with the bizarre 
and uncomfortable intellectual problem of how a rape could in any possible world be considered 
a joke.  
What else could we say that this passage accomplishes besides making the reader feel 
somewhat less than human?  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
The Agile Agency of Elizabeth Bowen’s Comic Style 
 
Satire’s bodies 
In Wyndham Lewis’s  early satirical fiction, a person’s sense of humor is mapped onto the 
physical capabilities of his body. Individuals who bully and mock are described as having strong, 
capable bodies. “My bodies is large, white and savage,” one character boasts (“A Soldier of 
Humour” 17). When he engages in witty repartee with another person, he describes himself as a 
fighting machine that has channeled its violence into laughter:  
But all the fierceness has been transformed into laughter. It still looks like a visi-
gothic fighting-machine, but it is in reality a laughing machine. As I have 
remarked, when I laugh I gnash my teeth, which is another brutal survival and a 
thing laughter has taken over from war. Everywhere where formerly I would fly at 
throats, I now howl with laughter. That is me. (ibid)  
The eponymous soldier of humor has translated his brutality into laughter. The old violent body 
language moves into this new register with surprising ease, as he gnashes his teeth and grimaces 
with a kind of gleefully violent laughter. The bodies of characters who less up to the challenge of 
witty exchange are often described as lacking finesse. They, too, are machines, just less efficient. 
The soldier of humor says that he can read “the important secret of [one] man’s entire machine” 
by looking at “the awkward cut of his clothes, with their unorthodox shoulders and bellying 
hams” (23). Satire tries to understand a person’s “entire machine” through surface reading. That 
surface, for Lewis, is often described in terms of movement. The soldier thinks that a worthy 
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adversary should move like he does, with a violent agility that this other man, with his poor-
fitting clothes, simply does not possess.  
  Agility is an important concept for Anglo-Irish novelist Elizabeth Bowen as well. In To 
The North, Bowen employs a comic style that is reminiscent of Lewis’s externalist art in style 
but wholly different in its social philosophy. As in “A Soldier of Humour,” agility signifies a 
sharp mind that revels in wit. The body of a Bowen character say a lot about, to use Lewis’s 
phrase, its entire machine, with the crucial difference that agility is defined by the degree to 
which someone is able to connect with and not dominate others. Whereas Lewis’s satire mocked 
the human-animal-machine aping at an ideal of humanity, Bowen’s fiction valorizes the 
personality that can empathize and connect above all else. For both authors, agility is a gendered 
concept. In Lewis’s satires agility is masculine and violent, while in Bowen’s work agility speaks 
to the way that women respond to sexual violence.  
Elizabeth Bowen’s To the North (1932) is a novel seemingly at odds with itself. The 
frequently satirical tone of Bowen’s wry narrator would appear to be in direct contrast with the 
neo-Gothic melodrama of the novel’s plot. The coexistence of these opposing narrative strategies 
amounts a distinctly comic style, a syntax of humor perhaps most evident where the narrator 
chides the male characters’ dominating comic sensibilities. What looks like formal inconsistency 
is in fact comic style. Yet, if To the North is a comic novel, it is not the kind described by Ian 
McEwan when he says that reading comic fiction is “like being wrestled to the ground and being 
tickled, being forced to laugh” (qtd. in Soal). Though it would of course be difficult to gage the 
affective reaction of every—or even the average—Bowen reader, it seems unlikely that one 
would walk away from a novel like To the North with the distinct feeling of having been sat 
upon while tickled. Bowen’s novel is comic in a less obvious way, creating a style that is 
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structurally comic but not riotously humorous. Like Lewis, Bowen creates a style that expresses 
a mirthless laughter, though, for Bowen, such laughter is decidedly more optimistic.   
This style—what I call the novel’s meta-comedy—is not comic insofar as it provokes 
boisterous laughter, but rather is so structurally. The novel’s style, rather than provoking the kind 
of self-reflexive laughter that critics often associate with late modernist fiction, embodies that 
laughter in the style of the novel itself. In theorizing Bowen’s comic style, then, this paper also 
attempts to rethink the category of late modernist comedy. Offering a definition of late 
modernism less as a movement than as a framework, I suggest that authors who, like Bowen, 
balance the difficulty of formal innovation with the readability of popular fiction utilize the 
aesthetic frameworks of late modernist comic style in order to create, not an aesthetics of 
impotency based on “an almost substanceless subjective ground for giving form to a work” 
(Miller 57), but one of agency. Late modernist writing, then, represents a move first towards a 
mirthless satirical mode and then a turn away from satire before finally moving towards a newly 
optimistic and ethical comic style that dramatizes the problem of sexual agency as structural 
incongruity.  
 
A page of Proust superimposed on a clear page of Wodehouse 
To The North (1932) is often considered one of Bowen’s lesser works, overshadowed by 
novels that register the affect of particular places during major geopolitical upheaval. The Last 
September (1929) chronicles the end of the big house period in Anglo-Irish history, while The 
Heat of the Day (1948) is considered to be one of the most significant documents of what 
London felt like during the blitz. The focus of To the North is more local than these novels. 
Gender and sensation are significant to all of Bowen’s work, but here they become the primary 
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focus. To the North follows Emmeline Summers as she works in the decidedly male space of a 
London travel agency and as she navigates an abusive romantic relationship with Markie 
Linkwater. As the title suggests, movement is an important category of experience in the novel, 
as new technologies of transportation, body language, and living/working spaces intersect to 
drive the novel’s primary conflicts.  
Agility is perhaps most important in understanding the way that men and women interact 
with each other in the novel. “It’s like watching something catch too many flies on its tongues,” 
Cecilia remarks to her sister-in-law Emmeline after Markie leaves their house for the first time 
(Bowen 58). Though a success, the party was of the kind that “leave[s] one rather depressed” 
after it is over (58). Markie had spent the evening dominating the conversation. More than just 
the life of the party, his sense of humor seemed to negate the possibility of anyone else even 
telling a joke. For Bowen’s narrator, this forceful comic sensibility was manifest on his body—
“having almost no neck he veered bodily from the waist, which gave one an alarming sense of 
his full attention—or traversing round the table his rapid fire of talk, he dominated the party” 
(57). Stocky and restricted in his movement, Markie has to literally throw his weight around in 
order to make his comedic presence felt.  
When Cecilia compares Markie to a frog (“something catch[ing] too many flies on its 
tongue”), she suggests that his manner of telling jokes at a party is a kind of violence, albeit a 
violence against a fly. It is not violence against his hosts. Rather, Markie places the others in 
uncomfortable position of simply watching as he does violence to someone else, perhaps in the 
form of telling jokes about other people. Cecilia feels she has been made to watch violence 
happen, not that it has happened to her. The narrator, however, describes Markie as rapidly 
turning at his hosts, dominating the party with a series of whole-body gestures. The “alarming 
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sense” with which his hosts receive “his full attention” comically literalizes the figurative 
violence he performs against them in dominating the party. In describing his figurative violence 
as a literal immobility, the narrator not only suggests that there is something funny about 
Markie’s physical presence but also implies that it was not funny to those at the party. As a 
result, Cecilia’s comparison of Markie to a frog takes on a new connotation. Just as the narrator 
wryly notes the way that Markie’s sense of humor is represented through his body’s 
inadvertently comic gestures, so too Cecilia’s quip becomes both a comment on the violence of 
Markie’s gesture and evidence of an inability to see that violence as being directed at herself.  
Throughout To the North there is a gap between the satirical commentary of the narrator 
and the alternatively tragic and melodramatic events that take place in the novel. Maud Ellmann 
has suggested that Bowen’s novel “pits its Gothic melodrama of destructive passion against a 
comedy of manners; in generic terms, Emily Bronte collides with Oscar Wilde” (101). Yet, the 
technique of To the North is not quite genre parody because neither genre is ever really kicked to 
the side. Indeed, the melodramatic and the comic exist side by side throughout the novel, though 
there is often more humor in the narrator’s asides than in the characters’ words and actions and 
the element of tragedy in the novel’s plot is often not mimicked in the narrator’s voice. There is 
something distinctly comic about the coexistence of these two narrative modes—indeed, 
Bowen’s style itself seems comic.  
The distance between a narrator and a cast of characters is of course a convention of the 
novel. Yet, To the North exaggerates this difference and repeatedly draws attention to the 
coexistence of something like two novels, one narrated and one occurring. In To the North, the 
reader’s attention is constantly pulled between melodrama and comedy, plot and narrator. One 
significant example of this exaggerated style is way that the narrator frequently remarks on 
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Markie’s sense of humor. When Emmeline visits Markie’s flat for the first time, she is startled by 
the sound of his cook whistling “up the speaking-tube when dinner was starting up the lift” 
(Bowen 84). Emmeline laughs “immoderately” (ibid). “What an extraordinary cook,” she 
exclaims, “our cook doesn’t whistle” (Bowen 84). Finding himself the object of an outburst of 
“immoderate” laughter, Markie reacts with a cold explanation of the situation. Bowen’s narrator 
informs us that his “sense of humor was not agile, [that he] saw nothing funny about his 
domestic arrangements” and that “he was accustomed to lead laughter rather than be surprised by 
it” (ibid). If Markie’s sense of humor is described earlier in the novel as being represented 
through his physical presence in the room, then, here, that physical restrictiveness is translated 
back into the figurative. Markie’s distaste for being surprised by a joke becomes rigidity.   
We might read agility in two ways. It could connote being able to be both the joker and 
the object of ridicule, being flexible enough to be on both sides of the punch line. Yet, agility 
might also signify the desire to avoid ever being the butt of a joke at all—that is, to be someone 
who always manages to stay on the side of the mocking and never fall into the camp of the 
mocked. The difference between these two connotations can be clarified by looking at Freud’s 
1928 revision of Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious—a brief essay titled, 
“Humor.” In this community-based theory of comedy, Freud distinguishes between “humor” and 
“wit” as two distinct manifestations of the comic impulse. Though both have “in [them] a 
liberating element,” humor is directed at oneself and wit is directed at others (Freud 2). Unlike 
wit, humor is “fine and elevating […]. It refuses to be hurt by the arrows of reality or to be 
compelled to suffer” (2).  
For Freud, telling jokes, whether they fall into the category of humor or of wit, involves 
“adopting towards the [object of the joke] the attitude of an adult towards a child, recognizing 
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and smiling at the triviality of the interests and the sufferings which seem to the child so big” (3). 
In wit—laughing at others—one adopts a parental perspective with reference to the individual 
who is the butt of the joke. In humor—laughing at oneself—one is both the joke-teller and the 
object of ridicule; in humor one mocks oneself. It is precisely because of this ability to be both 
parent and child that Freud holds humor, though frequently less riotously hilarious, to be 
nonetheless more liberating and elevating: 
[…] the jest made in humor is not the essential thing; it has only the value of a 
proof. The principal thing is the intention which humor fulfills, whether it 
concerns the subject’s self or other people. Its meaning is: ‘Look here! This is all 
that this seemingly dangerous world amounts to. Child’s play—the very thing to 
jest about! (Freud 5) 
When jokes are made about others, one highlights the absurdity or horror of a situation. We 
laugh because there is no way out, because of the fact of the object of ridicule’s childishness. 
Indeed, we not only laugh at the inescapability of the situation, but also at the way that that 
inescapability belittles the person stuck in it. In humor, however, we laugh because that same 
childishness has been made child’s play. The inescapable has been made trivial. Though we 
might laugh less heartily than at what Freud calls the humorous joke, we are at least not returned 
to the world as an inevitable horrifying place. As Simon Critchley notes, Freud’s theory suggests 
that “humour both reveals the situation, and indicates how that situation might be changed. That 
is to say, laughter has a certain redemptive or messianic power” (16). Freud revised his earlier 
theory of comedy to incorporate a community-based ethics. Laughing at others is not only 
demeaning to the objects of ridicule (a claim that would seem to be obvious), but indeed less 
socially useful as well. It is only in laughing at oneself that one is able to suggest an alternative 
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scenario, to make the dangerous into “child’s play” and not only to return oneself (and others) to 
the world as it is but to hint at the possibility of change as well.  
 Freud’s distinction illustrates the ethical implications in the two possible connotations of 
the term agility listed above. The person who is agile enough to be both the joker and the butt of 
the joke laughs self-reflexively. If one is rigid enough not to refuse to ever be the butt of joke, 
then one never laughs humorously in Freud’s sense of the term, never sublimates childishness 
into child’s play. What Freud suggests is that humor is valuable precisely because of its agility—
its playfulness. When the narrator quips that Markie has a particularly rigid sense of humor, the 
implication is that he is merely witty in Freud’s sense of the term. If comedy is a game, then 
when Markie plays no one else gets a turn: “he dominate[s] the party” (Bowen 57). Agility, in 
this context, does not connote the ability to always remain on the mocking side of a joke (i.e., 
Markie’s special social skill). Rather, to be agile in one’s sense of humor here connotes being 
humorous in Freud’s sense. Yet, the syntax of the narrator’s observation is strange. Saying that 
Markie’s sense of humor was “not agile” offers agility as a category of humor, and we are left 
with the question, who, if anyone, has an agile sense of humor in To the North?  
One of the idiosyncrasies of Bowen’s style in To the North is the distance between a 
frequently comedic omniscient narrator and a cast of comically unaware characters. Emmeline’s 
short-sightedness, likewise, becomes a comic literalization of her own lack of self-awareness. 
Indeed, as Ellmann notes, her “myopia makes a comic contrast to the long-sighted vistas of her 
enterprise. Imagining herself a rocket scientist, rather than a lowly travel agent, she shoots her 
clients into unknown continents” (103). Lady Waters, who imagines herself floating into and 
rearranging the affairs of everyone around her, “was quick to detect situations that did not exist” 
and she often “enlarged her life into ripples of apprehension on everybody’s behalf” (Bowen 10). 
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In contrast to her cast of characters, To the North’s narrator sees everyone more clearly than they 
see themselves. Yet, much of the humor of the novel arises from the narrator mocking the 
characters, drawing attention to the way that she sees the characters far more clearly than they 
see themselves. To borrow from Freud’s terminology, much of the humor of To the North is 
more witty than humorous.1 
Regina Barreca theorizes the comic technique of To the North in terms of gendered 
comedic agencies. Reflecting on Markie’s tendency to “dominate the party,” she notes that 
Markie “is too busy making an impression of himself to register an impression made by someone 
else; he is too busy being amusing to be amused” (126). Bowen’s fiction, she argues, suggests 
that because “men’s humor rarely leaves women unscathed […] women must create their own 
humor in contrast to the conventions of comedy” (125). Under this reading, Bowen’s fiction 
contains not only a dominating, “male” comic sensibility, but also something that we might want 
to call a “feminine” sense of humor, something that Barreca thinks might end up looking nothing 
at all like what we typically think of as comedy. Barreca’s reading suggests that the alternative to 
Markie’s dominating wit can be found in the sense of humor of another of the novel’s characters. 
Yet, such a strategy is antithetical to the way that Bowen, as Ellman suggests, “thinks in fiction: 
[the way that] her ideas are inseparable from her objects, settings, plots, characters, and from the 
oddities of her unnerving syntax” (Ellmann 7). If Bowen wants to say something about comedy 
in To the North, then it is to be found not on the level of characterization but rather on the level 
                                                
1 The most obvious exception to this general stance of unsympathetic wit is in the way that the narrator treats 
Emmeline—a character who is not only tragic, but also, as I argue in Part II of this essay, comic. The peculiar 
agency of Bowen’s comic style is most evident in the style of the passages in which Emmeline responds to Markie’s 
jokes—what I call the “meta-comedy” of their relationship. Though Emmeline’s ambition is wryly mocked by the 
narrator, her way of negotiating Markie’s sense of humor is not.  
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of narrative strategy—or, perhaps more accurately, at the point of intersection between style and 
narrative technique.  
 Published in 1932, To the North’s comic style places it in a constellation of other late 
modernist novels in which experimental style and comedy intersect. Novels like Samuel 
Beckett’s Murphy (1938) and Djuna Barnes’s Ryder (1928) are difficult not only because they do 
not fit into the usual narrative of an overtly politically-conscious 1930’s modernism, but also 
because their departure from that mode (and from earlier modernist texts as well) is in part due to 
their employment of a distinctly comic style. Late modernist novels in this tradition engage with 
the political conditions of the 1930’s more obliquely than many other late modernist novels. 
Style, for novels like Murphy and Ryder, is often closely related to comedy. Indeed, to think 
about the relationship between a novel like Murphy and the politics of the 1930’s is to think 
about the relationship between style and comedy.2 The style of Samuel Beckett’s middle period, 
for example, is often described as a “syntax of weakness”: 
As Beckett’s Malone remarks, paralysed in his death-bed, ‘If I had the use of my 
body I would throw it out of the window. But perhaps it is the knowledge of my 
impotence that emboldens me to that thought.’ This is quintessentially 
oxymoronic Beckett: the condition of the possibility for the hypothesis 
‘if…then…’ is an impossibility. (Critchley 106) 
Beckett’s fiction is dominated by a “comic syntax” that suggests that “life is not something to be 
affirmed ecstatically, but acknowledged comically” (ibid). The joke is graphed onto (and indeed, 
                                                
2 David Weisberg notes the complexity of this dilemma for Beckett in writing Murphy. He argues that the novel 
negotiates “the choice facing the artist in the 1930’s [to] respond to the ‘colossal fiasco’ either by engaging it, by 
making ‘contact,’ or by escaping into the freedom of the imagination, even if the escape courts madness” through 
style (32). In writing Murphy’s encounter with this dilemma, Beckett comes to an aesthetic “impasse”—“Aesthetic 
autonomy, imagined as a closed, self-sufficient system of mind and language, blocks rather than provides access to 
the liberation of the ‘real’ […] from habituated modes of perception” (41). The way that Murphy engages with the 
political problematic of 1930’s Europe was through a style that was in many ways about the comedy of the impasse.  
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perhaps most evident in) Beckett’s syntax. Formal experimentation has become comic style. 
Though the style of To the North differs from Beckett’s comic syntax in many ways, I would like 
to suggest that we must approach Bowen’s novel with the same mentality that we approach 
works like Murphy and Ryder. We can expand what Ellmann calls Bowen’s “unnerving syntax” 
to include Bowen’s overall style as well, suggesting that her syntax is part of a larger comic 
narrative stylistics. It is not enough to think about the way that characters joke with one another 
in To the North, nor is it enough to talk about why the novel is funny at some points and 
melodramatic at others. To talk about the humor of To the North is to talk about Bowen’s style.  
 The idiosyncrasy of Bowen’s syntax is evident from the first sentence of the novel. To the 
North begins with a description of a train station: 
Towards the end of April a breath from the north blew cold down Milan platforms 
to meet the returning traveller (sic). Uncertain thoughts of home filled the station 
restaurant where the English sat lunching uneasily, facing the clock. The Anglo-
Italian express—Chiasso, Lucerne, Basle and Boulogne—leaves at 2:15: it is not 
a train de luxe. To the north there were still the plains, the lakes, the gorges of the 
Ticino, but, as the glass brass-barred doors of the restaurant flashed and swung, 
that bright circular part outside with its rushing girdle of trams was the last of 
Italy. (Bowen 1) 
The syntax of this paragraph is difficult, either describing the perspective of “the returning 
traveller” or possibly describing the station from the point of view of no one and everyone at 
once. The “returning traveller” might be Cecilia Summers. Yet, if that is the case, it seems odd 
that Cecilia would only be introduced at the start of the next paragraph as if for the first time—
“Cecilia Summers, a young widow returning to London, was among the first to board the 
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express” (ibid). The opening paragraph describes the train station from the point of view of 
someone who is about to embark on a train, and yet the narrator refuses to single out an 
individual traveler. It is as if the event described by the opening paragraph and the paragraph 
itself are somehow at odds with one another.  
The distance between syntax and described object/event is perhaps most evident in the 
second sentence. The narrator on one level simply tells her readers that a group of English 
travelers are anxiously awaiting the coming train in the restaurant, thinking “uncertain thoughts 
of home.” Yet, the syntax suggests that the “uncertain thoughts of home” literally “filled the 
restaurant” in which the English travelers just happened to be “lunching uneasily.” Something 
similar happens in the next sentence. Though we might say that the event described is the 
impending arrival at 2:15 of “the Anglo-Italian express,” the syntax here suggests a remark made 
by one passenger to another that has been uprooted from its context and placed in this paragraph 
in collage-like fashion. The final sentence of the paragraph is similarly idiosyncratic. It begins by 
listing a series of sites that one will see on the coming train ride—“the plains, the lakes, the 
gorges of the Ticino.” Then it goes on to locate the unnamed subject of the sentence’s position in 
the station as being behind “the glass brass-barred doors of the restaurant.” The “bright circular 
part outside,” we are told, “was the last of Italy.” The question is, the last of Italy for whom?   
Beginning with the next paragraph, the chapter focuses on Cecilia’s train journey and her 
encounter with Markie. Yet, this first paragraph both outlines the experiences any English 
traveler about to return home might have while waiting for the train and refuses to focus in on 
any one passenger. From the novel’s first sentence, there is a difference between the thing 
described and its description. Yet, what matters here is less the difference itself than the fact of 
the conjunction of opposites at work in the gap between syntax and event. If, as Ellmann claims, 
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To the North is, generically-speaking, Oscar Wilde writing Wuthering Heights, then it is also a 
novel in which the convention of the distant, commenting narrator is exaggerated to become the 
coexistence of difficult syntax and melodramatic plot. The opposition of syntax and plot, perhaps 
most obvious in the moments where the narrator wryly comments on the characters’ senses of 
humor, is what I want to term Bowen’s comic style.  
 Bowen gives us a metaphor for this style early on in the novel when Julian panics over 
the arrival of Pauline, his orphaned niece—“His community with all bachelor uncles in the great 
tradition of English humorous fiction did not console Julian. He saw that this must be funny, but 
suffered acutely” (Bowen 41). Though he recognizes himself to be in the position of the bachelor 
uncle in comic fiction, he nonetheless “suffered acutely.” The narrator describes Pauline’s arrival 
in typographical terms:  
The descent of an orphan child on his life might have been superficially comic, or 
even touching. But the disheartening density of Proust was superimposed for him 
on a clear page of Wodehouse. The poor child’s approximation to what she took 
to be naturalness parodied his own part in an intimacy. (42) 
Julian’s fretting over what easily might be seen as a “superficially comic” situation is compared 
to a page of Proust superimposed on a “clear page of Wodehouse.” We might read this as the 
narrator remarking on the humorous way in which Julian exaggerates a comical situation into 
“Proust.” Indeed, to make Proust out of Wodehouse—to try to elevate the mundane—is the very 
definition of being melodramatic. Yet, the image of a page from one novelist superimposed on a 
page from a radically different novelist also functions as an image of Bowen’s comic style. 
Instead of reading the image as suggesting that the page from Proust muddies the clarity of the 
Wodehouse—i.e., turns the comic into the melodramatic—I would suggest that this image refers 
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to Bowen’s style—specifically, the way that reading about Julian’s situation is like reading both 
one page and another beneath it at the same time. Reading To the North involves working 
through not only the gap between syntax and event, but also the difference between comedic 
commentary and tragic/melodramatic plot. Indeed, it involves recognizing that the text reduces to 
neither “Proust” not “Wodehouse”; indeed, that it is somehow both. Bowen’s style consists in 
this dual-request of her readers—to read both commentary and plot, never mind how much they 
are at odds with one another.  
Bowen’s style in To the North is not comic in the sense that it provokes boisterous 
laughter, but rather in the sense that it consists in the conjunction of opposites. This style is 
structurally similar to what Freud terms the humorous. The novel itself contains both the 
narrator’s wit and the melodrama of the plot—that is, both the mocker and the mocked. 
Returning to the question of who has an agile sense of humor in the novel, it seems as if one 
clear candidate is the novel itself. Like Freud’s concept of humor, Bowen’s style is not riotously 
hilarious. Yet, it is does something that a merely witty novel cannot. Freud thinks that humor is 
valuable because it not only returns us to the world as it exists, but also offers us a vision of that 
world with a difference. The tragic, terrible, or horrifyingly mundane can be trivial as well; 
Freud’s humor is laughter with options. Thinking about To the North as having a humorous 
style—as having what Critchley calls a “messianic” quality—allows us to think of style as 
having agency. Agility and agency have the same Latin root—agere, or “to do.” To have an agile 
sense of humor is to have agency, to be able to suggest a possible alternative to the situation at 
which one laughs. In a novel featuring a travel agent—a woman whose lover is the most frequent 
object of the narrator’s ridicule—this comic style challenges the way that critics have theorized 
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the comic element of late modernist style as impotent or fundamentally lacking any agency 
whatsoever.  
 
Between melodrama and externalist style 
 Late modernism is a vexed—and not always useful—category for describing the way that 
modernist writers in the late 1920s began to satirize the conceptual framework of the highly-
visible generation of modernist writers that included Pound, Yeats, Eliot, and Joyce. This 
concept is particularly useful in thinking about the relationship between canonical writers and 
authors who share some affinities with other modernist writers but seem to be doing something 
rather different at the same time. It is therefore more useful as a framework for thinking about 
the unconventionality of authors like Bowen than it is as a category with clearly defined generic 
and conventional boundaries. For Bowen, the concept of late modernism provides a way of 
thinking about how her work differs from that of someone like Wyndham Lewis, an author with 
whom she shares many visual strategies put to very different uses.  
Late modernism is often defined as a response to historical conditions coming to bear on 
the ideology of modernist aesthetics. Though numerous critics have noted that the formal 
innovations of first-generation modernist literature mediate the political conditions in which the 
texts were written, critics working on late modernism have suggested that in this later moment 
the political is not just mediated by form but in fact causes form to become internally 
inconsistent. Such is Tryus Miller’s claim when he suggests that “if modernist poetics are a mesh 
of interrelated statements, evaluations, and judgments, then late modernist writing is the product 
of the pressure of historical circumstances on that mesh, which threatens to fray or break at its 
weakest points” (19). Miller locates a tendency in authors writing around or after 1926 to resist 
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what he sees as the effort of earlier modernists to focus “on the problem of mastering a chaotic 
modernity by means of formal techniques” (17). Miller characterizes late modernism in terms of 
a formal technique that resists unification. It is a movement based on the impotency of formal 
innovation, and yet also defined by an attempt to make that impotency the focus of a stylistic 
practice.  
 Miller suggests that one result of such attempts is the creation of “self-reflexive 
laughter,” which he associates most closely with the mirthless laughter of Wyndham Lewis’s 
satire (46). Laughter in Lewis, he argues, has the function of “inoculat[ing] the organism against 
the buffetings it faces from without […]” (47). Yet, at the same time, it is a distinctly impotent 
laughter, apparently incapable of just the kind of shoring up it was intended to produce: 
In late modernist works, accordingly, self-reflexive laughter bursts out above all 
at moments of maximum stress on characters, pushed to the limits of madness, 
dissociation, and death. The potential for such eruptive manifestations of laughter, 
however, underscores the tenuous nature of all such containing structures of 
literary form. (57)  
Late modernism, Miller argues, is a movement that “both reflected and reflected critically upon 
[the] loss of a stable, authentic social ground” (43). The novels of Samuel Beckett, Wyndham 
Lewis, and Djuna Barnes “point to a shared sense that their contemporary reality—both 
subjective and objective—was somehow becoming ‘less real’” (45). Laughter is the symptom of 
this fracturing of shared reality. What is most significant about Miller’s argument, however, is 
that laughter is both the product of late modernist style and that which illustrates such a style’s 
“lack of formal solidity”: 
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In the case of late modernist writing the “occasion” is the writing itself, which 
seeks to provoke self-reflexive laughter as its “significant” and “conscious” 
expression. Yet as such, this intention represents a very weak organizing basis—
an almost substanceless subjective ground for giving form to a work. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the observable lack of formal solidity in late modernist 
works, an absence of overall symbolic form, which runs the gamut from pastiche 
[…] to out-and-out collapses of large-scale form. (57-8) 
The “intention” of late modernist style—its aim to produce a self-reflexive laughter that in 
shoring up the subject against dissolution marks the decline of a shared sense of reality—is itself 
a weak organizing formal principle.   
  Not all theorist of late modernism agree with Miller’s assessment that the formal 
strategies of late modernism point towards a feeling of the dissolution of a shared sense of 
reality. Jed Esty has argued that “in the demotropolitanizing phase, modernists begin to connect 
aesthetic impersonality less to ingenius stylistic innovation (which could always be assimilated 
back to the notion of the idiosyncratic mind) and more directly to shared rituals and traditions” 
(12). Artists like Eliot and Woolf, beginning in the 1930’s, “seem to posit an inherited cultural 
legacy as the agent required to mediate between totality and particularity, between unity and 
fragmentation, or between the collective and the individual” (13). Esty and Miller differ in the 
group of authors that they list as contributing to this late modernist reassessment of early 
modernist practices. Esty defines late modernism as the late work of modernism/modernists 
whereas Miller defines it as an “emergent literature [that] appears in tandem with a still 
developing corpus of high modernism” (Miller 10).  
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 Both theories, however, define the kind of self-reflexive and often comic writing that 
emerged in late 1920s as modernist in some form. Elizabeth Bowen does not quite fit into this 
descriptive category as she balances melodrama with modernist style. She is perhaps closer to 
the middlebrow, a different kind of self-reflexive writing that in the interwar period often 
satirized modernist techniques. Nicola Humble characterizes the middlebrow novel during this 
period in terms of its “frivolity and its flexible generic boundaries” (Humble 5). She notes that 
middlebrow is never a popular category and certainly not something that an author aspires to 
(12). The worry is that middlebrow writers are simple rehearsing tired genre conventions or 
doing a half-hearted and heavily commercialized pastiche of the avant-garde. Yet it is precisely 
this element genre parody, she argues that gives the middlebrow is dynamic appeal. “There is a 
determined intertextuality about this literature,” she argues, where “novels continually refer to 
other novels, with the effect that an intricate network of connections is built up between texts” 
(47). She recasts the old critique of middlebrow writing as commercialized and recycle literary 
form as a vibrant intertextuality, asking what this intertextuality signifies for the readers who 
voraciously consume these novels.  
 Stella Gibbons’ satirical novel, Cold Comfort Farm (1932), employs many of the 
strategies that Humble associates with middlebrow writing in the 1920s and 1930s. Gibbons 
satirizes the work of authors like Thomas Hardy, for whom natural environments provided 
metaphors about the way that characters think and feel. Cold Comfort Farm is intensely 
intertextual, featuring not only frequent allusions to the novels of Hardy and the Brontë sisters 
but also references to textual strategies employed by travel guides. Parody (of Hardy and the 
Brontës) and pastiche (of travel guides) play an important role in Gibbons’ narrative strategy. 
Cold Comfort Farm is not simply reheating the stale literary techniques of a past generation. It is 
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reframing them, through satire and pastiche, as a way of critiquing the relationship between the 
individual and the region in popular British fiction. This last point is particularly important 
because when Gibbons gently mocks Hardy, she knows that her readers will be familiar with the 
subject material. Doing so reframes Hardy as a popular novelist.  
 Cold Comfort Farm begins with a letter from the author to a dear friend, laying the novel 
before him in a gesture that parodies the long-standing convention of presenting novels as 
intimate storytelling that the author would never dream of considering for publication on her 
own. Gibbons presents herself here “with something more than the natural deference of a tyro,” a 
curious allusion to the never naturally-deferent Wyndham Lewis (Gibbons, 5). She writes that in 
transitioning from journalist to novelist she had to learn to repackage her thinking for a new 
market: 
I found, after spending ten years as a journalist, learning to say exactly what I 
meant in short sentences, that I must learn, if I was to achieve literature and 
favourable reviews, to write as though I were not quite sure about what I meant 
but was jolly well going to say something all the same in sentences as long as 
possible. (5-6) 
Literature is something to achieve and equated with getting favorable reviews from the press. 
This achievement can be accomplished through obfuscation and baggy sentences. Many of the 
hallmarks of modernist writing (difficulty, allusion, complicated syntax, ambiguity) are here 
reframed as market requirements for literary success. Over sixty years before Lawrence Rainey’s 
Institutions of Modernism, Gibbons was taking modernist writers to task over their 
commercialization.  
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 Gibbons is concerned that her readers will not be able to navigate the literary conventions 
she has felt compelled to adopt in her novel, and so she graciously provides them with a guide to 
the most important moments, a kind of internal Cliff Notes: 
And it is only because I have in mind all those thousands of persons not unlike 
myself, who work in the vulgar and meaningless bustle of offices, shops and 
homes, and who are not always sure whether a sentence is Literature or whether it 
is just sheer flapdoodle, that I have adopted a method perfected by the late Herr 
Baedecker, and firmly marked what I consider the finer passages with one, two, or 
three stars. In such a manner did the good man deal with cathedrals, hotels and 
paintings by men of genius. There seems no reason why it should be applied to 
passages in novels. (6-7) 
The author aligns herself with her readers, who may not be able to distinguish between Literature 
and flapdoodle. She humorously implies that she herself may have had to use conventions in her 
own writing that she does not fully understand. The starred passages almost always parody the 
work of other novelists, and her system of asterisks points the reader to moments in the novel 
that are both the most Literary and the most satirically original.  
Cold Comfort Farm is an example of the kind of writing that emerges in the space 
between the conventions of modernist and popular writing practices. Through parody Gibbons 
demonstrates a detailed knowledge of the conventions that she claims not to fully understand. In 
addressing the reader who works in the vulgar and meaningless bustle of office spaces and 
homes, she implicitly asks why the ability to navigate the overwhelming noise of everyday life 
does not enable readers to navigate literary convention. The joke here relies on the unspoken 
connection between literary flapdoodle and vulgar, meaningless bustle. The distinction between 
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these two forms of navigational expertise is gendered for Gibbons. “In Cold Comfort Farm,” 
Jonathan Greenberg observes, “putatively male high modernism and putatively female 
sentimental popular fiction become almost indistinguishable in their flights of stylistic and 
emotional excess” (102). Gibbons presents herself as a tourist navigating two very different 
readerly strategies, both of which seem inadequate to the task at hand of writing a novel about 
life in the English countryside in the 1930s. Combining the two strategies while gently mocking 
both of them, however, is adequate to the task.   
Humble describes this middle path as something that emerges when middlebrow writing 
responds to modernist strategies without simply replicating them in a popular medium. Humble 
warns that the middlebrow should not be collapsed into modernism, that indeed middlebrow 
writing resists being made into a sub-category or inheritor of modernism. Instead, she argues, 
any accounting of the social function of the middlebrow must  
[…] retain the sense of cultural boundaries that dominates contemporary thinking 
about literature; it is only by exploring the heavily patrolled border between 
intellectual, experimental fiction and the commercial middlebrow that we will 
find places where the distinctions between the categories begin to break down, 
and interesting things escape. (Humble 25-26) 
Bowen is one of those interesting things that escapes from the cracks between the modernist and 
the middlebrow novels. With Humble’s formulation in mind, late modernism can be 
reconfigured as a framework for understanding the way that writing practices emerge alongside 
and in conversation with modernism without being reducible to modernism as a social practice.  
 Like Bowen, Gibbons uses an implied narrator to find humor in places where her 
characters cannot. Gibbsons’ narrator, anxious to reform the uncultured rural characters she 
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encounters, is incapable of seeing the absurdity of her clichéd mission. Gibbson’s implied 
narrator, however, is not. She marks passages that make the narrator seem particularly clichéd, 
linking her to the authors that the novel parodies. The example of Cold Comfort Farm illustrates 
that one of the interesting things to escape from the crack between modernist and middlebrow is 
a movement from satire to a comic style that happens at the incongruous intersection between 
syntax and narrative.  
 
Agile Agency 
Bowen effects this movement from satire to comic style by occupying a space between 
the commercially-defined literary categories of experimentation and melodrama. David James 
has argued that Bowen “neither advocat[ed] a depersonalizing withdrawal into the sovereignty of 
formal mastery, nor a commitment to the political efficacy of literary realism alone” that 
represents a “third way for late-modernist writers, amounting to an alternative approach to 
experimentation” (James 52). Bowen’s novels challenge the line between experimental and 
popular fiction—between difficult style and readability. Approaching Bowen in this fashion 
requires a descriptive approach. James has argued for “reconsider[ing] the legitimacy of 
assessing fiction from [the late modernist period as Miller defines it] by recourse to high 
modernism as the sole source from which everything inventive flows” (44). Such an approach 
requires bringing to the table “a less prescriptive notion of what constitutes formal innovation in 
this transitional period approaching mid-century” (James 47).  
Bowen’s style is humorous in Freud’s sense of the term—that is, self-reflexively comic. 
Miller argues for the persistence of a “mirthless laughter” in late modernist fiction, something 
less specifically funny than “serv[ing] to absorb shock experience and to deflect it aggressively 
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outward as self-preserving laughter” (54). In Bowen, too, we find a kind of mirthless, self-
reflexive laughter—yet, it is of a different kind altogether. Whereas Lewis’s nonethical satire 
seeks to provoke laughter that goes beyond the category of the merely funny, Bowen’s style is 
humorous precisely because of the way that it juxtaposes, on the level of syntax, the comic and 
the melodramatic. Lewis’s satire causes—or, perhaps, allows—the reader to laugh at himself, 
everyone to laugh at everyone, and no one to laugh at no one. Bowen’s style differs insofar as it 
laughs at itself. To the North is a late modernist novel that employs a style that, rather than 
provoking self-reflexive laughter, is an embodiment of that kind of laughter in itself. This crucial 
difference in kind of comic self-reflexivity suggests that, for some late modernist novels, the 
formal strategy described by Miller might not be all that weak of organizing principle at all.  
  This “third way” challenges Miller’s claim that “late modernist writing was not 
particularly successful in either critical or commercial terms” (Miller 13). When the category of 
late modernism is read less as a movement grounded upon formal experimentation in impotency 
and resulting in commercial failure—when we include novels like To the North—then an 
addenda can be made to the claim that late modernist humor is impotent as well. The peculiar 
agency of Bowen’s comic style suggests that her novels not only laugh self-reflexively, but that 
they do not do so impotently. Here, self-reflexive laughter—though still predicated on a stylistics 
that seems at odds with itself—does not point to “a very weak organizing basis” (Miller 57), but 
rather to a distinct comic agency. Thinking To the North through the category of late modernist 
self-reflexive humor bridges the formal innovations described by Miller and the socially minded 
reworking of the aesthetics of impersonality described by Esty. To the North not only employs a 
comic style predicated on self-reflexive laughter, it also represents a “transpersonal agency or 
communal voice, thereby generating new solutions to the old problem of literary impersonality” 
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(Esty 12). This transpersonal agency happens at the level of style in Bowen—specifically in the 
way that the text seems to laugh at itself. This transpersonal agency is perhaps most evident in 
what I term the meta-comedy behind the interactions between Markie and Emmeline. By “meta-
comedy” I mean the humorous (self-reflexively comic) style with which their relationship is 
often described.  
 The physical space of her agency is perhaps the novel’s most comic space, though its 
humorous quality shifts as Emmeline’s relationship with Markie begins to develop. This shift is 
central to understanding the “meta-comedy” of that relationship: 
Their office, a room with fine cornices overlooking a courtyard, had once been 
someone’s back diningroom [sic] and was divided by folding doors from the 
premises of an archæological [sic] society where almost complete silence reigned. 
Peter and Emmeline each had roll-top desks of their own, hers by the window, his 
under the green glare of a lamp he hardly ever turned off. Their secretary 
occupied a deal table half into the fireplace; she had wedged the legs with 
blottingpaper [sic] but when her violence became excessive they would both look 
up and wince. (Bowen 36) 
While the scale of the travel agency’s business expands across the world, the space of the agency 
itself—the room that contains “maps stuck over with flags (to denote the position of clients)” 
(ibid)—is comically cramped. Emmeline’s new slogan for the group, “Move dangerously” (25), 
could just as easily apply to navigating their office. Yet, the clutter of the claustrophobic space is 
a significant part of the agency’s charm. It is part of what makes it different from Cook’s, and 
therefore, somewhat successful. Meeting Julian Tower for the first time, Emmeline is quick to 
distinguish her own small travel agency as different altogether from Cook’s (“Just a travel 
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agency…How very nice,” Julian remarks (24)). As Emmeline’s affair with Markie begins to take 
her away from the office more frequently, Miss Armitage (the replacement for Miss Tripp, 
whose desk was “half into the fireplace”) begins to clean up the clutter: “Efficient as Nemesis 
and as unrelenting, Miss Armitage hustled the startled partners along; they worked at high 
pressure, as though they were organising a coronation” (216). Increasingly, Emmeline finds 
“herself crowded out of the office” (277). “Miss Armitage,” we are told, “was no longer funny: 
the partners, frightened and impotent, did not know where they were” (ibid). In this shift from 
cluttered, but effective past dining room to clean and efficient, yet not as charming office space, 
the pun on “agency” is clear. Emmeline’s agency—both her business and her status as an agent, 
an actor—is literally located in the humorously cramped space. Indeed, it is located in the 
idiosyncrasy of that space—a place where moving dangerously is not only a metaphor for both 
unique mobility into strange places (the peculiar promise of Emmeline’s business) and financial 
independence, but also a unconscious joke about the idiosyncrasy of both the kind of travel 
experience promised by the agency and the literal space of their offices. 3  
This office space is self-reflexively comic. Though it is the restriction of their own bodies 
that is the source of the humor, Peter and Emmeline nonetheless make that comic impediment a 
source of revenue. The idiosyncrasy of the way that they move in the space of their own office is 
part of what makes their agency successful and, ultimately, different from the competition. This 
is a productive humor—and when Miss Armitage tidies up the business, both the office space 
and the agency itself are “no longer funny.” Humor here has agency; it makes the business work.  
                                                
3 In sending their clients to rarely visited locations frequently involves justifying the unpleasantness of the trip by 
the sheer fact of the trip’s uniqueness: “Quite right, if you don’t keep wrapped up at sunset you may die of 
pneumonia, but you can buy beautiful native shawls” (Bowen 113).  
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As her relationship with Markie develops and the distinctly comic productiveness of 
Emmeline’s agency (the business) decreases, however, a different kind of comic agency begins 
to emerge. This agency is not so much a conscious possession of Emmeline’s as it is a 
characteristic of the “meta-comedy” of her relationship with Markie. This agency is most evident 
at the moment when Markie considers Emmeline’s sense of humor. She suggests to him that 
“most of [his] friends [are] amusing,” but that because he is “amusing [himself he] might not 
notice” (226). He responds by saying that “only one can be funny at a time, if that’s what you 
mean” (ibid). In the paragraph that follows is an interior monologue in which he thinks about 
why it was “a little blighting” for him “to be looked at so dispassionately by her and told that he 
was a funny man” (ibid). Markie thinks in conflicting terms about Emmeline’s own sense of 
humor:  
He did not, in fact, waste much wit on her. Partly because he distinguished 
actutely between intimacy and society—her presence lay lightly upon one; she 
was kinder than solitude—partly because his wit, from its very nature, blunted or 
splintered against a quality that he called her divine humourlessness, and that was 
in fact a profound irony. He found her—like all naïve and humourless people who 
did not in any way represent themselves but had to be taken as they were found—
funny: she seemed adorably comic. (ibid) 
 Markie feels that his wit blunts and splinters against Emmeline’s apparent lack of a sense of 
humor. If wit is a social mechanism, then there is something distinctly asocial about someone 
characterized by a “divine humourlessness.” From Markie’s perspective, Emmeline’s apparently 
humorless outlook literally breaks his jokes—which, to Markie, amounts to fracturing an 
interpersonal network. Yet, this “divine humourlessness” is itself “adorably comic” for Markie as 
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well. Markie describes the way that Emmeline interacts with him in tactile metaphors. She is 
both something which “lay[s] lightly upon one” and that which “blunt[s] or splinter[s]” his 
extension of himself. In both metaphors, Emmeline is not only thing, but also a thing that does 
something to someone else, whether that action be a light laying over or an encounter with a 
fixed, immobile object.  
 Emmeline thus has agency, somehow, in her paradoxical position as both “humourless” 
and “adorably comic.” This agency has to do with the subtext of the entire monologue—namely, 
Markie’s actual response to Emmeline’s question. “Only one can be funny at a time,” he says. 
There is something uniquely comical about someone who thinks that only one person can be 
funny at a time stumbling across the cleverly placed rock of divine humourlessness. Emmeline’s 
way of responding to Markie’s jokes resembles the wry wit of the narrator. Yet, Emmeline’s 
responses are in a sense passive as well. If he occasionally finds her to be a splintering object, 
she is at other times something which “lay lightly upon [him]; she was kinder than solitude.” 
Insofar as she splinters Markie’s jokes, she is humorous in the way that the novel’s narrator is 
humorous. Yet, insofar as she is “kinder than solitude,” she is “adorably comic.” That is to say 
that in the very way in which she responds to Markie’s jokes, Emmeline is dually inscribed in a 
meta-comedy, both that which comically impedes Markie’s attempts at humor and the object of 
an implicit ridicule on Markie’s part.  
 Though this meta-comedy takes place in the subtext of his interior monologue, Markie 
himself nonetheless offers an explanation of this paradoxical quality in Emmeline: “Her 
seriousness, her angelic politeness, her cat-like unaccountability all, while exposing themselves 
to his laughter, remained beyond his derision” (ibid). He begins to describe this as a “something” 
which she possesses, but which also exceeds her conscious awareness of it. Tellingly, it becomes 
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not her but “its mobility” (ibid, emphasis mine). Like Emmeline’s sense of humor, this mobility 
is dually-inscribed in the novel. Emmeline is both an indefinable something which “kept 
[Markie] uneasy” (227) and a limit of Emmeline’s elusive being. “In fact,” Markie decides in the 
end, “she was not everyone: there were places she could not occupy” (ibid). Yet, unlike the 
question of her sense of humor, Emmeline herself has something on this point: “I wish I were 
everyone. […] Because then everyone would be happy, and also I’d always be such a change for 
you” (231).   
 The two versions of the idea of Emmeline as “a change” epitomize the meta-comedy of 
the relationship between Markie and Emmeline. In Markie’s mind, “she was not everyone.” She 
does not and cannot satisfy all of his desires—“there were places she could not occupy.” 
Significantly, Markie’s conclusion occurs inside of an interior monologue, and yet Emmeline 
seems to respond to it when she says that she wishes she could “always be such a change for” 
him. Her words not only have a conscious or surface-level significance: that she wishes she 
could be enough—people, of a change, etc.—to wholly satisfy him. They also have a latent 
significance. “Her unconsciousness,” Markie thinks, “still had him wholly at its command” 
(227). The way that Emmeline is both the object of Markie’s ridicule and also something that 
holds him “wholly at its command” is here inscribed in the style of the passage. The two possible 
meanings of the possibility of her being “such a change” coexist. This congruence of opposite 
connotations is not just structurally similar to Freud’s concept of humor. It also possesses an 
agency akin to that possessed by that humor. The meta-comedy of Markie and Emmeline’s 
relationship—the style of the passages in which that relationship takes place—suggests that 
Emmeline’s situation is not merely tragic. She is not just the object of Markie’s ridicule, but also 
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that which holds “him wholly at its command.” In this style, then, Emmeline’s tragedy is made, 
in Freud’s words, the very thing to jest about. 
 For Miller, late modernism registers the anxiety accompanying the breaking apart of a 
shared sense of reality in an impotent style that produces a self-reflexive laughter, which in turn 
reminds us of the very impotency of that style as a governing formal principle. Yet, in To the 
North, the self-reflexive laughter takes the form of a humorous style. Here, tragedy is present in 
the way in which Emmeline seems unable to register the way that Markie’s laughter points 
towards that very dissolution of a shared sense of reality—that is, the reality of their relationship. 
Emmeline learns all too late that with Markie “only one can be funny at a time” (226). Yet, there 
is also a meta-comedy in their relationship, a sense in which she is not only the mocked but also 
the mocker. The novel itself thus embodies a kind of comic agency—an agile agency—precisely 
insofar as that agency is both possessed, however unconsciously,  and beyond the grasp of its 
heroine. Rather than being a weak formal principle for the organization of a novel, this comic 
style represents the way in which Bowen negotiates the problem of female agency in the 1930’s.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Geoglyphics, Haptic Reading, and the Character-Body of Finnegans Wake 
“Language has a verbal geometry, and [that] writing 
necessitates a crafting of space.” 
Arielle Saiber, Giordano Bruno and the Geometry of Language 
 
Mary Ellen Bute’s 1965 film Passages from Finnegans Wake begins with a hybrid animated/live 
action depiction of HCE’s famous fall. The novel’s protagonist wakes in the middle of the night 
and inexplicably and dramatically tumbles out of bed. The subtitles “ARRAH!” and “THE 
FALL!!!” scroll across the screen as a series of loud crashes sound off screen. Flashes of white 
punctuate images of HCE as he falls out of his bedroom and into the blank space of his dreams. 
His body turning and contorting as it falls, HCE is alternately depicted as a kind of photographic 
cutout blowing in a strong wind and as Humpty Dumpty. In both of these images Martin J. Kelly 
(HCE) is spliced into a half-animated version of himself. The juxtaposition of these images with 
a montage of later scenes from the film and stock clips of collapsing buildings underscores the 
way that Kelly’s body is similarly clipped and modified to fit the animated sequence.  
 
Figure 10: HCE in Passages from Finnegans Wake 
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This emphasis on bodily transformation and animated disfiguration is representative of 
the film’s many interpretive interventions in the then nascent conversation about the structure 
and motifs of Finnegans Wake. Bute completed her adaptation fifteen years before the 
publication of Roland McHugh’s landmark Annotations to Finnegans Wake, a volume which has 
codified a particular way of reading Joyce’s novel. Like Margaret Solomon’s Eternal Geomater 
(1969) or John Bishop’s Joyce’s Book of the Dark (1986), Bute’s adaptation is a pre-McHugh 
interpretation. It emphasizes, among other interpretive claims, the centrality of HCE as a 
dreamer, the primary of the Porter family to the narrative, and the ultimate redemption of HCE 
by the novel’s end. In blending live action and animation, however, Bute highlights an aspect of 
Joyce’s novel that is frequently overlooked: Joyce’s playful study of the space of the body.  
 There is a tactile quality to HCE’s fall in the opening sequence of Passages from 
Finnegans Wake. The animator’s hand is present on the screen in both the drawn overlay of the 
body and in the way that the resulting image of HCE/Humpty Dumpty is repeatedly flipped over 
and frozen in place. The actor Michael Kelly’s body is transfigured by the animation, and his 
face betrays the fear that HCE experiences as he feels his own body become something slightly 
less than real. The horror of unwanted bodily transformation is coupled with the humor of 
watching a man become a nursery rhyme character. In this opening sequence, the experience of 
embodiment is the experience of feeling your body being reconstructed by someone else. The 
horror of that experience is contrasted with the glee of the animator, a playful comic sensibility 
shared by the audience who laughs at HCE’s journey from publican to animation. Or, to put it in 
Joycean terms, the audience is invited to laugh at the way that HCE is transformed from a person 
(actor on film) into a character, something both taken from another source (Humpty Dumpty) 
and something drawn (the characters “h,” “c,” and “e”). In animating the bodies of so many 
   
 125 
characters in her adaptation, Bute draws attention to an important question about Finnegans 
Wake: why is it that embodiment is understood through the intersection of writing and drawing 
throughout Joyce’s novel?  
 Passages from Finnegans Wake is an important early critical account of the relationship 
between embodiment and linguistic meaning in Joyce’s novel, a relationship that has received 
little critical attention since Bute’s adaptation. An animator and experimental filmmaker, Bute 
may have simply brought the right tools to the task of interpreting Joyce’s playful linguistic 
constructions. As Luca Crispi observes, in Finnegans Wake Joyce seemed to have been 
“composing by collage: just as he had used disjointed notes and fragmentary sentences before, 
now he was using fragmentary paragraphs and blocks of text dispersed on various sheets of 
paper to create his narrative” (Crispi 233). This collage method happened at both the level of the 
page and of the sentence. Joyce employed a complicated system of cross-references between 
numerous notebooks, clipping together entire blocks of text. He also modified individual words 
to create a bizarre portmanteau language. One result of this visually-striking compositional 
method was the creation of what Joyce termed sigla, a series of editorial marks that found their 
way onto the final pages of Joyce’s novel as symbolic representations of the bodies of the 
novel’s characters. These are typographical characters that represent characters in the narrative. 
Bute’s adaptation of Finnegans Wake is remarkable because of the way that it emphasizes HCE’s 
body as an animated character, drawing attention to the relationship between movement 
(animation) and stasis (typed character) in Joyce’s representation of bodies.  
 Whatever else it might be said to accomplish, Finnegans Wake takes an idiosyncratic 
approach to the by then well-wrought modernist fascination with the space of language. The 
words on the page are stuffed with the letters and characters of other words to the point that they 
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become leaky containers of signification. That is to say that meaning is fundamentally spatial in 
the Wake. Allusions to spatial theories of language abound in the novel: Egyptian hieroglyphics, 
translation machines for the blind, constellations, geoglyphs, etc.. What links these disparate 
theories and playful explorations is an interest in the haptic space of language.  
Finnegans Wake is like an inverted Braille text in that it asks the reader to read through, 
not his body (finger), but through the bodies of the novel’s protagonists. These bodies of these 
protagonists are often presented in terms of geographical environment. The distinction between 
body and environment in Finnegans Wake is often blurred, to the point that the novel’s 
exploration of embodiment is equally an exploration of geography. This blurring is perhaps most 
obvious in the novel’s exploration of extension (space) through HCE’s interment in the 
landscape of Dublin and environs, though it is equally evident in the novel’s interrogation of 
movement (time) in the way that ALP’s body is described as river flow and water cycle. If 
Finnegans Wake is an exercise in geoglyphics, then clearly the space of the body matters greatly 
for the way that Joyce reimagines geospatial form.  
This chapter argues that the Wake’s haptic language uses humor to represent the body as 
both extended in space and in motion. The focus of the chapter will be the image at the end of 
the “Nightlessons” chapter that presents ALP’s body as at once graphic (in both senses of the 
word), abstraction (triangle), and landscape (delta). Seeing the intersection of these versions of 
her body involves cultivating what the novel calls the “aha hahah” (293.29)—that is, treating 
humor as revelatory. Humor, with its emphasis on incongruity and disjunction, allows for the 
possibility of treating the body as multiply-determined, both itself and something other than 
itself. In order to explore the idea of a multiply-determined body-character in Finnegans Wake 
we have to first explore the relationship between textual space and linguistic meaning in the 
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novel. The first part of the chapter argues that printed language in the Wake is full of leaky 
containers, words that are overstuffed and thus brimming over with excesses of signification. 
The space of the printed word—and its relationship to the idea of bodily extension—is then used 
to describe the relationship between extension and movement in ALP’s body-character.    
   
The Vacuous Space of Language 
In I.6—the “nightly quisquiqock of the twelve apostrophes” (FW 126.18)—Shaun is 
asked a series of questions about the principal figures in Finnegans Wake, himself included. The 
eleventh “apostrophe” is a question about what he would do “If [he] met on the binge a poor 
acheseyeld from Ailing” (148.33). Though the question itself is repeatedly qualified to the point 
that it is unclear what exactly Shaun is being asked if would “care to this evening” (149.10), it is 
significant that the “poor acheseyeld” is also referred to as “the blind blighter” (149.2), 
suggesting perhaps that Shem is the “poor acheseyeld” in question. Yet, Shem is also the 
questioner, and so one might wonder why the question ends with Shem asking, “we don’t think, 
Jones, we’d care to this evening, would you?” (149.10-1). In a sense, the question is about what 
Shaun would do, and yet it is also more straightforwardly about what he would do about his 
brother, a fact that is reflected in the way that Shaun figures his ambivalent relationship to his 
responsibility towards his brother in the fable of The Mookse and The Gripes in the second part 
of his answer to the question.  
Following Shaun’s answer to this question, there is a final, twelfth question, here 
reprinted in full with its answer: 
12. Sacer esto?  
Answer: Semus sumus! (168.13-4) 
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The question is composed of the final phrase of a statement from the Law of the 12 Tables. The 
original statement in its entirety reads, “If the patron abuses the client, let him be accursed” 
(McHugh 168). The “him” in the stand-alone final phrase reformulated as the twelfth question 
would seem to refer to Shem, the “blind blighter” whose fate is up for question in the eleventh 
“apostrophe.” Shaun’s answer, however, can be read as either saying “we are Shem” (sumus 
being the Latin for “we are” and Sem the French for “Shem”) or “we are the same,” which would 
require hearing “same-us” in “semus.” We might say, then, that the final two questions of I.6 
concern the way that Shem and Shaun are defined/outlined. Yet, the twelfth question is in some 
sense a follow-up question to the eleventh, and so if the two questions are about self-definition, it 
is a self-definition drawn along the lines of difference written over sameness.  
Shaun’s tries to answer the eleventh “apostrophe” numerous times, each time failing 
because he infers that his “explanations here are probably above [Shem’s] understandings” 
(152.4-5). Each attempt at an answer relocates itself at a different spatial point from its 
predecessors, moving from a classroom/academy (site of institutional intellectual debate) to a 
fabled landscape (“The Mookse and The Gripes”) to the family dinner table (Burrus and 
Caseous). The first is a kind of mock-philosophical treatise that outlines the history of 
approaches to what Shaun terms the “dime and cash problem”:  
[…] before proceeding to conclusively confute this begging question it would be 
far fitter for you, if you dare! to hasitate to consult with and consequentially 
attempt at my disposale of the same dime-cash problem elsewhere naturalistically 
of course, from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist. (149.14-9) 
The “dime-cash problem,” as the later references to Spinoza, Bergson, and Einstein hint at, is on 
one level the philosophical debate about the relationship between the way that we experience 
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space and time and the reliability of that experience as a way of knowing something about the 
way that the world actually works. “Dime and “cash” reappear throughout the rest of Shaun’s 
attempts at answering his brother’s question, and the initial way in which the terms are played 
with in the first answer sets the tone for the rest of Shaun’s response.  
“Cash” originates from the French casse—“a box, case, chest, to carrie or kepe wares in, 
also a Marchants cash or counter (Cotgr.)” (OED)—and can be traced to the Latin caspa—or, 
“coffer” (OED). “Cash” thus denotes, not only space, but also the idea of a container. “Dime” 
sounds like “time,” though it also echoes Demiurge, the creator-god of Plato’s Timaeus myth 
(McHugh 149)). Shaun states that “the sophology of Bitchson while driven as under by a purely 
dime-dime urge is not without his cashcash charackteristicks” (FW 149.20-2). Demi- (partial, 
half) becomes dime- (one-tenth), and so the concept of the demiurge itself is “driven as under” 
by the rewriting of the half-urge as a one-tenth-urge. Time, as part of the “cash and dime 
problem,” thus implies a decreased share—the demiurge reduced the erotically charged “dime-
dime urge” of Bitchson/Bergson. Since Shem is frequently depicted as Jacob and Shaun as Esau, 
the idea of a decreased share immediately calls to mind the fact that Jacob (who later tricks his 
brother into giving up his birth right) is the second of the two twins to be born, his name coming 
from the fact that he is born “gripping Esau’s heel” (Gen. 25.26).1 Rewriting demiurge as “dime-
dime urge” and adding the overtones of licentiousness suggests that Shaun’s discussion of 
space/time is somehow also concerned with his always ambivalent and frequently antagonistic (if 
not violent) relationship with his brother, the relationship between himself (Esau) and the brother 
(Jacob) who decreased his share.  
                                                
1 Jacob’s name is derivative of the Hebrew word for heel (‘aqev). See Attridge, p. 40.  
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Maud Ellmann—writing about the ballad of the Ondt and the Gracehoper, a kind of twin 
passage to Shaun’s answer to the eleventh “apostrophe”—argues that “the visible is the modality 
of space and writing, whereas the audible is the modality of time and voice” (389). This claim 
would suggest that space is associated with Shaun and time with Shem. Yet, I would like to 
argue that, particularly in Shaun’s first answer to the eleventh “apostrophe,” disability matters 
more than ability. That is to say, that it is less a matter of thinking of Shaun as visual than of 
thinking of him as deaf or becoming deaf. Doing so causes us to think of disability as a site of 
conflict in Finnegans Wake defined not by opposing sides in a debate about the nature of 
language (as Ellmann’s formulation might lead us to do) but rather by the acts of disabling 
someone. Read in this way, disability allows us to consider how the other iterations of this 
struggle (space/time, air/vacuum, etc.) outline a struggle defined by a difference that ultimately 
falls back onto a similarity.  
The way that similarity underlies difference is most evident in the form that Shaun’s first 
attempt at an answer takes. As McHugh notes, the reference to Bergson is likely also a reference 
to Wyndham Lewis’s claim in Time & Western Man that “Bergson had said that the intellect 
‘spatialized’ things. It was that ‘spatialization’ that the doctrinaire of motion & or mental ‘time’ 
attacked” (McHugh 149). By saying that he addresses the “the same dime-cash problem” as 
defined “elsewhere […], from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist,” however, Shaun situates 
his response to the question not as an embodiment of a particular solution to the philosophical 
problem but rather as a kind of embodiment of the sameness and difference inscribed in the 
debate itself.  
In his mini-history of the field, Shaun identifies Spinoza as “an extension lecturer on The 
Ague” plagued by a “chronic spinosis”(150.8). “The Ague” is also The Hague, the Dutch 
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metropole adjacent to Leiden, where Spinoza was a lecturer for much of his career.2 He is thus 
identified as a lecturer on a kind of fever (ague) and on a geographical location and his 
hometown (The Hague). There is a further dual-inscription of body and place in the phrase “an 
extension lecturer.” In Ethics, Spinoza argues for the existence of God by arguing for substance 
as “infinite, unique, and indivisible.” He suggests that “since […] there is no vacuum in Nature 
[…], but all its parts must concur that there is no vacuum, it follows that they cannot be really 
distinguished, that is, that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided” 
(Spinoza 96). In other words, Spinoza argues that the idea of an individual, discrete bodies—of 
separate “substances”—implies a vacuum in nature. The existence of distinguishable bodies 
would imply that space is in essence empty. Responding to the critique that human beings are 
naturally “inclined to divide quantity” he argues that “parts [or, bodies] are distinguished [by us] 
only insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are 
distinguished only modally, but not really” (96). Earlier he had argued “that an extended thing 
and a thinking thing are either attributes of God, or […] affections of God’s attributes” (94). For 
Spinoza, there is only one substance (which he terms “god”), and what we experience as 
difference is in reality only affectations of that one substance, distinguished modally but never 
substantially. Calling him “an extension lecturer on The Ague,” then, echoes this argument about 
the relationship between bodies and space, divisibility and difference. Perhaps most importantly 
for the answer to Shem’s question, however, this phrase also implies something about the way 
that Spinoza suggests that humans experience sameness as difference, indivisible substance as 
separate bodies in the empty space of a vacuum.  
                                                
2 See Curley xiii-xiv.  
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Spinoza’s postulation suggests that there is only ever one body, and that what we 
experience as discrete separate bodies are in reality only perspectives upon or versions of one 
substance. Shaun addresses an “extension lecturer”—not only a lecturer on the subject of 
extention, but also one “extended” in space somehow—in a curious way. As is the case with 
every philosopher and scientist mentioned in his first answer to his brother’s question, Shaun 
never really tries to refute the reasoning of this lecturer, but rather immediately switches to 
talking about what he considers to be the real problem: the way that every philosopher and 
scientist he mentions misunderstands “talis” and “qualis.” He constantly moves between 
invoking the problem of defining basic terms and the problematic propositions of the other 
thinkers. In this way, the entire debate seems to melt into one extended explanation, each 
opposing argument dissolving into the next. The history of a debate becomes less a debate than a 
series of halted definitions and attempts on Shaun’s part to distance himself from the various 
existing approaches to the “dime and cash problem.”  
The way that Shaun distances himself from the philosophers, scientists, and 
anthropologists whom he discusses can be read as a rewriting of fraternal conflict. Shaun gives 
the names of three different professors who each in some form deal with “dime and cash 
problem”: “Professor Loewy-Brueller” (FW 150.15), “Professor Levi-Brullo, F.D. of Sexe-
Weiman-Eitelnaky” (151.11-2), and “Professor Llewellys ap Bryllars, F.D., Ph. Dr” (151.32-3). 
Each professor represents a different take on the “dime and cash problem,” though each name is 
derived from the combination of the names of same two famous early twentieth-century 
anthropologists: Robert Lowie and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (McHugh 150). The three professors 
whose names look and sound similar represent an intellectual history in which the findings of 
one are nearly indistinguishable from another. Moreover, Shaun cites them purportedly to 
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distance himself from them, though he never actually gets around to the task of addressing their 
arguments. 
Yet, frequently, Shem is also implicitly present in these opposing arguments cited by 
Shaun. According to Shaun, Bitchson/Bergson’s position “is driven as under by a purely the 
dime-dime urge” (149.20-1). As happens repeatedly in this first answer to the eleventh question, 
Shaun outlines only what his perspective is not—a kind of definition by negation. Separating 
oneself off—from one’s twin, as from the positions of other “spatialists”—is never an act of 
positivist definition but rather always of definition by negation. The way that Einstein works into 
this passage helps to clarify what is at stake in such a process of definition. Bitchson/Bergon’s 
perspective is described as being “in reality only a done by chance ridiculisation of the whoo-
whoo and where’s hairs theorics of Winestain” (149.26-8). Esau’s name, like Jacob’s, derives 
from a peculiarity of his birth. He is said to have “came out red, all his body like a hairy mantle” 
(Gen. 25.25), and his name echoes the Hebrew word for hairy (se’ar) (Attridge 40). “Where’s 
hairs” thus seems to mean not only splitting hairs but also, “where’s Esau/Shaun?” If we also 
hear in “hairs” heirs, then it seems that Shaun is partly asking about inheritance as well. 
Grabbing Esau’s heel in birth foreshadows how Jacob’s later convinced his twin to trade his 
birthright for “bread and lentil stew” (Gen. 25.34).3 Shaun seems to suggest, then, that 
Bitchson/Bergson’s argument, with its emphasis on time and the licentious “dime-dime urge,” is 
itself really just a version of asking who’s who and where’s “hairs” (i.e., Shaun).  
Here, the problem of self-definition is clearly also a problem of inheritance. “Where’s 
hairs” can thus also be read as “where’s the heir?” Shaun argues that Shem’s emphasis on time 
(internal experience) is really just an unwitting emphasis on space (outer experience), implying 
                                                
3 See Gen. 25.29-34.  
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that Shem’s argument is really the same kind of argument that Shaun might make. Shaun 
demonstrates that an opposing argument is in reality an argument for his own position. He 
suggests that the Bergsonian emphasis on time is really an emphasis on space as well (i.e., is 
Winestainian). However, in making such a criticism, Shaun emphasizes not the difference 
between himself and his brother but rather a point of their similarity. He opposes 
Bitchson/Bergson (and, in the process the echoes of his brother) only insofar as he demonstrates 
that the opposing argument is really an argument for his own position. The conflict between the 
two brothers, rewritten as intellectual debate, comes down to the question of “whoo-whoo and 
where’s hairs”—who’s who and where’s hairs/Esau/Shaun or, to phrase the question differently, 
which of the two is the heir? In trying to distance himself from faulty, dime-dime reasoning, 
Shaun ends up highlighting the resemblance between himself and the kinds of thinkers who 
utilize that kinds of reasoning.  
“Where’s hairs” is also a reference to the song, “There’s Hair Like Wire Coming out of 
the Empire” (McHugh 149). John Bishop notes that an earlier reference to the song “suggests 
that the empire’s ruled English has gone luxuriantly haywire” (308). Yet in the context of 
Shaun’s first answer to the eleventh “apostrophe,” it seems that the reference to the song title 
might be more about the way that hearing implies a distinct spatiality. Hearing and seeing are 
inscribed in the way that space and time are figured in Finnegans Wake along the lines of the 
fraternal conflict between Shem and Shaun, a conflict that itself frequently invokes another 
familial struggle—the intergenerational conflict between the two brothers and their father. I.6 
begins with the command to call forth “Shaun Mac Irewick, briefdragger” (FW 126.16). The 
German word for postman (briefträger (McHugh 126)) comes after a kind of full name for 
Shaun. “Irewick” implies perhaps one who burns with ire (i.e., one who has a candlewick made 
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of ire), though it is also his father’s name re/mis-spelled—Earwicker, with a difference. This 
re/mis-spelling becomes more significant when we consider that Shaun begins to answer the 
question posed of him by asking a series of indignant questions—“So you think I have 
impulshivism? Did they tell you I am one of the fortysixths? And I suppose you heard I had a 
wag on my ears?” (FW 149.11-3). Here, Shaun not only distances himself from HCE by listing 
things associated with HCE that he are not associated with himself—impulishivist, “one of the 
fortysixths,” and having “a wag on [his] ears” (i.e., being an earwig). He also refers to the 
question-asker’s having heard a rumor about his having wax in his ears—that is, his being deaf. 
Making wax-packed ears the cause of deafness marks the way that difference is written over 
sameness in Shaun’s last name. “Irewick” is earwigs re/mis-spelled as ear-wax, Shaun’s deafness 
represented by the way that his father’s having earwigs in his ears rewritten as candle-filled ears. 
His deafness itself thus becomes Shaun’s inheritance.  
The way that the family name signals inheritance makes Shaun’s indignation at the 
question-asker’s having heard the rumor of his deafness more significant. The fact that the 
similarity between Shaun’s last name and his father becomes evident when his name is spoken 
implies that his indignation about fraternal conflict. “Irewick” and “Earwicker” are spelled 
differently. Yet, when, read aloud, they sound similar. The way that Shaun sounds, then, marks 
him as related/similar to HCE. If we think about this in terms of disability rather than ability, 
then it becomes clear that Shaun seems to be able to not hear the similarity in the spelled 
difference. Shem’s ability to hear the similarity brings Shaun back to his father, erasing the 
spelled difference and replacing it with a heard family resemblance. It also, however, functions 
as a kind of reminder for Shaun of his decreased inheritance. Shaun’s re/mis-spelled name is an 
inheritance (in this case, his name) to which he has a diminished access because of his deafness.  
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Considering the relationship between “dime and cash” and deafness/blindness allows us 
think about Shaun’s deafness as resulting from an attack, as a passage from the Mookse and the 
Gripes episode just a few pages later in 1.6 illustrates: 
— Efter a thousand yaws, O Gripes con my sheepskins, yow will be belined to 
the world, enscayed Mookse the pius.  
— Ofter thousand yores, amsered Gripes the gregary, be the goat of 
MacHammud’s, yours may be still, O Mookse, more botheared. (FW 156.19-
23) 
The Mookse is described as having “enscayed” something to the Gripes, a word that 
encompasses the Welsh encyd—or, “space.” The Gripes’s “amsered,” a word that echoes the 
Welsh amser—or, “time” (McHugh 156). The Mookse/Shaun’s quip about the Gripes/Shem’s 
eventual blindness is thus somehow made spatial, and the Gripes/Shem’s quip about the 
Mookse/Shaun’s eventual deafness is similarly made temporal. Perhaps the most important thing 
to note, however, is how the Gripes describes the Mookse’s impending deafness. The Gripes 
suggests that the Mookse will eventually become “botheared”—a word that suggests not only 
“bothered” but also “both-eared.” The OED lists the etymology for “bothered” as unknown, 
noting only that “the earliest instances occur in the writings of Irishmen (T. Sheridan, Swift, 
Sterne), and the word has long formed part of the vocabulary of the comic Irishman of fiction 
and the stage. This suggests an Anglo-Irish origin; but no suitable etymon has been found in 
Irish” (OED). It does, however, list the closest possible Irish relatives—among them, bódhar 
(deaf) and bódhairim (I deafen).4 The original meaning of the word “bother” given by the OED 
                                                
4 The entry does on to list buaidhirt (trouble, affliction) and buaidhrim (I vex), suggesting in the end that each of 
these Irish homonyms nonetheless “labour under the difficulty that the spoken words do not suggest bodder or 
bother” (OED).  
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is “to bewilder with noise.” Despite the fact that the OED states that there is not sufficient 
evidence to etymologically link bódhar with bother, it seems clear that Joyce uses “botheared” to 
suggest not both being bewildered/overcome with noise and (perhaps in the process) being 
deafened. To be both-eared might mean to give someone both ears, to listen really well. Yet, if 
Shaun is both-eared in the sense of being “all ears,” it seems that he is so against his will. He is 
thus both-eared insofar as he is bothered, all ears in that he is bombarded with sound.   
 Particularly in I.6, deafening involves an excess of sound, a kind of overwhelming sonic 
attack. One thing that the connection between space/time and seeing/hearing illustrates is that 
Shaun’s deafness is perhaps as much about a kind of disabling attack as it is about his preference 
for the writing over the heard. In order to see how this is the case, we have to think about how 
violence and sound intersect in Shaun’s first attempt at answering the eleventh question in I.6 in 
the form of another, perhaps less outrightly aggressive form of attack—intellectual debate, or, 
more specifically, institutionalized intellectual debate like the kind carried out within academic 
disciplines. The way that Shem bothers/both-ears Shaun is enacted in Shaun’s account of the 
debates surrounding the “dime and cash problem.” In this debate, it becomes increasingly clearer 
that language, for Shaun, is a kind of container—has a spatial dimension—and that in its sonic 
qualities language exceeds these dimensions as well.  
The first paragraph of Shaun’s answer to Shem’s question is all about what Shaun later 
terms “the dime and cash diamond fallacy” (FW 150.23-4), a particular misreading of two terms: 
talis and qualis. In the final sentences of the first paragraph of his answer, Shaun traces the 
space/time problem to the way that “spatialists” use these two terms:  
To put it all the more plumbsily, The speechform is a mere sorrogate. Whilst the 
quality and tality (I shall explex what you ought to mean by this with its proper 
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when and where and why and how in the subsequent sentence) are 
altinativomentally harrogate and arrogate, as the gates may be. (149.28-33) 
To put it “plumbsily” is not just to phrase it clumsily, but also to put it spatial terms, as a plumb 
is “a sounding lead used for measuring the depth of water” (OED). There is a similar 
spatialization in the “sorrogate.” A surrogate is also a sorrow gate. Yet, “gates” here is also 
“case.” The “speechform” is thus both an entryway/opening and also a case/container. The 
second connotation is reinforced by the fact that in the French casse or coffer, the transliteration 
of the Latin caspra, we might hear casket and coffin, an echo perhaps of HCE’s “teak coffin” 
(FW 76.11).5 Similarly, we might hear echoes of the gates of hell in the word sorrow gate.  
 Shaun’s claim that history of the debates surrounding the problem of space/time has at its 
root a series of misreadings of talis and qualis is related to his claim that speech is a mere 
surrogate for language—or, alternatively, meaning. The way that space is figured as aural space 
in this passage echoes the way that Stephen Dedalus, sitting in the National Library, refers to 
books as coffins—“Coffined thoughts around me, in mummycases, embalmed in the spice of 
words” (U 9.352-3). If this sentence appeared in Finnegans Wake, we might be tempted to hear 
“space” in “spice.” Yet even if such a reading is less available to us in reading Ulysses, it is 
nonetheless significant that Stephen’s quip suggests that, like books, words too have a kind of 
space, are a kind of coffin for the thoughts and histories (accessible through etymologies) 
contained “within” them. Containers—and openings in them—are at the center of I.6. With 
reference to Stephen’s quip, we might further suggest that what is stake in Shaun’s first answer 
                                                
5 There seems to be a rather interesting connection between Shaun’s first attempted answer and this passage from I.4 
in terms of the way that hearing and place are figured in HCE’s interment: “Let us leave theories there and return to 
here’s here. Now hear. […] The teak coffin, Pughglasspanelfitted, feets to the east, was to turn in later, and pitly 
patly near the porpus, materially effecting the cause” (FW 76.10-13).  
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to the eleventh question is the way that the messy stuff of “meaning” leaks out of its embalmed 
containers, the way that words’ substance exceeds their spaces.  
For the first part of Shaun’s answer to the eleventh question, though, the question of 
leaked-meaning is really the question of aural space. In his response, Shaun seems to favor the 
written over the heard, casting aside speech as the mere surrogate of language/meaning. 
However, the “gate” in “sorrogate” carries with it the resonance of the later pun on “gates” as 
“case.” If the “speechform” is a mere surrogate, it is also a case (a container of meaning) and a 
gate (an opening for or leak of meaning). It is important to remember that cash has its 
etymological roots in the French casse, a word just one s off from case. We might add, then, the 
possible reading of the “speechform” as “cash”—i.e., something we trade with or cash in on. In 
the echoes of “sorrogate,” then, we might hear “alternativomentally” to Shaun’s intended 
meaning. Speech becomes not only a surrogate for language, but also a leaky container, a 
gateway into other meanings, and finally language’s currency. The last echo—speech as cash—
encapsulates the way that Shaun’s statement functions in at least two directions at once. 
Currency is at once a kind of substitute (exchanged in lieu of bartered goods) and also the “stuff” 
of exchange (the material upon which exchange depends). To say we trade in speech is at once to 
say that we do so and that we do so in lieu of trading in something else.  
 Shaun assertion that “quality and tality […] are alternativomentally harrogate and 
arrogate, as the gates may be” (FW 149.32-3) illustrates the way that space and time play into the 
seeing/hearing split. Harrogate, a town in Yorkshire, denotes an actual place, and to arrogate is 
“to ascribe to another without just reason” (McHugh 149). Qualis and talis may alternatively 
mean, then, either an actual place or an incorrect ascription. Yet, we might also hear aerate in 
“arrogate,” “to create bubbles of air or other gas in (a liquid or other substance) by mechanical or 
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chemical means” (OED). In this sense, “arrogate” might also denote the creating of space with 
air. Talking requires first breathing in, and the echo of aerate in “arrogate” suggests that the 
echoes of other shades of meaning that can be heard in words are similarly inflations. Words 
literally become expanded by these shades. The re/mis-spelling of a word suggests alternative 
ways of hearing it, frequently expanded the space occupied by the word on the page in the 
process.  
 Air is important in Shaun’s first attempted answer because of the way that it seems to 
float behind so much of the passage’s language. “Hairs” might be read as “airs.” The decision to 
use “cash and dime” for “space and time” might suggestion inflation, or, in the case of the 
demotion of “demiurge” to “dime-dime urge,” deflation. Air, or rather the lack of it, is also 
central to the only argument printed in full in Shaun’s history of the debate surrounding the “cash 
and dime problem.” The first professor’s (Loewy-Brueller’s) findings are given in the form of a 
lengthy, digressive formulation: 
[…] looking through at these accidents with the faroscope of television, (this 
nightlife instrument needs still some subtractional betterment in the readjustment 
of the more refrangible angles to the squeals of his hypothesis on the outer tin 
sides), I can easily believe in my own most spacious immensity at my ownhouse 
and microbemost cosm when I am reassured by ratio that the cube of my volumes 
is to the surfaces of their subjects as the, sphericity of these globes […] is to the 
feracity of Fairynelly’s vacuum. (FW 150.32-151.3, 151.6-7).  
The professor’s argument consists of a talis(so)/qualis(as) relationship. He asserts that he “can 
easily believe in [his] own most spacious immensity” when he is sure that “the cube of [his] 
volumes is to the surfaces of their subjects as the, sphericity of these globes […] is to the feracity 
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of Fairynelly’s vacuum.” The “cube of [his] volumes” might refer to a box containing his books 
(his volumes), and, given that we might define “surface” as “the outermost boundary […] of any 
material body, immediately adjacent to the air or empty space, or to another body” (OED), the 
“surfaces of their subjects” could refer to covers of his books. These are terms denoting spatial 
boundaries—the box containing volumes and volumes literally containing their subjects insofar 
as their bindings prevent sheaves of paper spilling over into other volumes.  
The emphasis on bounded space and containers becomes significant when one considers 
the first part of the second half of the talis/qualis relationship. A perfectly round sphere is an 
object that is not only self-contained but also moves about on an external surface. “Sphericity” 
implies a smooth, entirely rounded surface. To emphasize the “spherecity of these globes,” then, 
is two emphasize the separateness/distinctness of at the very least more than one globe. The word 
“globe,” moreover, might denote “world.” This alternative reading becomes significant given 
that in beginning with his account of Loewy-Brueller’s theory Shaun starts referring to the “dime 
and cash problem” as the “dime and cash diamond fallacy” (FW 150.23-4). In addition to 
perhaps having something to do with the way that Joyce plays with currency in I.6, the word 
“diamond” is interesting for our purposes here because of its pronunciation history. Trisyllabic 
until roughly the sixteenth-century, “diamond” was occasionally spelled “dimond” as it began to 
shift towards a more common disyllabic pronunciation (OED). In its disyllabic form, one can 
perhaps hear both “dime” and “mond”—dime and mound, time and (in the case of HCE buried 
in the landscape) grave. It is also possible to read the disyllabic form as di-monde, or two worlds. 
In its trisyllabic form, however, we might read it as dia-(across)monde(world) (OED). In its 
disyllabic form, “diamond” suggests separate, divisible, contained worlds. In its expanded 
pronunciation, however, “diamond” suggests movement across one world. “Globe” also, 
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however, might denote “eye,” suggesting the visual component of the way that we experience the 
world. Either way, emphasizing the “spherecity of these globes” suggests that what is at stake in 
the first part of the second half of this talis/qualis formulation is not only boundedness of object, 
but also the way that such boundedness implies an empty in-between space, either the vacuum of 
space between literal globes-as-worlds or the kind of vacuum discussed by Spinoza in his 
account of what the world would have to be like in order for more than one substance to exist. If 
two globes are spherical, then, at the very least, we must posit the existence of an empty space 
between them. This is exactly the reverse of Spinoza’s argument for the existence of one 
substance in Ethics. The first professor’s argument relies on the existence of a vacuum as a 
conclusion, rather than following the “extension lecturer” or Spinozistic model and 
demonstrating, reductio ad absurdum, that the existence of separate bodies implies also the 
ridiculous state of affairs of a vacuum.  
The final part of the professor’s equation is “the feracity of Fairynelly’s vacuum.” 
Farinelli was a “castrato singer with great power of breath retention” (McHugh 151). His 
“vacuum,” then, is his lungs. “Vacuum” is perhaps the central pun in the first part of Shaun’s 
answer to the eleventh question, and it is in it that the similarly punned relationship between 
“airs,” “hairs,” and “heirs” becomes clearer. A vacuum is either a space devoid of air (and thus 
sound as well) or a rather loud cleaning device dragged across a surface.6 Since sound waves 
require air in order to be able to be transmitted and light does not, there is a sense in which a 
vacuum is an empty space that is both silent and visible. On the other hand, a vacuum cleaner is 
                                                
6 On vacuums as space without air, see Noll, p. 17. Though numerous electronic “sweepers” were sold previously, 
Hubert Cecil Booth patented the first such device to bill itself as a “vacuum cleaner” in 1901. However, it wasn’t 
until W. H. “Boss” Hoover’s large-scale production of vacuum cleaners starting in 1908 that such devices were 
commercially available (Scott 763-764). Given the dates, then, it seems likely that Joyce had to have at the least 
have been aware of the possible reading of “vacuum” as “vacuum cleaner,” especially in a passage frequently 
concerned with space and sound.  
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perhaps the perfect embodiment of bothering/both-earing; particularly in the earlier part of the 
twentieth-century, it is a device that has the possibility of being overwhelmingly loud.  
Yet, what is perhaps most significant about a vacuum, in either sense, is the way that it 
implies containment. A vacuum cleaner involves a contained space insofar as the bag of the 
cleaner inflates while the vacuum is run and deflates when the vacuum is turned off. The vacuum 
of space might bring the mind the vast empty space between discrete objects nonetheless bound 
together by Einsteinian time-space. Thought of in this sense, a vacuum brings us back to the way 
that Bitchson was reduced to the “whoo-whoo and where’s hairs theorics of Winestain” in the 
first paragraph of Shaun’s response (149.27-8). A vacuum in the sense of empty, soundless 
space, however, also might bring to mind the kind of vacuum tubes common in early twentieth-
century radio sets and early televisions. This reading might be implied in the fact that Loewy-
Brueller’s theory takes “looking through at these accidents with the faroscope of television” as a 
basic premise (150.32). “Accident” is also a technical term in Aristotelian philosophy. When 
Spinoza uses “affectation” to describe the way that the only-existing substance looks like a vast 
of different substances to us, he means something similar to what Aristotle means by “accident.” 
An affectation, like an Aristotelian accident, is something like a characteristic of a substance.7 
The basic premise of the professor’s theory, then, is that he looks at accidents/characteristics 
through the “faroscope of” tele(far)vision. Vacuum tubes were developed to increase the 
amplification of television and radio sets, and so we might read this passage as pointing to the 
contained space of a vacuum tube as something used to transmit at first sound (though, 
increasingly images as well) across greater distances. Yet, these contained vacuums are also 
figured as “accidents,” mere facets of a large web—perhaps hinting at the way that discrete 
                                                
7 See Annas, p. 146.  
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points of transmission (individual, contained vacuums) transmit the same program to various 
(spatial) locations.  
 Air is figured in these readings of “vacuum” via movement—suctioned out of vacuum 
tubes, contained within the globes populating empty space, the vehicle for relocating tiny objects 
littering the surface of a floor in the case of a vacuum cleaner. Inflation and deflation, expansion 
and the emptying out of space all signify the movement of air through or around contained 
spaces—bodies/worlds in a vacuum, vacuum tubes, vacuum cleaner bags. Yet, as we get closer 
to the end of Shaun’s first attempted answer, explosion, as a different kind of movement, 
becomes more prevalent. The second professor’s argument is dismissed by the claim that “His 
everpresent toes are always in retaliessian out through his overpast boots” (151.21-2). Shoes, 
perhaps from repeated use/movement, deteriorate and that which they contain spills out of them. 
This spilling out becomes a metaphor for the language’s aural space when we consider the final 
professor’s position: 
[…] his man’s when is no otherman’s quandor […], the all is where in love as 
war and plane where me arts soar you’d aisy rouse a thunder from and where I 
cling true tis there I climb tree and where Innocent looks best (pick!) there’s holly 
in his ivies. (FW 151.34-152.3) 
“Quandor” can be read as “when” (the Latin quando) or as “candour” (openness, frankness) 
(McHugh 151). If time is associated with an opening/openness, then space (where) becomes the 
“all […] in love as war,” that is, in fraternal conflict. Here we find yet again that difference is 
underwritten by sameness—in the when/quandor split, in the way that time is an opening and 
place made the opposite of local (“the all”).  
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 The account of a final take on the “dime and cash problem” contains two kinds of sound, 
the first an explosion of sorts (the fart signified by, “where me arts soar you’d aisy rouse a 
thunder from”) and a bell peal (“where I cling true tis there I climb tree”). The first makes 
reference to the “plane where me arts soar”—that is, to the plane (surface) where my arse is. The 
reference to an arse recalls not only another way that violence is reiterated in Finnegans Wake 
(as being shot in the arse) but also implies being stationary in the sense of sitting, perhaps 
suggesting a rock since a rock (as opposed to a tree) sits on a surface. Moreover, calling a fart 
thunder recalls not only HCE’s hundred-letter words for thunder that encompass the words for 
thunder in various languages, but also Shaun’s version of the same practice in the ondt and the 
gracehoper, there coughing instead of thunder.8 Shaun’s version of the HCE’s “thunder” appears 
just before he begins the Ondt and the Gracehoper, a clearing of his throat before he begins his 
fable. Yet, it is significant that Shaun is asked to sing, not tell a story (“Song! Shaun, song!” 
(414.14)). The act of coughing or clearing one’s throat before singing brings us back to 
“Farinelli’s vacuum”—the lungs of the Italian singer. It also recalls the evident pun on coffer (as 
one of the etymological meanings of “cash”) and coffin. Though Shaun does not cough in this 
passage from I.6, calling his fart “thunder” echoes the way that elsewhere in Finnegans Wake a 
word describing a non-articulated noise takes the extended shape of around a hundred letters, the 
word itself a composite of various words for the sound being made in other languages. Words 
like HCE’s “thunder” seem to craft an aural space that bothers/both-ears Shaun, a fact evidenced 
perhaps by the way that his versions of these words point towards a diminished inheritance. 
Whereas HCE has “thunder,” Shaun coughs, an involuntary interruption that also takes place on 
a much smaller scale in comparison to that of his father’s words. The involuntary cough is 
                                                
8 See 414.19-21.  
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another version of the words that seem to get out Shaun’s control—like “cash”—and of the 
words inflated/expanded to the point of explosion by the heard shades of meaning. The language 
of Finnegans Wake thus seems to have an aural space—a kind of expansion of the written plane 
of writing that leads to shades of meaning that bother/both-ear insofar as the expansion seems to 
fracture or break through the spatial boundaries of the original word. Shuan’s disability—read in 
terms of the conflict with his brother—illustrates the way that meaning breaks out of and through 
the contained space of written words, breaking over the reader’s ears in waves of involuntary 
meaning. The reader in Finnegans Wake is bothered in the sense of being overwhelmed with 
sound.  
 The second sound in this final take on the “dime and cash problem” is a ringing bell, 
though the language used to describe this ringing emphasizes the juxtaposition between the two 
brothers. If the first sound is associated with the arse and sitting (echoing perhaps the way that 
Shaun/Mookse turns into a stone), then the second sound is associated with a tree (echoing the 
way that Shem/Gripes turns into a tree). Yet, this seems to be an odd ending to Shaun’s first 
answer to the eleventh question. Ostensibly still explaining yet another iteration of the kind of 
approach to the “dime and cash” problem from which he seeks to distance himself, Shaun ends 
with the third professor’s position, which he thus seems to adopt it as his own if only because he 
offers no critique of it. If this is the case, then it is significant that the third professor seems to 
say that when he farts he is like a stone (and, in some way, the recipient of a decreased 
inheritance from HCE) and that when he rings like a bell he is like a tree. This seems like a 
version of the twelfth question, with Shaun apparently saying that at certain times/places he is 
Shaun-like and at others he is Shem-like.  
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 In an attempt to answer a question about how he would respond to his brother in which 
the question itself is set up as a response to what Shem would do about himself (“we don’t think, 
Jones, we’d care to this evening, would you?” (149.9-10), Shaun repeatedly rehearses possible 
answers from which he would like to distance himself. Yet, the answers are often littered with 
references to Shem. Shaun fails to actually distance himself from these positions, frequently 
instead positioning himself as occupying the same place as the philosophers, scientists, 
anthropologists, and (ultimately) Shem as well. The “dime and cash problem” is thus a 
reiteration of the way that sameness and difference play into the conflict between Shem and 
Shaun. Their conflict reduces to the affectation of the same substance as they seem to disappear 
into one another, and Joyce demonstrates in the process the way that affectation (family 
resemblance/inheritance) and affection underwrite fraternal conflict. 
 
Still Moving   
In Finnegans Wake, the printed word encapsulates the tension between time and space. It 
is static and yet leaking. It is something that does not itself change but that contains the 
generative possibility of multiple, changing linguistic meanings. This dynamic tension is 
nowhere more evident than in the graphic elements that occasionally appear in the novel. 
Formatted and typeset differently than every other section in the novel, the Nightlessons chapter 
is the most graphically dynamic section of Finnegans Wake. With the appearance of a heavily-
annotated textbook, the chapter features margins that are substantially larger than those found in 
the other chapters. Running alongside each margin are a set of annotations, one scholarly and 
serious in tone and the other juvenilely jocular. (The tone of each side switches halfway through 
the chapter like sides swapping ends at halftime in a soccer match.) Along the bottom are a set of 
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footnotes, whose tone remains wryly ironic throughout the chapter. These annotations and notes 
are written from the perspective of the children, with Shem and Shaun represented in the margins 
and Issy represented in the footnotes. A series of handwritten figures and notes appear near the 
end of the chapter. The contrast between these handwritten notes and the typed marginal 
annotations suggests that the children’s intrusions and commentaries on the text have been 
themselves somewhat authorized by the text itself, incorporated into its structure as if they are 
part of the lesson as well.  
 More than any other chapter, character is a function of the material dimension of 
language in this chapter. The pun on character as an actor in a narrative and character as a sign in 
an alphabet is foundational to Finnegans Wake, a novel in which characters are more masses of 
characteristics than persons and often identified by a variety of names that play off of their 
initials. The novel’s protagonist is variously Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker, Here Comes 
Everybody, etc. but always HCE. The novel’s many “sigla” are further examples of character as 
character. What began as an elaborate system of editorial marks evolved, through the 
composition process, into shorthand for identifying the archetypes that Joyce used as characters. 
This manuscript shorthand eventually found its way onto the page in a series of marks that could 
not be typed. Their status as un-typable symbols is significant because they function as 
something like hieroglyphics, a kind of pictoral language in which the signs are not related 
directly to sound. In the Nightlessons chapter, the lexicon of this pictoral language is greatly 
expanded to include a host of other symbols including the logic notation for “conclusion” and the 
Euclidian diagram that Shem and Shaun draw of their mother’s body. Through this expansion, 
the pictoral dimension of the novel’s language becomes directly mapped onto the body, leaving 
the character/character pun behind in favor of a character/body relationship.  
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As the narrative perspective closes in on the Earwickers’ pub at the start of the 
nightlessons chapter, HCE is described as “Length Without Breath, of him, a chump of the 
evums” (261.13-14). Though “Length Without Breath” is capitalized, it is the acrostic buried 
within the phrase that follows—“of him a chump of the evums”—that identifies the “he” as 
HCE. This description of HCE riffs on the closing lines of the Gloria Patri, with “world without 
end” changed to “length without breath.” The doxology describes the boundless extension of the 
godhead through time and space. God is the world without end. HCE embodies a comic deflation 
of this image, as his sleeping/dead body (complete with a nighttime erection) is stretched out 
across the landscape of Dublin. A line that originally describes God’s vitality as limitless being 
here becomes a humorous description of a publican whose corpse-like and aroused body is 
bloated and stretched to its limits.  
 Throughout Finnegans Wake, HCE’s body is described in terms of extension, through 
both space and time. Extension is often equated in these accounts with stillness. When the novel 
opens, the time of HCE is identified as that time when “rot a peck of pa’s malt had Jhem or Shen 
brewed by arclight” (03.23-34). The allusion to Noah (arclight; rainbow) suggests that this time 
is quite distant from the present, whenever that might be. And sometime between that far distant 
time and now HCE’s sons brew their father’s malt (seed). The continuation of his line—his 
extension in the bodies of his descendants and through time—is described as a distillation, 
brewing malt in a still. HCE is unnervingly present for his descendants. His body is all around 
them in the form of the landscape of Dublin and, through heredity, in their own persons. The 
implications of his fall in Pheonix Park are still present for all of them as well. He extends 
through time into the physical world that his descendants find themselves moving through. 
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 Stillness lurks behind every subject that the children study in the nightlessons chapter. 
From their opening obsession with heredity and race, to Issy’s desire to make her body move in 
ways that her parents find unbecoming and the twins’ attempt to flatten the movements of their 
mother’s body into the abstract planes of Euclidian geometry, stillness remains the governing 
problem of the children’s evening. Read in this context, the description of HCE as Length 
Without Breath suggests an important dynamic between breadth and breath. HCE, as a dead man 
or a man sleeping like the dead, is like the Dublin landscape insofar as he does not breathe. His 
body is not unlike the bodies of the dead soldiers in The Childermass with their irrational nerves. 
It is extension without an actual body. If we think of extension as persistence, however, as the 
continuation of life, then “stillness” without breath is impossible.  
 HCE’s bodily extension is often described as a kind of death. As the dreamer, he is 
either—and both—asleep and dead, literally buried as his body sinks into the landscape of 
Dublin and its environs. When his extension is described in terms of the continuation of his line, 
he often framed as an ancient ancestor of his more modern descendants. This ancestral extension 
is frequently signaled by HCE’s assumption of the role of a biblical archetype. He is Adam after 
the fall, Noah after the flood, or Abraham after his sons have seen him in his nakedness. In the 
nightlessons chapter, this deadness is evident in his role as the expanding universe, a largely cold 
and lifeless place that is nonetheless constantly expanding. Mamalujo (one the novel’s many 
narrative voices) has been “told, on excellent inkbottle authority, solarsystemised, 
seriolcosmically, in a more and more almightily expanding inniverse under one, there is 
rhymeless reason to believe, original sun” (263.23-27). There is something incestuous in this 
ever-expanding universe, something that undermines reason and stymies systemic thinking. As 
the system grows, it seems to give us less and less reason to believe in anything at all—in the 
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fundamental importance of original sin (the big bang; HCE’s fall) for the descendants of the 
original sinner, in the son/sun as the descendant of something so cold and distant, in the 
mechanical laws of this universe that has lost the rhyme in its reason. In other words, Newtonian 
mechanics have failed us. The more we look into the almightily expanding inniverse, the more 
we find that the math has gotten a bit weird. Enter Einstein.  
We need a language—and Joyce seems to understand Einstein as providing a new 
mathematical language for understanding abstract space—that can give us a way of 
understanding HCE’s length without breadth. “Universe” refers to the unification (uni; whole) of 
all movement (verse; turn). In HCE we find the inverse of what we expect in the physical world: 
an unturning, a surprisingly dead stillness. Length without brea(d)th. We need a new language 
for this physical world that seems to invert our understanding of space and time. Verse as 
language. A language that can be as flexible as space-time, literally expanding to accommodate 
extra characters and the surprising etymological implications that accompany them.  
HCE is described as lifeless embodiment, while his wife, ALP, is described as life 
breaking through and resisting the lifelessness of static representation. If we think of HCE as a 
comic enactment of Wyndham Lewis’s irrational nerve, then ALP seems to be Joyce’s humorous 
response to Lewis’s highly masculine model of embodiment. The initial descriptions of ALP’s 
body frame her as a Grecian ideal. “Lead us seek,” the boys say to each other, “light us find, les 
us missnot Maidadate, Mimosa multimimetica, the maymeaminning of maimooneining, Elpis, 
thou fountaion of the greeces, all shall speer theeward from kongen in his canteenhus to knives 
hind the knoll” (267.1-6). The fountain of the graces, ALP is here a Grecian figure. If HCE is 
where the boys came from, ALP is here the end towards which they spear. Her figure is 
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aspirational in a second sense as well, however. As “multimimetica,” she embodies the idea of 
duplication. As ideal, her body signifies mimesis.  
 In a wry footnote to the phrase “all speer theeward,” Issy subversively repeats her 
brothers’ description of their mother: “Mannequens’ Pose” (267 F2). She comically deflates the 
boys’ ideal of femininity to the statue of a young boy pissing, suggesting as she does that there is 
something crass and artificial (pose) in the image that the boys’ have created of their mother. 
Artificiality is further suggested by the transposition of manneken into mannequin. Like HCE, 
dead and buried across the landscape of Dublin, here ALP is plastic and lifeless, placed into a 
pose that ill fits the biological functions of her body. If the boys want to flatten their mother into 
a posed figure, Issy is quick to remind them that this mannequin pisses, that this posed figure 
resists being made static. Importantly, it does so through humor.  
 This questioning of the stillness of this Grecian ideal alludes to Keats’ “still unravish’d 
bride of quietness,” that “foster-child of silence and slow time, / Sylvan historian, who canst thus 
express / A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme” (“Ode to a Grecian Urn” 1-4). The bride 
is still in both the sense of being an image painted on an urn and still unravished. Her time, 
however, is not at a standstill, but moving on a different scale than that of the poet. She is the 
foster-child of slow time, a historian telling a story through image. The slow decay of the 
physical medium in which she works that is more effective than that told in language by the poet. 
Stillness in this context is persistence, and to persist you cannot remain motionless. To continue 
to exist you have to change. The bride tells her story through the slow material degradation of 
her image on the urn.  
 The mannequin pisses because it too is a still bride of quietness. A few passages earlier, 
Izolde (a figure who in Finnegans Wake often represents the transition between young girl and 
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woman, daughter and mother, Issy and ALP) is described as being “an litlee plads af liefest 
pose” (265.14). The acrostic of ALP is repeated twice across the phrase, signaling that ALP is in 
this description of Izolde. The younger woman is depicted as a leafy place being that has been 
described with a lisp, two further hints that ALP is present here as she is often identified with the 
soft lisping noises of the passing waters of the River Liffey in Dublin. Life (liefest) is in this 
place of peaceful repose, and yet there is a lie in this posed stillness as well. These images of 
ALP as still or posed embody a tension between a kind of persistence that is life-giving and an 
imposed idealization that deadens her. Seeing and speaking are contrasted here in gendered 
terms. Looking seems to be associated with masculinity, a kind of flattening of the female body 
that arrests vitality in the creation of an image. Speaking, however, seems to resist this 
perspective. The image of the leafy place is spoken with a lisp, a characteristic typically 
associated in the novel with female characters. This is a synaesthetic model of language. The 
body imposes itself onto the abstract world of linguistic meaning by modifying the way that 
words sound, enacting in the process a kind of resistance to way that the boys flatten their 
mother’s body. The liefest place is a lie; the image of peace and stillness is revealed as a place of 
lifelessness as well.  
 
Sigla—the space between writing and animating 
 The tension is perhaps most evident in the novel’s most graphically experimental 
moment, the inclusion of a Euclidian diagram that is both the lesson that the boys are studying 
and an image of their mother’s body. Though HCE is more frequently associated with extension 
in space, ALP’s siglum suggests that she represents the intersection of space and time. A delta, 
ALP’s siglum evokes both the fertile combination of soil and water at the mouth of a river and a 
   
 154 
woman’s pubic hair. It recalls Leopold Bloom’s daydream of Molly’s pubic hair that was 
provoked by the red triangle on the label of a bottle of Bass Ale and that, “after a myriad 
metamorphoses of symbol, […] blazes, Alpha, a ruby and triangled sign upon the forehead of 
Taurus.” Like Bloom’s vision, ALP’s siglum is constantly undergoing a myriad metamorphoses 
of symbol. It is triangle, delta (letter), delta (landmass at river mouth), hair, vulva, pair of legs, 
etc. In each of these versions, Δ is defined by the way it moves. Unlike HCE’s sleeping body, 
which is laid across the landscape of Dublin as he sleeps, ALP’s body seems to be always in 
movement. It is always “lurking gyrographically” (292.28-9), its geographic significance lying in 
its gyrations. The allusion to Yeats’s gyres is provocative not only because of the playfully 
sexual implication of gyrating gyres, but also because it provides Joyce with a way of thinking 
through abstract geometric figures as representing movement.  
 A swirling mass of symbols is invoked to describe this movement in the nightlessons 
chapter. The twins are trying to understand the first proposition in Euclid’s Elements: the 
construction of an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line. As they do so, however, they 
begin to playfully confuse geometry and algebra. “Allow me,” one brother says to the other, 
“And, heaving alljawbreakical expressions out of old Sare Isaac’s universal of specious 
aristmystic unsaid, A is for Anna like L is for liv. Aha hahah, Ante Ann you’re apt to ape aunty 
annalive!” (293.26-30). The line from A to L is the finite straight line, the line that will later on 
be used to demonstrate that the equilateral triangle can be flipped down to make a mirror image 
of itself. In drawing a line from A to L, the brother has to invoke “alljawbreakical expressions,” 
substituting symbol (letter) for variable (body). This process seems to “break” his jaw, linking 
the act of speaking to the body. The left-hand marginalia, now adopting the mock-academic tone 
of the right-hand marginalia, describes this substitution as “The Vortex. Spring of Sprung Verse. 
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The Vertex” (citation needed). An allusion to Vorticisim, this comment suggests that movement 
exercises a magnetic control over language, pulling it into what one brother calls the “Vertex.” 
The search for a geometric proof here becomes also a search for their own origins, as the boys 
find in this Vertex “Uteralterance or the Interplay of Bones in the Womb.” The triangle becomes 
their mother’s uterus, inside of which they were both uttered and altered. The interplay of bones 
suggests not only the co-existence of two bodies within a third (twins in their mother’s womb), 
but also the inter(course/play) of bone (penis) in womb that produced them. Interplay is also 
uteralterance, a linguistic alterity lurking gyrographically behind the symbols that represent their 
mother’s body.   
 ALP’s body is thus often presented in the language of mathematics, not just in the 
figurative sense of being described as a mathematical problem but also in sense of requiring a 
specialized set of mathematical symbols to describe. Moreover, ALP’s body seems to break the 
mathematical languages available to us, a breaking that is felt in the body of the person doing the 
description. Her body breaks the boys’ jaws as they try to fit it into the terminology of algebra. It 
is precisely this conjunction of body and language that is at stake in the chapter’s repeated 
descriptions of ALP as mathematical problem. This conjunction is evident throughout the novel 
in the form of sigla. Finn Fordham has argued that  
such ‘characters,’ fertile in their associations, were designed to be able to expand 
into ‘principles,’ and this potential to expand is partly ensured because their 
original designation as signal was non-lettristic, and therefore potentially 
hieroglyphic in their significance: as sillouettes they could become dead ends, 
cross-roads, bridges, girls tying shoe laces, etc. (“Sigla in Revision” 89) 
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Non-lettristic characters, the sigla are able to expand into organizing principles for the novel 
because they are graphically suggestive. They are as much image as character and so function as 
one of the novel’s many nods towards hieroglyphics, pictorial languages, and other non-
alphabetic systems of writing. The example of ALP’s aljawbreakical body, however, suggests 
that these characters are hieroglyphic particularly insofar as they are haptic.  
 
Figure 11: The boys' drawing 
 The act of looking at the illustration of their mother’s body is a powerfully haptic moment 
for the boys. As Shem draws his brother into his scheme, Shaun exclaims that the joke “makes us 
a daintical pair of accomplasses” (295.26-27). They are a pair of identical legs in the compass 
that traces the outline of their mother’s body. Their camaraderie, however, also seems to make 
them feminine—dainty lasses. This statement suggests that the act of looking not only involves 
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the voyeur’s body but changes it as well. Such a suggestion is further evidenced by the allusion 
here to their father’s supposed crime in Phoenix Park, an act of voyeurism that surely makes 
HCE’s body complicit as he becomes sexually aroused by the sight of either a pair of legs or a 
pair of girls urinating. Looking is a bodily action—or, rather, it makes one’s body complicit 
through arousal, stooping, or otherwise physically engaging with the thing been viewed. But how 
is it that voyeurism makes the male body effeminate, especially when the voyeurism seems to be 
patently masculine in its sexual aims? The answer lies in the way that the pair of daintical 
accomplasses move. One “leg” presumably pivots on a center point, while the other circles 
around it. In this metaphor, the two legs function like those of a dancer performing a pirouette à 
la seconde, an image that recalls the sigla for Issy that imagines her body as a dancer’s legs.9 The 
accomplasses move in order to create their mother’s legs, with the center points representing 
something like her bones and the circles representing her legs’ circular motion in an abstract 
sense. The intersection of the two circles signifies her genitals.  
 The movement of the accomplasses suggests another image, one further emphasized by 
Shem’s request that his brother “Watch!” The implied center points in the middle of the compass 
circles suggest that the legs not only trace the outline of the circles, but also move around them 
like hands on a watch face. The circles are of course also glasses, and so the evocation of an 
image that has hands and a face implies that the voyeur’s body is present here alongside 
(superimposed on?) the mother’s body. The boys, it would seem, are not only accomplices to 
each other, but also to their mother, to whose body they are linked by the act of gawking. This 
                                                
9 Fordham argues that the sigla “can be seen as dancing forms: K dancing the cancan kick, Issy a 
ballerina stretching at the bar, etc” (89). We can extend this idea further by thinking about ballet 
as a kind of language of dance, with a defined “dictionary” of set moves that are combined to 
form clever sequences not unlike the combinations of words created by poets.  
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linking of voyeur and object/victim is particularly apt given the boys’ initial interest in looking at 
their mother’s body. Their exercise begins as an inquiry into the problem of sexual difference. 
Looking across at each other, Shem, Shaun, and their sister Issy seem to wonder, “how is it that 
we look so different but come from the same person?”   
 Looking here feels positively Lewisian, recalling the way that looking at other bodies 
makes one complicit in a kind of violence in The Childermass. In Men Without Art, Lewis says 
that he is “for the wisdom of the eye, rather than that of the ear” (105). He privileges vision over 
sound, space over time. As we have already seen, Joyce genders these categories, associating 
looking with a masculine appreciation of the body and hearing/speaking with a female 
perspective. The example of the Shem and Shaun tracing the abstract representation of their 
mother’s body with their compass introduces another category of experience. We do not merely 
see, hear, and speak language. We also touch it.  
 There is a tactile quality to the language of Finnegans Wake that is epitomized by the 
unpronounceable, untypable sigla. Sentences in the Wake are polyrhythmic, blending speech 
patterns, song structures, and religious incantation. Particularly in group settings, readers are 
often surprised to find that they have stumbled into a familiar phrase or way of speaking. These 
new and strangely familiar meanings arise from a haptic negotiation of the novel’s language, as a 
reader’s mouth forms around extra characters and tries to organize those sounds into expected 
patterns. Readers often try out versions of a particular word or phrase multiple times. They 
literally try on different possible versions of the language through the ways that their mouths 
grasp after meaning.  
 Sigla and other symbolic depictions of bodies in the Wake invite a similar kind of haptic 
reading practice. Unpronounceable and unfamiliar, they are aberrations in a novel that otherwise 
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invites its readers to try on different modes of speaking and hearing. While they can be seen but 
not spoken, they are ultimately characters inserted into the text. These extra characters refuse to 
be incorporated into the linguistic play of the novel as the other extra characters are. They almost 
function like errant punctuation marks. As the example of Shem and Shaun demonstrates, they 
dramatize the act of haptic reading in a way that emphasizes the way that gender and sexual 
difference impact the way that we read and make meaning out of bodies.  
 
*  *  * 
 
This project originally developed as a way to make sense of the language of Finnegans Wake, 
with its playfully comic approach to meaning and its insistent tactile quality. By the 1930s, Joyce 
was writing in an increasingly self-reflexive mode. The Wake is stuffed with allusions to his 
previous work, to the work of Wyndham Lewis, and to the intellectual and artistic precursors to 
literary modernism. It is a curiously backward-looking document, a novel that is in part about the 
project of intellectual modernism. By way of closing, then, I want to use this idea of haptic 
reading from Joyce to think about the legacy and development of visual comic practice of 
modernist writing.  
 Each of the texts discussed in this project invites readers to consider their own ethical 
implication in the act of reading. Fraught and often uncomfortable, laughter is the vehicle 
through which these texts invite the reader to consider the relationship between his body and the 
bodies on the page. What Joyce makes visible is the haptic element of this kind of writing. Or 
perhaps it is more accurate to say that he makes visible the increasing presence of the reader’s 
body on the page of Anglophone modernism. Mirrlees’s reader negotiates an unconventional 
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page through vertigo. Lewis’s reader is invited to join him in a bizarre comedy of revulsion. 
Bowen’s reader negotiates complex syntax in the construction of a meta-comic style of gendered 
embodiment. Joyce’s reader finds that the novel’s characters have crammed themselves into his 
mouth as he tries to read the overstuffed language.  
 And after all, what is laughter in literature if not a haptic experience—something that 
erupts the reader’s body onto the page in a disruptive celebration of signification in excess of 
easily categorized meaning.  
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